


STUDIES ON  
KṚṢṢADĒVARĀYA  
OF VIJAYANAGARA

*(Thesis approved for the  
Ph. D. Degree of the Andhra University, 1946)*

BY

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## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In the following pages I have attempted to clarify and solve some of the problems that arise out of a study of Kṛṣṇadēvarāya's reign in Vijayanagara. I do not presume that mine will be the last word on the subject. But it is an original attempt, in so far as originality means an independent evaluation of facts.

These studies start with the rise of Tuluva Narasa Nayaka to power as the Regent of the Empire and take us to the end of Kṛṣṇarāya's reign. My work is more a discussion than a narrative in form. I have, however, taken care to include all the relevant political events, so that the reign of Kṛṣṇarāya is presented fairly completely and in its chronological sequence. The arrangement of the work has made some repetition inevitable. But I hope this repetition is about the minimum required.

Great is my debt to the host of scholars, the pioneers and luminaries in this field of historical research. Wherever I failed to accept their conclusions, I did so with extreme reluctance. In the more recent publication, *FURTHER SOURCES OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY*, Dr. N. Venkataramanayya tried to fix in great detail the date of Kṛṣṇadēvarāya's coronation on a Sri Jayanti day. But this is based on tradition which is admittedly of a later century. I may, therefore, be excused if I prefer contemporary epigraphical evidence to any tradition.

(ii)

I am greatly indebted to Prof. G. Venket Rao, Head of the Department of History and Politics, Andhra University, who directed these studies throughout. I cannot adequately thank Sri M. Somasekhara Sarma, but for whose inspiring encouragement I could not have resumed these studies which I had given up for years.

In all humility, I acknowledge the kindly word of encouragement from Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India. He found time to go through my typescript and bless my efforts to secure its publication. His blessings have borne fruit, and to him I am deeply grateful.

I am very much beholden to Kalaprapūrṇa Sri Sri Rajāh Venkata Rangarao, Rajah of Munagāla, whose princely donation to the University to institute the Emperor Kṛṣṇadēvarāya Research Fellowship in History yielded the funds necessary for this publication. Blessed is he whose wisdom, ripening with years, enthuses others to take to historical research.

I offer my sincere thanks to the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate of the Andhra University whose deep interest in Research in various fields is well-known. I deem it a great privilege that this book is included among the University publications.

My thanks are due to Sri A. Nagenwara Rao, Proprietor of the Saraswathi Power Press, for his fine effort to give my work the present form.

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Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.

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Vijayanagara Commemoration Volume.

## ABBREVIATIONS

A. R.	Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy. (Numbers such as 180 of 1913 refer to particular inscriptions in this work.)
A. S. R.	Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India.
Barbosa.	The Book of Duarte Barbosa.
Commentaries.	Commentaries of Afonso Dalboquerque.
E. C.	Epigraphia Carnatica.
E. I.	Epigraphia Indica.
F. E.	Forgotten Empire by R. Sewell.
H. R.	Hindustan Review.
I. A.	Indian Antiquary.
I. H. R.	Indian Historical Quarterly.
J. A. H. R. S.	Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society.
J.B. & O.R.S.	Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
J. I. H.	Journal of Indian History.
J. O. R.	Journal of Oriental Research.
J. R. A. S.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Portuguese or Danvers.	Portuguese in India by Danvers, F. C.
Purchas	Purchas : His Pilgrims, Vol. x.
Q. J. M.	Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society.
Report	Report on the Portuguese Records relating to the East Indies by Danvers, F. C.

(x)

S. I. I.	South Indian Inscriptions.
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T. T.	Tirupati-Tirumalai Devasthanam Inscriptions, Reported by S. Subrahmanya Sàstry.
V. R.	Topographical List of the inscriptions of the Madras Presidency, by V. Rangachari.

*"There is no man, however feeble or insufficient his resources, who does not essay. According to his nature, he questions or recoils before that mystery. With some it has the effect of repressing; with others, it enlarges the Soul"*

*"Is the night calm and cloudless? It is then a depth of shadow. Is it stormy? It is then a sea of cloud. Its limitless deeps reveal themselves to us, and yet baffle our gaze; close themselves against research, but open to conjecture."*

*'Toilers of the Sea.'*

## CHAPTER I

### WHEN TULUVA NARASA BECAME REGENT

Srīmad Rājādhirāja, Rājaparamēśwara, Praudha-pratāpa, Saluva Narasinga Rāya began to rule from Vijayanagara from the year 1486 A. D. The inscription from Tumkur<sup>1</sup> giving him the supreme titles of sovereignty is dated Nov. 1, of that year, while the last of the Sangamas, Dēvarāya Maharāya Virupāksha Praudha Dēva Maharāya appears to have been still ruling in July 1485 A. D.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the Saluva usurpation in Vijayanagara must have occurred sometime in between. The master architect of Saluva ascendancy was Tuluva Narasa Nayaka, who captured the capital city for his master, the reigning monarch having fled the city.<sup>3</sup> Saluva Nṛsiṃha came to recognise in Narasa Nayaka the main pillar of his empire; he had helped him win the vast kingdom at the point of the sword. And if the past glory of the empire were to be restored and its unity perpetuated, the empire would stand in no small need of the warrior and minister, Tuluva Narasa Nayaka.

There was soon occasion for calling on Narasa Nayaka to undertake this great responsibility. Saluva

1. E. O. Tumkur No. 54.

2. E. O. Malbagal, 104; See also S. I. I. No. 190.

3. Nandis, P. H. p. 307; PĀRIJĀTAPAHARAṆAMU, SOURONIS, p. 107.

## KRṢNADEVARĀYA

Nṛsimha's conquests were almost all made before he became king. If there were any subsequently effected, they were not of the character to have made him the undisputed sovereign of all the lands that had originally belonged to Vijayanagara.

Besides Goa and the surrounding territory, there still remained three important fortresses to be taken—"Rachol, Odegary and Conadolgi".<sup>4</sup> These had large and rich territories and were the principal forts in the kingdom. But, for Saluva Nṛsimha, the time for their capture was past. For, his end drew near. And "this king (Narsymgua), before he died, sent to call Narsenaque, his minister, and held converse with him, telling him that at his death, he would by testament leave him to govern the kingdom until the princes should be of an age to rule; ... .. and the king begged him to keep good guard over the kingdom and to deliver it up to the princes, to whichever of them should prove himself most fitted for it. And after the king's death this Narsenaque remained as governor, and soon he raised up the prince to be king, retaining in his own hands the treasures and revenues and the government of the country."<sup>5</sup>

Thus began Tuluva Narasa Nayaka's regency of the empire. But we have still to ascertain that eventful year which saw the close of the effective rule of the Saluvas and in which the beginning of yet another usurpation, this time by the Tuluvas, were made. The

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4. Raichūr, Udayagiri and probably Kondavidu

5. Naniz, F. E. p. 203.

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consensus of opinion is that Saluva Nrsimha reigned as emperor for about seven years and died either at the end of A. D. 1492 or at the beginning of the following year, at any rate before January 27, 1493 A. D.<sup>6</sup>

The available evidence, however, seems to point to a slightly different conclusion and we have to assign the death of the first Saluva monarch to the first half of 1491 A. D. In this connection, inscriptions are uncertain guides and a mere similarity of name or title is no safe basis for purposes of identification. Hence we have to look for other sources of information, bearing on our present enquiry. Nuniz and Ferishta alone make some attempt to depict the history of these difficult times. Even there we find statements contradicting one another. Within this resultant maze, therefore, one has to strive for historical fact-finding.

In the last moments of his life, Saluva Nrsimha was apparently a helpless witness to the great changes that were rocking the neighbouring Bahmuni kingdom. Consequent on the assassination of Khwajah Jehan Muhmūd Gawān in 1481 A. D., the two factions of

6. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar: A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER IN VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY, pp. 54 and 68. See also Sowell, J. R. A. S. 1915. Mr. C. Hayavadanrao, the editor of Mysore Gazetteer, believes that Saluva Nrsimha died about 1498 A. D. See Op. Cit., Vol. II pt. III, Chap. XI, pp. 1693-1710. Mr S. Subrahmanya Sastri argues that Saluva Nrsimha was no usurper at all, and that his rule extended to 1498 A. D. See T. T. D. Report, pp. 146-47.



the Dakhanis and the Habshis joined battle on the issue as to who should seize the reins of government, now so loosely held by the young Sultan Mahmūd Shah. The latter was unable to resolve the conflicts. At last he entered into a treaty with Kāsim Bārid, giving him the rank of Mir-i-Jumla, and making him the virtual ruler of the Dakhan. This was the signal for a general revolt and of the disruption of the Bahmuny kingdom as such. We have it from Ferishta<sup>7</sup> that Yūsuf Adil Khān caused the Khutba to be read in his name in A. H. 895 i.e., Nov. 1489-Nov. 1490 A. D.

Yūsuf followed this up by wresting many forts from the Governors of Muḥmūd Shah and he subdued all the country from the river Bheema to Bijapur.

This rise of Yūsuf to independent power was most disagreeable to Kāsim Bārid, the *de facto* ruler of the kingdom. For he had himself entertained hopes of founding a kingdom at Bijapur. He now wrote to the Rāya of Vijayanagara that Mahmūd Shah Bahmuny would willingly cede him the forts of Raichūr and Mudkal if he would wrest them from Yūsuf Adil Khān. At the same time he addressed letters to Bahādur Geelany, who possessed Goa, and Konkan, inviting him to invade Yūsuf's territory.

Kāsim's invitation was most welcome to Vijayanagara. But the Rāya was "a child"<sup>8</sup> and could

7. Briggs, Vol. III, pp. 9-10.

8. Scott translates Ferishta thus, "The Roy, being a child, his minister Heemraaje, sent an army." - Quoted from Sewall, F. B. p. 111. Brigg's translation is slightly different. It is stated there that "the Ray, being a child, deputed his minister, Timraj," Vol. II, p. 538.



not personally lead the expedition. But he would not forego this great opportunity. So with great despatch he collected an army and Timrāj, one of the generals of Vijayanagara, led it northwards.

An unqualified success attended the Vijayanagara arms on the occasion. As Ferishta writes "Timrāj, the general of the Ray of Beejanuggur, having crossed the river Toongbudra laid waste the country as far as Moodkul and Rachore; and Bahadur Geelany reduced the fortress of Jumkindy. Yooseof Adil Khan was too weak to repel these attacks by force. He accordingly made peace with Timrāj, and expelled Bahadur Geelany from the dominion; but without attempting to recover Jumkindy, led his army, composed of eight thousand foreigners, towards the capital against Kasim Bereed."<sup>9</sup>

Yūsuf's assertion of independence, his conquest of a wide region, and the settling up of the whole area, all these are ascribed by Ferishta to the year A. H. 895 (Nov. 1489 to Nov. 1490 A. D.). At the end he adds that Yūsuf being "*subsequently* joined by many Deccany officers, who had formerly deserted him on his retiring from Ahmālabād Bidur, *his power daily increased.*"<sup>10</sup> These events must have occupied not only the whole of the year, A. H. 895, but some of the initial months of A. H. 896 as well. Kasim Bārid's invitation to Vijayanagara must, there-

9. Briggs, III, p. 10.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10. The Italics are mine.

fore, be ascribed to A. H. 896. In that year, presiding over the extensive dominions of the Vijayanagara empire, there was, according to Ferishta, a mere "child".

Robert Sewell resolutely disputes Ferishta's observations that at that time the Rāya was so small of years.<sup>11</sup> To agree with Ferishta in this particular would be to concede that by A. H. 896, Saluva Nṛsimha had already been dead and one of his sons occupying the throne. But in fairness to Ferishta we must observe that he was not insistent that the prince was so very tender of age. For according to the same writer, by February of 1493 A. D., scarcely two years later, the ruler was old enough to be "young".<sup>12</sup> Yet, the exact details regarding the king's youth are not very material to our argument. On both the occasions, both in A.H. 896 and in A. H. 898, whether he were a child or a youth, one and the same individual was ruling over the kingdom of Vijayanagara. Ferishta would have him young. And by no stretch of imagination, could Sāluva Nṛsimha be termed a young man, were he still alive and reigning in A. H. 896. Whoever was the king, he could not be Sāluva Nṛsimha.

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11. J. R. A. S. 1915. Here Sewell discusses Immadi Nṛsimha's age and maintains that he was already a father, ruling over the Tippur Sima. He takes this stand on the basis of inscriptions. E. C. X., Gd. 80 & E. C. IX, D-R. Nos. 42 and 45. Sadhu S. Subrahmanya S'astry holds similar opinion of Immadi Nṛsimha's age on the basis of T. T. Inscription No. 197 - See T. T. D. Report, p. 147.

12. Briggs, III. p. II. Referring to 1498 A. D. Ferishta styles the King "the young Ray".

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Here we may suggest that Ferishta read with Nuniz would simplify the problem a good deal. We have already seen how, Yūsuf lost to Vijayanagara the fortresses of Raichūr and Mudkal in A. H. 896 or 1491 A. D. Vijayanagara enjoyed undisturbed possession of these forts until the beginning of 1493 A. D. But in that year, Ferishta informs us, Yūsuf "marched to retake Rachore." <sup>13</sup>

Now, according to Nuniz, Rāichūr was one of those three forts which Saluva Nṛsimha had longed to possess, but failed, time proving too short and fleet. Nuniz writes, "At the death of that king, there remained three fortresses which had *revolted* from his rule, and which *he was never able to take*, which were these - Rachol, and Odegary and Conadolgi, which have large and rich territories and are the principal forts in the kingdom." <sup>14</sup> The term "Revolt" need not mislead us. It could not have occurred subsequent to A. D. 1491. For had Rāichūr revolted after that date, Nṛsimha "was never able to take" it back. And wherefore should Yūsuf try to recover it in the very next engagement over Raichūr in 1493 A. D. ? Nor could the revolt have taken place prior to A. D. 1491 either. For in that case, Nṛsimha was able to take it in A. D. 1491. Then why those regrets during his last converse with Narasa Nayaka that for him the time for its capture was past ? Anterior to this year, throughout

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13. *ibid.*

14. *E. K.* pp. 307 - 308.

the long career of Saluva Nṛsimha as general, minister, semi-independent ruler and *de jure* sovereign, on no occasion do we find him opposed to the Bahmuny or any other Moslem forces, with the seizure of Raichūr as his objective. The "Revolt" therefore, was merely theoretical in that Vijayanagara had always claimed sovereignty over the whole of the Kṛṣṇā-Tungabhadra doab with its fortresses of Raichūr and Mudkal. In that sense, therefore, Raichūr remained in revolt until after the death of Saluva Nṛsimha, when Narasa Nayaka effected the seizure of the fort in 896 A. H. It stands to reason, therefore, to presume that Saluva Nṛsimha must have died about the first half of the year 1491 A. D.

Inscriptions of the period wholly bear out our conclusion. An inscription from Chaulikeri of the Udipi taluk in S. Kanara <sup>15</sup> refers to Narasingarāya Mahārāya as the reigning king. It is dated in Saka 1412 (exp.) Saka 1413 (current) Śādharaṇa, Kartika, Śu. (1)- Oct. 14, 1490 A. D. From Bowringpet hails a record dated in Saka 1412, and referring to one "Kaṭṭari Saluva." <sup>16</sup> This title was borne by Saluva Nṛsimha, the father of Immadi Nṛsimha. Later kings and even Chiefs took the same title. But since no earlier inscription of Immadi Nṛsimha with that title is yet available, we may assume that by "Kaṭṭari Saluva" of the Bowringpet inscription is meant Sāluva Nṛsimha I. He was still reigning on 14th January, 1491 A. D., " and

15. 269 of 1981 - 2.

16. H. O., X. Bowringpet, No. 14.

17. 414 of 1928 - 29 from Ponnūr, Wandiwash Taluk, N. Arcot.

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upto that year we find no inscriptions that mention any of his sons either as the ruler or as a provincial governor. In this latter capacity appears Sāluva Immaḍi Nṛsimha in an inscription found in the Chennakēśava Pagoda, Chāgalamarri, in the Sirvāl taluk of the Kurnool District. It appears to have been of the first of his records and is dated in Saka 1413, Virōdhikṛt (March 10, 1491 to Feb. 27, 1492.)<sup>18</sup> By Jan. 27, 1493 A. D. we obtain several inscriptions mentioning Srīman' Mahāmandalēsvara, Pascima Samudradhipati, Kaṭṭari Sāluva Immaḍi Nara-singa Rāyaru.<sup>19</sup> Evidently his elder brother was in Vijayanagara getting himself initiated into statecraft under the expert guidance of Tuluva Narasa Nayaka. If this be the position, then, the interval between *14th January* 1491 and the cyclic year Virōdhikṛt that begins on *March 10* of the same Christian year must have seen the last days of Sāluva Nṛsimha's reign and also the rise of Tuluva Narasa Nayaka to power as the Regent of the empire of Vijayanagara.

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18 INSCRIPTIONS OF THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY: V. Ranga-chari, Vol. II Kurnool 602.

19. E. O. Mg. 54 and 56. See also Kolur 34; Mg. 50; 736 of 1909; 516 of 1906.



## CHAPTER II

### DISSENSIONS

The year 1491 opened dismally for Saluva Nrsimha for he knew he would not live much longer. Next to him, Tuluva Narasa Nāyaka was the most powerful man in the whole kingdom. His own sons were not so very young. But in case Narasa Nāyaka chose to oppose their interests, they would make no headway at all. Not that Saluva Nrsimha was afraid of that eventuality. Yet nothing would be better if Narasa's loyalty to the Saluva family could be further cemented. The best way was to make him realise the implicit faith the king placed in his self-less uprightness. So the king sent for him, gave him all the royal treasures and his own two sons as wards, with the injunction that one of them should be raised to the throne. Even this last was not stipulated in so many terms. Narasa was told that he could be trusted to select, and that in good time, whichever of the two princes would prove worthier of that most responsible role of the emperor of Vijayanagara. Narasa's finer emotions were deeply stirred. "Much loved as being a man of much justice,"<sup>1</sup> Narasa would prove that he had his heart in the right place. So, "soon he raised up the prince to be king."<sup>2</sup>

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1. Nuniz, F. E. p. 310.

2. *ibid*, p. 308.

But this prince was obviously only the king-designate. We learn nothing of his coronation. Even his name still remains unknown. Manifestly Narasa expressed his readiness to recognise the older of the princes as the future sovereign and probably initiated him into the intricacies of the administration of the empire. It was about this time that Kasim's invitation to invade Bījapur was received in Vijayanagara. Most eagerly Narasa Nāyaka responded to the call, in as much as it provided him an opportunity to achieve, even partly, what his late master had always longed for.

It appears that Narasa Nāyaka did not personally lead his armies into action.<sup>3</sup> But the victory was as much the Regent's as it was the general's. And it was a great victory too. For Yūsuf Adil Khan himself confessed later in A.H. 908 (1502 A.D.) to the Council of his principal subjects that when Timraj and Bahadur Geelany invaded his territories, they "nearly seized the reins of govern-

3. As regards this, Ferishta has been translated differently by Scott and Briggs. Scott has it that Hoemraja, the Minister sent an army (i. pp. 190 & 210). Briggs translates that the king deputed his minister Timraj, against Yūsuf (ii, p. 588). But in the same context, while describing the history of the Adil Shahis, he calls him "the general of the Ray of Beejanuggur" (iii, p. 10.) In all cases, Briggs has him only as "Timraj". But with reference to events of early 1498 A. D., he styles him as "the minister" (iii, p. 11). Was it that he was referring to the same individual throughout, who was both minister and general of Vijayanagara? Besides Narasa Nāyaka, Vijayanagara had more such minister-generals. Or was he trying to distinguish Timraj, the general from Timraj, the minister?

( *f. n. Continued* )

ment from his hands." <sup>4</sup> It was evidently this same exploit that Fr. Luis, the ambassador at Krṣṣnadēvarāya's court, recalled in his letter to Dalboquerque, the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa, in 1510 A. D. Therein the ambassador explained why Krṣṣnaraya would not believe that Ismael Ādil Shāh would keep faith with him. Ismael's would be only that punie faith "which his father had shown towards the King of Narasinga when he took him in battle but released him on his promise to serve him for ever." <sup>5</sup> The Telugu works *Parijatāpaharaṇamu* <sup>6</sup> and *Bālabhagavatamu* <sup>7</sup> and the Sanskr̥t works *Acyutarāyābhyaṇḍayam* <sup>8</sup> and *Varadāmbikāpariṇayam*, <sup>9</sup> all reliable sources of information, speak of this great victory of Narasa over the ruler of Bijapur. The last work confirms Fr.

(f. n. Continued from Page 11)

In the passage dealing with the war of A. H. 895 - 896, Scott mentions the name of "Ramaraṇja". This name does not occur again. Hence Sewell concludes that it was "a slip of the pen" (P. E. 111, n. 2) But if by "Ramaraṇja" Scott had referred to the leader of the Vijayanagara armies as distinct from "Heemaraṇja" the minister, and if the minister-captain Timraṇ of Briggs were the same Ramaraṇja - then we may observe that Scott was more correct. For we have it in Telugu literature that in these wars with Bijapur, one Ramaraṇja - Timmayya covered himself with glory (See above.)

4. Briggs, III, p. 22.

5. COMMENTARIES OF AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE, Vol. III, p. 38.

6. SOURCES, p. 107.

7. *ibid*, p. 207.

8. *ibid*, p. 109.

9. *ibid*, p. 175.



Luis and explains the real import of Yūsuf's statement that Timraj "nearly seized the reins of Government from his hands".

The battle of Mānuva<sup>10</sup> was quite decisive, for it was there that Yūsuf got so thoroughly beaten. But of the laurels of victory, one Timma or Timmaraju of Āravīṭi family would claim an equal share with the Tuluva Regent. The Balabhagavatamu of Kōṇērunatha has it that Timma defeated the Ēdula (Ādil) Khan at the battle of Mānuva.<sup>11</sup> This Timma was the son of Rāmaraju and grandson of Āravīṭi Bukka. Bukka was a great friend of Sāluva Nṛsimha. Like Tuluva Narasa's father, Iṣvara Nāyaka, Āravīṭi Bukka had fought several battles for his friend and Lord Sāluva Nṛsimha and got entitled "Sāluva Nara-simharāja Rājya Pratiṣṭhāpanacārya."<sup>12</sup> Like him, his son Rāmaraju won repute as a matchless swordsman and added glory to the army of Vijayanagara. His three sons, Timmaraju, Kondaṛaju and Rangaṛaju were appointed respectively to the fiefs of Avuku, Nandyala and Srīranga pattana. It was the eldest Timmaraju, also styled Rāmaraju - Timma, after his father, who led the Vijayanagara armies so successfully against Yūsuf Ādil Khan in A. H. 896. This triumph for Vijaya-

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10. The Telugu and Sanskrit works refer to the battle of Mānuva, in this context.

Mānuva is in the Bijapur territory - see SOURCES, p. 10 and also STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE THIRD DYNASTY OF VIJAYANAGARA, by Dr. N. Venkatarāmāyaṇa, Intro. xxxiii.

11. SOURCES, p. 207.

12. RĀMARAJIYAMU, SOURCES, p. 108.

nagara arms greatly added to Narasa Nāyaka's prestige and strengthened his position beyond compare. But he does not seem to have enjoyed this newly found power for a longer term than a couple of years. For early in 1493 A. D. Yūsuf Ādil Shāh found it very opportune to attack Vijayanagara, notwithstanding the peace he made with Timraj in 1491 A. D. As Ferishta states "On learning that dissensions prevailed in Beejanuggur, he marched to retake Rachore." <sup>13</sup>

The course of events in Vijayanagara during this brief space of two years is not easily traced. Any explanation offered is largely an appreciation of probabilities. But even probabilities cannot be judged in a vacuum. A diligent search must therefore be made for pointers that might exist in the situation.

Ferishta writes, "On reaching the banks of the Krishna, Yoosoof Adil Khan amused himself for some-time in hunting; but having brought on an ague and fever by exertion he was confined to his bed for two months; ..... In this interval Timraj the minister, having composed his disputes with the young Ray of Beejanuggur, advanced at the head of an army to Rachore,....." <sup>14</sup> It is clear, therefore, that the king and his minister were at odds with each other. Dr. S. Krishnaswamy Ayyangar seeks the origins of their differences and states:— "The general Narasa under the testament recorded by Nuniz, perhaps preferred Narasimha II to his older brother and nominated him. This would create an opposition

13. Briggs, III, p. II.

14. *ibid.*

and there would have been dissensions consequent upon this division, among the powerful nobles and generals of Vijayanagara, the first prince himself actively declining to be set aside. Narasa composed the difficulties by accepting the elder brother for the time being, the younger having his own following in the provinces directly under Narasa. " 15

But Narasa Nayaka could not have been so unversed in politics. Had he aspired for supreme power, he was beginning at the wrong end when he used his discretion, as Dr. Ayyangar would have us believe. Sāluva Nṛsimha's testament left the choice of the Emperor in Narasa's hands. By implication, it even reckoned upon the younger of his sons proving more capable, as certainly he did. For unlike his elder brother, Immadi Nṛsimha figures in a number of inscriptions even before he ascended the throne. *Ambition* would select the weaker for king and the first-born of Sāluva Nṛsimha was certainly not strong. But one may argue that Narasa was actuated by motives more honourable, and that his first selection was based purely on the needs of the empire. But then according to Dr. Ayyangar's showing, the older of the brothers could easily secure support from a very powerful section of the nobility and force Narasa to revise his earlier decision. Here is thus presented a Narasa, weak in judgement and of much vacillation, a striking contrast to the strong, silent general into whose safe keeping, the Great Sāluva Nṛsimha had left the fortunes of his own two sons and of his hard-won empire.

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15. A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER, p. 63.

We refuse to believe that Narasa Nāyaka was so dense of mind. He would not ignore the rights of the first-born, and thus obviously invest the opposition with a just cause to fight for. It mattered little if the prince were feeble. For Narasa himself would steer the state clear of all influences that might still work for its disruption. The causes for the dissensions must therefore be sought elsewhere. And we find them much simpler and more convincing.

We have already suggested that on the eve of the war of 1491 A. D., Narasa had designated the older of the two princes as king. Now that the war ended so favourably for Vijayanagara, the nobles must have looked forward for the coronation of the prince. But nothing like it was at all indicated. The disappointment was keen. Soon this yielded place to a sense of dismay when they found Narasa "retaining in his own hands the treasures and revenues and the government of the country."<sup>16</sup> What was worse, Immaḍi Nṛsimha, the only one who could be expected to raise his voice in strong protest against the strange doings of the Minister, was away from the Court.

The Chagalamarri inscriptions dated in the year Virōdhikṛt (10th March 1491 - 27th February 1492) presents Saluva Immaḍi Narasingarāya's Pradhān Timmarasa, granting a piece of land to God Chen nakēśava.<sup>17</sup> In another one from the same Kurnool District but from Nandyāl Taluq appears Immaḍi Nṛsimha donating a village to the temple of Gōpa

16. Nuniz, F. E. p. 308.

17. V. R. Kurnool 602.



in Chabolu, in Śaka 1415 Parīthāvi.<sup>18</sup> Evidently the prince was enjoying great freedom of action and was using it to further extend his influence further, for a Mudgere epigraph,<sup>19</sup> dated in Śaka 1414, Parīthāvi, Magh, Śu. 10 Sunday (January 27, 1493) styles him Srīman Mahāmandalēśwara, and Paścimasamudradhipati. Was the prince keeping his eyes open? Or was it a case of "needs must, when the devil drives?" Most disturbing thoughts these, specially so to the disgruntled nobles who had been helpless witnesses to the meteoric rise of Narasa Nayaka. Discontent in low whispers soon gained in volume and when it burst out in loud protests, Narasa had to cry halt to his political efforts and take stock of the situation. The prince was only suffered to be king. He must have all the time nursed his resentment in silence. But now that he saw so much opposition to Narasa, perhaps he openly stood out for his rights as king.

The Hindu capital was torn with dissensions. Vijayanagara's adversity was Bījapur's opportunity. Yūsuf Ādil Shāh marched his armies against the Vijayanagara dominions in an effort to recover the priceless forts of the doab. On reaching the banks of the Kṛṣṇā, however, he exerted himself so much that he became ill and perforce halted there for two months.

The situation was fraught with grave danger. To Narasa Nayaka, the volume of opposition to his

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18. *ibid* 516.

19. No. 54.

regency was as surprising as it was inexplicable. For at no time had it crossed his mind that he should snatch the throne for himself and thus emulate his late sovereign. Sāluva Nṛsimha was a good judge of men and Narasa stood true to the ideal set before him of maintaining the integrity of the Hindu empire. Sweet reasonableness would hardly be forthcoming from his political opponents. He must make some concessions to their opinion, close up his ranks and offer a united opposition to the invading hosts of the enemy.

Yūsuf's illness was thus very gratifying to Narasa, for it stayed the enemy attack for two precious months. Narasa utilised this interval to conciliate his opposition. What the nature of the concessions was is not known. Probably he agreed to yield the prince his rightful place at the head of the administration and himself take the next position of importance in the state. As Ferishta writes, "In this interval Timraj the Minister, having composed his disputes with the young Ray of Beejanuggur advanced at the head of an army to Rachore which struck terror into that of Yoosoof Adil Khan."<sup>20</sup> The Adil Khan, recovering, made ready to meet Narasa's advancing columns. Soon both the armies encamped at a little distance from each other. Yūsuf "threw up entrenchments round his camp to prevent surprise".

The battle was fought on a Saturday in Regib 898 (April 1493). It went badly for Yūsuf and his armies were forced to fall back in disorder. Dustoor

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20. Briggs III, p. 11.

Khan relates how Yūsuf retrieved the situation by a stratagem. He arranged peace talks with Narasa on the basis of "allegiance to the Ray for the country he held." "While still the talks were on, he fell in full force on the king and Narasa and their unsuspecting retinue. Seventy persons of rank were killed and their armies routed. Yūsuf now detailed Rāab Jung Bahādur Khan with a force to reduce Rāichūr and Mudkal. This was effected in forty days and Yūsuf returned to his capital Bijapur."

With this defeat the political alignments in Vijayanagara once again went out of joint. The situation was much more complicated, for the young king died at the same time under what the nobles held to be suspicious circumstances. Ferishta, however, states "Timraj and the young Ray fled to Beejanuggur. The latter died on the road of wounds received in the action." Was Narasa above board? Had he not all along grudged power to the young Rāya that was no more? It required so much opposition within, and an external threat besides, to get Narasa agree to associate the king in public affairs. Only once had the king figured prominently and that, in that fateful peace parleys with Yūsuf. And so shortly after, the king is reported dead; the nobles would smell the rat.

A different account of the king's death is furnished by Nuniz, who was an earlier writer than Ferishta. He states, "At that time a captain who

21. *ibid*, p. 18.

22. *ibid*, pp. 13-14.

wished him ill, determined to kill the prince, with a view afterwards to say that Narsenaque had bidden him commit the murder, he being the minister to whom the government of the kingdom had been entrusted, and he thought that for this act of treason Narsenaque would be put to death. And he soon so arranged it that the prince was killed one night by one of his pages who had been bribed for that purpose, and who slew the prince with a sword." <sup>28</sup>

Nuniz has not related the war of 1493 in which that unfortunate prince had played a part. His version points out that the king must have died in the capital, while Ferishta would put the event somewhere on the way to Vijayanagara. Again as regards the instrument of death, was it the soldier's sword or the soulless assassin's knife? It is rather significant that the assassin must have used a sword for this nefarious act. Was it that the wounds should resemble those received by the prince in battle?

Much more revealing is the fact that both Ferishta and Nuniz absolve Narasa Nayaka of all responsibility for the King's death. Nuniz in addition lays open the character of the opposition that Narasa Nāyaka had to contend against. They were out to destroy Narasa and, to do so, would stop at nothing. They would sacrifice the king himself, provided that would lead Narasa to ruin. The great minister was more than justified in his extreme reluctance to share power with such base elements and allow them access to

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28. F. E. pp. 308 - 309. Nuniz gives the name of the Captain as Tymarasa.



the king. While he seemed to dictate, Narasa really protected the king: and when the latter seemingly shook himself free from the regent's galling authority, the prince virtually destroyed himself.

The king was dead. What happened subsequently is again differently described by Nuniz and by Ferishta. Writes Ferishta, "Timraj seized the government of the country; but some of the principal nobility opposing his usurpation, dissensions broke out, which gave Yooseof Adil Khan a respite from war in that quarter."<sup>24</sup> This statement of Ferishta must be taken with good deal of circumspection. Narasa had already been foiled in his attempts to retain all power in his hands. How could he expect to seize the crown itself, when the blame for the king's death might be placed at his door? Probably Ferishta meant no more than that Narasa Nayaka attempted to resume all the authority that he had earlier forsworn in favour of the king. But his opponents were still very strong and his attempts were bound to fail.<sup>25</sup> Narasa's enemies were gaining in strength, were getting more slanderous and aggressive. He must silence them. He must convince the people that

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(24) Bilgis III, p. 18.

(25) Mr. C. Hayavadana Rao reports a copper plate grant dated in S'aka 1414, Parithavi, Phalguna, ba. 7. Sunday (10th March 1498) which shows Immadi Nrsimha ruling from Vijayanagara. We may infer that when Narasa left with the king for the battle front, Immadi Nrsimha was in charge of the capital. Narasa's failure to resume his powers conferred on him by Saluva Nrsimha's testament may then be connected with Immadi Nrsimha's presence in the capital at the time.

personal aggrandisement had never motivated his political conduct. As soon as Narasa Nāyaka "learned that he himself (was supposed to have) sent to kill" the king, writes Nuniz, "he raised up another brother of the late king's to be king, not being able further to punish this captain, because he had many relations, until after he had raised this younger brother to be king, who was called Tamarao." <sup>26</sup>

The battle, that was the precursor of such fateful development in Vijayanagara, was fought in April 1493 A. D. Since then, to the end of the year, full eight months, proved very trying for Narasa in his attempts to bring the whole empire under one supreme control and direction. He hoped to vindicate himself by placing Immadi Nṛsimha on the Gadi of his father.

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26. F. H. p. 309. Mr. H. Krishnasāstri rightly identified Tamarao of Nuniz with Immadi Nṛsimha, son of Saluva Nṛsimha I. (A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 169). But Mr. K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyer identifies Tamarao of Nuniz with the Busbalrao of the same chronicle (A. R. 1980, pp. 84-5) and extends his reign from S'aka 1414 to S'aka 1480-81 leaving no interval between the reigns of Saluva Nṛsimha's son Immadi Nṛsimha and of Kṛṣṣadevaraya. H. Krishna s'astri assumes that Bhujabalaraya Immadi Tammayyadeva must have been a surname of Saluva Nṛsimha I's son, Immadi Nṛsimha. (A. R. 1909-10). See inscription 25 of 1919; 122 of 1918, 47 of 1916, 195 of 1924; 270 of 1981-82. Read also DHARMARAYA and VIRANARASIMHA by Dr. N. V. Ramanayya (Proceedings Indian History Congress, Allahabad, pp. 179-80). But Nuniz all through meant by Tamarao only the son of Saluva Nṛsimha I. It is idle to identify him with Busbalrao, a name which Nuniz invariably attached to the son of Tuluva Narasa Nāyaka.

Even here he failed in his object. He got estranged with the king. Irony of fate made the very captain, that encompassed the murder of the late king, the confidante of his brother, the new monarch. This captain had many relations and was too strong to be put down. Vijayanagara became too hot for Narasa Nayaka. So he elected to leave the city, but determined to return with sufficient sanctions behind him to enforce his will and enfeeble the opposition that would not place the interests of the State above personal greed.

One day, as though a hunting, Narasa Nayaka went out of the city, proceeded to Anegondi. Thence he made a detour and betook himself to Penukonda. This place seems particularly attached to Narasa. For there he repaired in this dire stress and he very soon gathered about him a powerful army with full complement of horse and elephant.

Thus assured of a mighty following, Narasa adopted a sterner tone towards his king. He sent to tell him the reason why he withdrew from the royal court. He denounced the king's favourite captain as a traitor and murderer of the late king and who would not hesitate to treat his present lord to a like fate, if he found it to his advantage. As the kingdom had been entrusted to him by the king's father as well as the care of the king himself and of his late brother, Narasa would demand of the king that the captain should be punished as he so richly deserved it. But this advice grated on the ears of Immaji

Nṛsimha. He would not heed Narasa. On the contrary, he bestowed further favours on the captain.<sup>27</sup>

Narasa now marched on the capital, at the head of his armies and laid siege to it for four or five days. The king saw that resistance was futile and he yielded to open force what he would not concede to a stern counsel. The captain "Tymarsaa" was put to death and his head sent to Narasa Nāyaka. The Tuḷuva chief greatly rejoiced at this favourable turn of affairs. "Narsenaque sent away all the troops and entered the city, where he was very well received by all the people, by whom he was much loved as being a man of much justice."<sup>28</sup>

We have already had occasion to refer to some records where Immaḍi Nṛsimha appears as no higher than a provincial viceroy. He is stated to have been ruling from Vijayanagara in a record<sup>29</sup> from Muttukuru in Cuddapah District, and which is dated in Śaka 1415 Pramāthin (by mistake for Pramāḍica) - 1493 A. D. It records a gift of taxes to Chenna-kēśava temple by a servant of Narasanāyanin garu a subordinate of king Immaḍi Narasinga Rāya Mahā-

27. This captain, according to Nuniz is named Tymarsaa. Mr. V. Rangachari feels that possibly he was the Pradhāni of Immaḍi Nṛsimha mentioned in the Chagalamarri record. (INSCRIPTIONS OF MADRAS PRESIDENCY II, Kurnool, 602) He may be the Timmayyadēva Mahārāja (if the epigraphist read the name correctly) of the Paramāndur grant (521 of 1925) dated in Śaka 1415, Pramāḍica, Simha, S'u. 7, Viśakha-Sunday 18th August 1498.

28. Nuniz, F. E. pp. 309-10.

29. 516 of 1906. Cf. n. 25. above.

rāya, son of Sāluva Narasingadēva Mahārāya. Two inscriptions<sup>80</sup>, from Doddaballapur, dated in Śaka 1415 Sarvajit (by mistake for Pramāḍica) Pushya Śu. 10-December 18, 1493 invest him with supreme titles, Śrīman Mahārājādhirāja, Rājaparamēśwara Mēdinīmīsara Gaṇḍa Kaṭṭāri Sāluva Immaḷi Rāya Mahārāya.

Thus had Narasa kept good guard over the kingdom during those difficult times since he became regent and by the end of 1493 A. D. delivered it up to prince Immaḍi Nṛsinha, Sāluva Nṛsinha's only surviving son.

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80. Nos. 42 & 45.



### CHAPTER III

## NARASA NĀYAKA WAS NO USURPER

"Some days and years had passed". The Regent entrenched himself in the affections of the people. So immense was his influence with the king that by 1496 A. D. Narasa Nāyaka came to be spoken of as a Partner with Immaḍi Narasingarāya in the sovereignty of Vijayanagara.<sup>1</sup> Various officers of the empire vied with one another in making gifts for the merit of Narasa Nayaka.<sup>2</sup> The king himself was no exception.<sup>3</sup>

But, according to Nuniz, as days passed and years rolled by, and as Narasa got more and more caught in the trammels of power, his character underwent a sea change. He determined "himself to govern the kingdom, for it had been entrusted to him by the king his lord so to do." He kept the young king in the city of Penukonḍa with 20,000 guards to make safe his person and gave him 20,000 cruzados of gold a year for his food and expenses. "Timapanarque" in whom Narasa Nāyaka greatly confided, was sent to Penukonḍa as captain. He was commanded that "he should not allow the king to leave the city and that he should carefully guard his person against treachery."

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1. 386 of 1904; 1420 Kalayukti.

2. 355 of 1912; 445 of 1913; 511 of 1928-9; 593 of 1929-30

3. 615 of 1907; E. C. Nagar 78.



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Narasa now began to make war on several places, taking them and demolishing them because they had revolted.

It was then that treason was whispered into Narasa Nayaka's ears. Its agent "Condemarade" at first evoked no response. But the suggestion worked and Narasa Nayaka soon succumbed to it. Condemarade so managed the whole affair that the king was slain without the very murderers knowing who their victim was. The king's disappearance was now widely talked about, the people believing that he had fled to make war on the Regent. Narasa secretly made all preparations to meet any emergency but openly feigned much sorrow. Soon Condemarade brought him assuring reports. "And since there was no news of the king and he holding everything now under his hand, he was raised to be king over all the land of Nar-syngua."<sup>4</sup>

If Nuniz were not seriously mistaken, all appearances are that Narasa Nāyaka ended his long loyal career, as an usurper and regicide. But eminent historians, such as H. Krishna Sastri and Dr. S. K. Ayyangar have all contended that the available epigraphical evidence gives a lie to the observations of Nuniz. Not all of them, however, are agreed over the details. The question of the authorship and time, if only of the usurpation, is seriously disputed but hardly settled. Recently Dr. N. Venkataramanayya joined issue stating that not only the theory of murder

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4. Nuniz, B. E. pp. 310-314.

but even of the deposition of Immaḷi Nṛsimha by Narasa Nāyaka cannot be maintained.<sup>6</sup> He seems to support Nuniz's account of Tammariya's assassination but would attribute it to Vira Nṛsimha, son of Tuluva Narasa Nāyaka.<sup>6</sup>

Robert Sewell concludes on the basis of epigraphical evidence that Immaḷi Nṛsimha was alive, "till at least February 28, A. D. 1505."<sup>7</sup> However much he might try to qualify it,<sup>8</sup> his faith in the infallibility of Nuniz about Narasa was implicit. He wholly believed that Narasa Nāyaka seized the throne immediately after the murder of Immaḷi Nṛsimha<sup>9</sup> and that the "usurpation probably did not take place till A. D. 1505 at earliest."<sup>10</sup> Mr. H. Krishna Sastri, on the other hand, was certain that Narasa was not a regicide, for according to him Narasa died about the end of Śaka 1424 (A. D. 1502).<sup>11</sup> But he did not make up his mind who should be regarded the usurper.<sup>12</sup> He is, however, positive, as was Mr. V. Venkayya before him, that the Tuluva usurpation of sovereignty of Vijayanagara was an accomplished

5. DHARMARĀYA AND VIRA NṚSIMHA, I. H. Congress Procdgs., Allahabad 1938, p. 180

6. *ibid.*

7. THE KINGS OF VIJAYANAGARA, 1486-1509, J. R. A. S. 1915, p. 392.

8. *ibid.* p. 393, "If the story of Nuniz is correct."

9. *ibid.*

10. *ibid.* p. 389.

11. A. R. 1918, pt. II, p. 121; A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 171.

12. A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 168.

fact by 1501-02 or immediately before that date.<sup>13</sup> Dr. S. K. Ayyangar is definite that Narasa was never sovereign on the throne of Vijayanagara.<sup>14</sup> Yet he would agree with Sewell that in all probability, Narasa Nāyaka died in 1505 A. D.<sup>15</sup> He would, however, maintain that the probabilities are that Vīra Nṛsimha, son of Narasa, set aside Immadi Nṛsimha completely and even got rid of him in the manner described by Nuniz.<sup>16</sup>

If Narasa Nāyaka were the usurper, then the usurpation must have occurred before the end of 1503 A. D. For an inscription from Bachahalli in Mysore with its date corresponding to December 13, A.D. 1503 states that a gift was made to temple "when Narasanna Nāyaka died."<sup>17</sup> The same event is referred to in a record from Dēvikāpuram<sup>18</sup> in North Arcot District dated in Saka 1425 Rudhiredgari (A. D. 1503-04) which registers a gift "for the merit of Svāmi Narasa Nāyaka who went to the Siva-Lōka."

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13. A. R. 1906, para 58 and *ibid* 1908, para 81.

14. A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY, p. 67.

15. *ibid*, p. 67 & 70.

16. *ibid*, p. 71.

17. E. C. IV, Krishnarajpet 64. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar translates it to have been for the merit of Narasa Nāyaka "when he should die." (A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER, p. 92, App. No. 61.) The original "astamanavadāga" is more correctly translated by the epigraphist as "when (he) set."

18. 357 of 1912.

Mr. Sewell admits that both the above epigraphs may refer to the same personage. But he observes "In the first of these, no titles of any sort are prefixed to the name, and in the second, the title 'Svāmi' certainly does not indicate a ruling sovereign."<sup>19</sup> So he sees nothing in these inscriptions to show that they refer to Tuluva Narasa Nāyaka for he argues "If an usurper became king, he would certainly insist on his royal title."<sup>20</sup> Like Sewell, but for different reasons, Dr. S. K. Ayyangar also believes that Narasa of the Dēvikapuram grant was not the great general at all.<sup>21</sup> Of another grant<sup>22</sup> which mentions 'Svāmi Narasa Nāyaka', he remarks "Svāmi (Lord) does not imply necessarily ruler. Every one is Svāmi to his servants."<sup>23</sup>

Surely "Every one is Svāmi to his servants." But Tirumalai Nāyaka and Īsvara Nāyaka, both donors of the gift registered in the Dēvikapuram grant could not be the subordinates or 'agents' of any Narasa Nāyaka. They were the sons of one Ettappa Nāyaka and they held sufficiently important positions in the state to have figured in several inscrip-

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19. J. R. A. S. 1915, p. 891.

20. *ibid*, p. 890.

21. A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER, p. 67.

22. 445 of 1913 from Aragalur in Salem District dated in Śaka 1484 - 1502 A. D.

23. A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER p. 67.

tions of the realm." The phrase "Svāmi Narasa Nāyaka" is not peculiar to grants from North Arcot alone. One from the Salem District is already referred to. Yet another appears in Vandalur in Chengleput District, its date corresponding to March 2, 1500 A. D. It registers a gift by one Konḍaya Nāyinar who was administering Vandalur, situate in the territory of Bāmu Nāyaka, the "Dalavayi of Svāmi Narasa Nāyaka." It is idle, therefore, to argue that this Svāmi Narasa Nāyaka of the inscriptions of about the same period and from several districts, could be any other than the Great Tuluva Regent.

24. 355 of 1912; 395 of 1912.

Their attachment to Tuluva-Narasa Nāyaka is nothing very peculiar. The modern Dēvikāpuram of North Arcot District was perhaps the Dēvakīpura, the original home of Tuluva Narasa's ancestors. From the Brihadāmba temple there hail a large number of inscriptions of the Tuluva family. The Colophon of the 11th canto in Varāhapurāṇam, a work dedicated to Tuluva Narasa addresses him thus:—

ధరణీసుత దేవకీపుర  
పరవిలయ. శ్రీగిరీశ పరసంపన్నే  
శ్వర విభుతనయా. సామవ  
నరసింహ నృపాల దండనాయక తిలకా.

'You the resident of the world-renowned Dēvakīpura, you born of Isvara by the grace of the Lord of Śrīśaila, you the foremost of the generals of king Saluva Narasimha.'

(See T. Achyutarao: "NANDI MALLAYYA — GHANJA SINGAYYA — Bharati, Vibhava, Śrīvijā.

25. 35 of 1934-35.



A copper plate grant from Dhārāsvara<sup>26</sup> dated in Śaka 1424, Durmati, in the month of Bhādrapada, registers a gift by Mahāmandalēsvara Dēvarasa Voḍoya for the *Longevity, health, wealth, Kingdom and victory* of Mahāmandalēsvara Sāluva Narasanna Nayaka, son of Yīsarappa Nāyaka, who is also styled Mēdinīmī-sara, Gaṇḍakaṭṭāri, Trinētra Sāluva. Mr. Sowell, however, hesitates to accept this document as a record of Narasa Nāyaka. He admits that later Tuḷuva kings of Narasa's family were accorded Sāluva titles but feels that this was only a later practice which was not true of Narasa Nāyaka's times.<sup>27</sup> But this is not a correct position to take. For as Dr. N. V. Ramanayya has pointed out, Tuḷuva Narasa Nāyaka was known as Sāluva Nṛsimha as early as 1497 A. D.<sup>28</sup> Another and stronger objection to accept the document as of Narasa Nāyaka is, according to Sewell, that Narasa is therein styled a mere Mahāmandalēsvara and not king, which he would be entitled to as the usurper who became king. But the pity is, instead of questioning Tuḷuva Narasa's claims to royalty, Mr. Sewell prefers to suspect the authenticity of epigraphical evidence.

The trouble has been with most of the writers and with Mr. Sewell above all, that they virtually deny to others, the possibility of mistaking one for the other among so many kings, all so similarly styled. Before Kṛṣṇadēvarāya, four Nṛsimhas ruled Vijayanagara successively, viz., Sāluva Nṛsimha and

26. 32 of 1905-06.

27. J. R. A. S. 1915, p. 890.

28. 44 of 1928. I. H. Congress, Proceedings 1938, p. 181.



his son Immaḍi Nṛsimha, both of the family of Gunda; and Tuḷuva Narasa and Vīra Nṛsimha, his son, of the house of Īsvara. The name Nṛsimha applied to them individually. As has been pointed out above, even Tuḷuva Narasa was known as Sāluva Nṛsimha and took all the Sāluva titles. Nor were the titles "Bhujabala" and "Bhujabalarāya" in any way distinctive. They preceded the names of Sāluva Nṛsimha,<sup>29</sup> his son Tammayadēva, another name for Immaḍi Nṛsimha<sup>30</sup> and Tuḷuva Narasa's son Vīra Nṛsimha.<sup>31</sup> The grandson of Īsvara would assume even the prefix "Immaḍi" as did the scion of the Sāluva royal line.<sup>32</sup> And when so much reason there was for confusion, why take Nuniz's story to be scrupulously true in every detail?

The truth is that Nuniz, a foreigner that he was, got so perplexed. His story reveals a Narasa of two minds, one who would not harm his late master's son, but would keep a guard to save him from treachery; and the other, surreptitiously scheming his assassination for motives of self-aggrandisement. These two contradictory traits in one and the same person are not rare. Yet, is it so impossible that Nuniz was depicting here the workings, not merely of two states of mind, but of two different individuals -- of Narasa Nayaka and of his son Vīra Nṛsimha?

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29. 25 of 1919 and 281 of 1981-82.

30. C64 of 1909; 122 of 1918; 47 of 1916; 195 of 1924.

31. E. O. IV, Gu. 67.

32. 54 of 1915; 541 of 1920.

This suggestion is not so fantastic as it may appear. For whatever his errors had been, Nuniz was quite clear in his mind that Tuḷuva Narasa Nayaka was never the king of Vijayanagara. But his son became one, after him. While describing the last moments of Sāluva Nṛsimha, Nuniz writes, "At his death, he left two sons, and the *governor of the kingdom was Narsenaque, who was father of the king who afterwards was king of Bisnaga.*"<sup>33</sup>

We may therefore conclude that Narasa died at least a year and a half earlier than Immaḍi Nṛsimha. He was neither a regicide nor a usurper but a strong disciplinarian. He retained all power but seized not the throne. He took no royal titles, for he took no crown but contented himself with governing the empire of Vijayanagara.

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33 F. E. 308. Mr. Sewe'll remarks that "this account of the second Narasa and the family relationship differs altogether from the results obtained from epigraphical study." (ibid. n. 2) I am unable to know how. For at the time when Narasa was the Governor of the kingdom, his son was not a king. Narasa was not alive when Vira Nṛsimha attained that position.

## CHAPTER IV

### KṚṢṆARĀYA IN CRADLE

“ Unknown are the beginnings of these things,  
Unknown are the ends of these things,  
And what is known is a little middle of the  
things that seem at present.

.....”

*Bhagavadgītā II. 28*

This pithy saying applies wholly to the life and reign of Kṛṣṇadēvarāya of Vijayanagara. His origin appears humble and is shrouded in tradition. His end again is not definitely placed in time.

Tradition in itself can neither be believed nor rejected. Though unconfirmed, if it is not controverted by known facts, tradition claims respectful scrutiny. Even so is what introduces us to the early life of Kṛṣṇarāya.

Besides on tradition, we may draw on the Portuguese chronicler, Nuniz, for some account of Kṛṣṇarāya before he became king. Nuniz has it that Kṛṣṇa's brother, Busbal Rao, the king, was sick and in the last hours of his earthly existence. He wanted that his son should succeed him on the throne of Vijayanagara. But his son was a mere boy of eight years, scarcely fit to rule. Busbal Rao knew that *the kingdom ought perhaps to belong to his brother*

*Kṛṣṇa, who was over twenty years in age and therefore more fit to be king. Yet reason is a feeble guide where ambition holds sway. Thus it came to pass that Busbal Rao ordered his minister Saluva Timma to blind Kṛṣṇarāya.*

But Timma's heart was warm with affection for Kṛṣṇa. The latter was a youth, of great promise. He had already established a name as a fine writer and had also won laurels while fighting his brother's wars. Sāluva Timma, therefore, could not bring himself to carry into effect the ill-judged commands of his sovereign. He summoned Kṛṣṇa into his presence and apprised him of the danger which threatened his person. Kṛṣṇa, however, avowed that he had professed no desire for the throne and therefore never deserved such a treatment of his brother. But, if it so pleased the minister to leave him alone, he would even turn a recluse and tell beads. Sāluva Timma decided to shield Kṛṣṇa and keep him out of harm's way. As to his readiness to take] to religious orders, the minister had very different plans for the youth, once the danger was past. In the meanwhile, the minister showed goat's eyes to the dying monarch to convince him that his orders were fulfilled. When Busbalrao died, Sāluva Timma lost no time and he raised Kṛṣṇa to the throne of Vijayanagara.<sup>1</sup>

Now Kṛṣṇarāya's brother, Vīra Nṛsimha (Busbal Rao of Nuniz) was still ruling in the month of Vaisākha of the Cyclic year Sukla, Saka 1431.<sup>2</sup>

1. F. E. pp. 314-315.

2. S. I. I. Vol. IV, No. 802.

The earliest inscription so far known of Kṛṣṇarāya, wherein he appears as the reigning king is dated in the month of Śrāvaṇa Śu. 10 Thursday of the same Śaka year Śukla.<sup>3</sup> So Kṛṣṇarāya became king sometime between 4th May and July 26 of 1509 A. D. Were he then over twenty years of age, Kṛṣṇarāya *must have been born about 1489 A. D. or earlier.*

Nuniz gives Vīra Nṛsimha a reign of six years. The latter must have come to power sometime in 1503 A. D. When in that year he constituted the Government of the country, his brother Kṛṣṇarāya appears, according to the Vijayanagararāja Katha, as a lad of sixteen.

As the Katha has it, when Vīra Nṛsimha ascended the throne he was still a youth and quite inexperienced in state-craft. Most of the subordinate princes, who had formerly been paying tribute to his father, now took advantage of the king's weakness and rebelled against him.

Vīra Nṛsimha, therefore, had to wage a war with them to bring them back into submission. But his absence with his armies in distant lands, would render the capital of the empire open to attack. So the king resolved to place Kṛṣṇarāya in charge of the central fortress. But Kṛṣṇarāya had greatly desired to be in the thick of the fray and he pleaded strongly with his brother to be made the head of the expedition. Vīra Nṛsimha was reluctant. He protested, that Kṛṣṇarāya, a lad of sixteen, would do

3. 708 of 1919 (from Gulya-Alur Taluq, Bellary District).



· better to be in charge of a fortress than that he should risk his own life in uncertain battles. But Kṛṣṇarāya's entreaties finally prevailed and he set out on his campaign against the rebellious nobles.

Nuniz, like the Katha, speaks of the various revolts in the empire that broke out soon after the death of Narasa Nāyaka. "As soon as his father was dead," writes Nuniz of Busbal Rao, "the whole land revolted under its captains; who in a short time were destroyed by that king, and their lands taken and reduced under his rule." <sup>4</sup> Over twenty years of age, according to Nuniz, at the time of his accession, Kṛṣṇarāya must have been of military age when his elder brother Vīra Nṛsinha was crowned king. No wonder, therefore, if Kṛṣṇarāya offered to measure his sword against those of the rebellious chieftains that he might restore to his brother those lands that had been formerly his father's. The Katha takes the birth of Kṛṣṇarāya to the year 1487 A. D. (1503-16 = 1487) which is quite in consonance with the age Nuniz records for Kṛṣṇarāya at the time of the latter's accession to the throne.

A clue to the year of Kṛṣṇarāya's birth may be found in tradition recorded by Mr. G. Sreeramamurty in his "Biographies of Telugu poets." It is stated therein that Kṛṣṇa's birth synchronised with the subjugation of the whole of the Vijayanagara territory by his father, Narasa Nāyaka. <sup>5</sup> We have placed Kṛṣṇa's

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4. F. E. p. 314.

5. Op. cit., p. 478.

birth in the last two decades of the 15th. century of the Christian era. Narasa Nāyaka, therefore, must have accomplished this great feat, not in his own right as king, but as the supreme commander of the forces of his master and sovereign, Sāluva Nṛsimha. The crowning act of this great achievement by Narasa was his capture of the capital city, Vijayanagara. We have reason to believe that this coup was brought off about the middle of the Christian year 1486 A. D.

The circumstances that saw the last of the rule of the Saṅgama dynasty of Vijayanagara have been well described by Nuniz. According to him, the last ruler, king Padearau fled from the city of Vijayanagara when "a captain of the army of ..... Narasymgua" penetrated the city as far as the doors of the Royal chamber. "When it was known by the captain that the king had fled, he did not trouble to go after him, but took possession of the city ..... , and he sent to acquaint his lord, Narsymgua. And after that Narasymgua was raised to be king." "

This "Narsymgua" of Nuniz was Sāluva Nṛsimha and his Captain was the Great Tuḷuva General Narasa Nāyaka, father of Kṛṣṇarāya. To this same event referred Nandi Timmanna, who adorned the court of Kṛṣṇarāya, the Poet-Emperor, while singing the praises of Narasa Nāyaka. In his poem, *Parijatapa-haraṇamu*, he writes that Narasa "demonstrated his great calibre when he seized Vidyapura so that the

Lord of Kuntalā was caught in trouble.”<sup>7</sup> It is evident that Narasa Nāyaka was mainly instrumental in bringing the whole country under the rule of the Sāluvas. Krṣṇarāya's birth, therefore, must have been contemporaneous with the Saluva usurpation in the kingdom of Vijayanagara.

The last king of the] Saṅgama dynasty of Vijayanagara was a profligate. He abandoned himself to his women and delighted in vices. He soon lost by his bad government a considerable part of his territories.<sup>8</sup> The only provinces that were under the effective control of the central authority were the Mālnāḍ districts of Mysore and the west coast comprising the Male and Tulu Rājyas with the country about the city of Vijayanagara itself. At the same time, the empire became hard pressed by enemies on its eastern frontiers. The disintegrating eruption of Kapilēśvara Gajapati made itself felt in the distant district of South Arcot.<sup>9</sup> Kapilēśvara's death about 1470 A. D., while

7. “కుంతలేశ్వరుడు నీక్కు పడంగ విద్యాపు

రంబు గైకొని విజప్రాధి నెఱపె”

— SOURCES OF VIJ. HIST. P. 107.

Dr. S. K. Ayyangar translates it thus :— “When the lord of Kuntala country was caught in trouble, he exhibited his valour and captured the city of Vidyapura.” If the king had already been in trouble, it could be much easier for Narasa to take the fort. In such a case, the incident need not have merited such a high praise from the poets.

8. Nuniz, F. E. 805-06.

9. A. R. 1907. Sec. 56.

it gave sufficient respite for Saluva Nṛsimha to build up his power, did not forbid the victorious march by the Bahmuny Sultan as far south as Kañchi which he sacked on 12th March 1481 A. D.<sup>10</sup> The only territories that still could hold their own against the enemies of the empire were those under Saluva Nṛsimha. He had started his career as the Governor of Chandragiri, his ancestral estate. Slowly he extended his sway over wider regions. By 1470 "Nursing was a powerful Raja, possessing the country between Carnatic and Telingana, extending along the sea-coast to Matchilipattam and had added much of the Boojanuggur territory to his own by conquest, with several strong forts."<sup>11</sup> He appears to have been ruling in his own name even from 1467 A. D. For, between 1467 and 1485, we have a series of inscriptions registering grants made by himself or in his name without any reference to the ruling sovereign.<sup>12</sup> He is there spoken of as: Mahārasu, Mahāmandalēśvara, Mahāmāṇḍalika, titles that just fall short of full royal significance. The first inscription that gives him the royal titles and speaks of him as seated on the throne of Vijayanagara is dated in Śaka 1408, Parabhava, Kārtika, Śu. 5 i.e., November 1, 1486 A. D. It runs "Śrīmad Rājādhirāja Rājaparamēśvara Praudhapratāpa Narasingarāyaṇa Vidyānagaradali Vijayasimhaśānārūḍhar

10. BURHAN-I-MAASIR, I.A. 1899. p. 290.

11. Briggs, FERISHTA II, pp. 498-9.

12. E. C. X, Kolar 88; E. C. X, Mulbagal 29; E. C. IV, Nagamaṅgala 79 and 89; E. C. IX, Channapaṭṇa 158; E. C. IV, Hoggaddevankota 74; E. C. IX, Kankanhalli 8; E. C. IV, Nagamaṅgala 59; E. C. IX, Magadi 52;

āgi Prithvīyam aluva." <sup>13</sup> Narasa Nayaka thus must have captured Vijayanagara for his master in the earlier months of 1486 A. D. And if the tradition embodied in the "Biographies of Telugu Poets" were true, *Kṛṣṇarāya must have been born in the last quarter of 1486 or the first quarter of 1487 A. D.*

According to the Vijayanagararāja Katha, to which we have already had occasion to refer, Kṛṣṇarāya was a lad of sixteen years <sup>14</sup> when his father died and his brother Vīra Nṛsimha came to the throne. An inscription from Dēvikāpuram in the North Arcot District refers to a gift made for the merit of Swami Narasa Nāyaka "who went to Sivalōka." <sup>15</sup> It is dated in Śaka 1425 Rudhirōdgari, i.e., 1503 A. D. A Bachahalli inscription with the date equivalent to December 13, 1503 A. D. records a gift "when Narasanna Naika died." <sup>16</sup> This again takes the year of Kṛṣṇa's birth to 1487 A. D. (1503-16=1487 A. D.)

There is a solitary inscription <sup>17</sup> dated in the reign of Kṛṣṇadēvarāya (Vṛsha, Āṣi 31, Mon., Ēkādaśī,

13. E. C. XII, Tumkur 54, Bishop Caldwell fixes the initial date of Saluva Nṛsimha's reign in 1487 (HIST. OF TINNEVELLY, p. 48) Mr. Sewell notes it but agrees with Dr. Burnell in fixing 1490 for the event. Sewell remarks - "We have yet to learn the history of his acquiring the sovereignty of Vijayanagara and ousting the older dynasty." (SKETCH OF THE DYNASTIES OF SOUTHERN INDIA, p. 106).
14. BIOGRAPHIES, p. 491.
15. 857 of 1912; See also A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 171.
16. E. C. IV, K. P. 64.
17. 216 of 1916 from Tirappukkuli in Conjeevaram Taluk, Chingleput District.



Mrgasīrṣa - 1521, July 29) which records that Vāṣa-  
vappa-Nāyaka, the elder brother of Adappaṭṭu  
Vaiyappa-Nāyaka made a gift of the village, Vānavan-  
taṅgal, for a festival to be conducted on the day of  
Jyēṣṭha in the month of Māsi, which was the  
Jannanaksatra of the king. Unfortunately the year  
of the king's birth is not given therein. The fore-  
going discussion, however, takes it to the year 1487 A. D.  
If this be accepted then king Kṛṣṇadēvaraya was  
born in the cyclic year Parabhava, Māsi 21,  
Jyēṣṭha nakṣatra (—Māgha ba. 8); on a Friday i. e.,  
A. D. 1487, February 16.

## CHAPTER V

### GAJAPATI GAJA-KŪṬAPĀKALA

The term "Gajapati Gaja-Kūṭapākala" is attributed to Kṛṣṇadēvarāya of Vijayanagara in his Hampi epigraph<sup>1</sup> of January 23-24 of 1510 A. D. *Kṛṣṇa became king* sometime between the months of Vaiśākha<sup>2</sup> and Śrāvaṇa Śu. 10 Thursday of Śaka 1431, Śukla,<sup>3</sup> i.e., *between 4th May and July 23 of 1509 A. D.* The date of the Hampi epigraph, therefore, could not have been of the anniversary of Kṛṣṇa's coronation, *but of the Coronation itself.*<sup>4</sup> The conviction that the king must have earned his right to all the titles given him in the inscription and the apparent improbability of so much achievement in so short a time led Mr. H. Krishna Śastri to infer that the inditing of the epigraph was long delayed after the coronation.<sup>5</sup> Dr. S. Krishaswamy Ayyangar, however, considers that those titles were *merely conventional* and "much too vague to bear the burden of the inference

1. Edited by Prof. Hultzsch, Ep. I. I. It is dated in Māgha, Śu. 14 of Śaka 1430 in the cyclic year Śukla. The Śaka year was actually 1431. See Sewall: F. E. p. 120 & I. A. xxiv p. 205.
2. S. I. I. Vo. IV, No. 802 when Vira Nṛsimha was the reigning king.
3. 708 of 1919 when Kṛṣṇa was holding sway.
4. Prof. Hultzsch is not quite certain of this. See Ep. I. I. p. 366.
5. A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 175.

drawn "that the Raya, by his previous achievement, must have deserved all those attributes." The Hampi inscription embodies mostly of the usual Tuluva Prasasti, and in addition Kṛṣṇa's name, his achievements and the general particulars of the grant. In all the references to the king's munificence and also to his personal attainments, we need find nothing to push forward the date of the actual incising of the epigraph. But so far it has been rather difficult to find in the events prior to the date on the inscription a justification for the Raya's title, viz., that he was a fever to the elephants of the Gajapati (Gajapati gaja-Kūṭapākala).

"The eulogy of Krishnaraya which is registered in this inscription," writes Mr. H. Krishna Sastri, "shows that the record must have been actually drawn up some years after the coronation, by which time at least.....he had conquered the Gajapati king." The conquest of the Gajapati certainly forewent the inscription. The latter was incised by the day of the coronation and there is no reason why the war with the Gajapati should not have preceded it. But Dr. S. Krishnaswamy Ayyangar doubts the war itself. He writes "The actual record in question makes no specific reference to the conquest of the Gajapati king ..... The reference to Gajapati is no more than 'who was like fever to the elephants of the Gajapati.'"

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6. "Yet - Remembered Ruler of a Long Forgotten Empire." :  
HINDUSTAN REVIEW, I, 1917, pp. 334-335.

7. H. R. 1917, Vol. I, pp. 334-5.

We hope we need not deny the war; we regret that we do not know something more of it. It is true, Epigraphy does not furnish any further evidence for this war. But Bengali tradition is rich in reference to Vijayanagara and they throw more light on this aspect of our enquiry." Mr. Ramos Babu pleads that "We may give some credit to the statement in the Chaitanya Bhāgavata and the Chaitanya-Mangala (of Jayānanda) which are unanimous in recording that Prataparudra attacked Vijayanagara about 1510 A. D. " "

The Caitanya-Mangala states that Prataparudra was in Vijayanagara, fighting a war.<sup>10</sup> The Caitanya Bhāgavata is more informative in that it synchronises this war with Lord Caitanya's visit to Puri. The passage runs:—

"At the time of Īswara's visit to Nilācala, Pratāparudra was not in Utkala. He had been to Vijayanagara on war. Hence the Lord did not see him for that once." <sup>11</sup>

8. Mr. R. D. Banerjee went wrong when he wrote "Oriya and Bengali writers do not mention a campaign against Vijayanagara during the reign of his son (Pratāparudra) but do so in his (Purushōttama's) case," — THE EMPIRE OF ORISSA, I. A. 1929, p. 61.

9. I. H. Q. III, March – December, 1927, p. 262.

10. '.....Pratāparudra  
Vijayanagare gēla Karivārē yuddh '

11. "E Samaya Īs'vara ayila Nilācale  
Takhane Pratāparudra nāhika utkalē '  
Yuddha rasēgi yāccēn Vijayanagarē  
Atayēva Prabhū nā dēkhalēn seyibārē "

When Pratāparudra Gajapati returned from the invasion of Vijayanagara, he had lost more than a war. For Lord Caitanya had already left for his South Indian Pilgrimage. Months passed before the Master went back to Orissa. It was then that king Pratāparudra paid his homage to Caitanya. Lord temporal bowed down to Lord Spiritual.

We are thus concerned more with the first visit of Caitanya to Pūri. This can be fixed, correctly, with the assistance of Caitanya-*Cartiāmṛta*. Nimi was born of Purandara and Sachi, "one evening in February or March 1485 A. D. when there was a lunar eclipse at the same time as the full moon."<sup>12</sup> As he grew up, he developed the tendencies of a hermit and induced Kēshava Bhārathi to initiate him to Sanyāsa. Nimi, newly born into Sanyāsa, was now named Kṛṣṇa-Caitanya. "He was then 24 years of age."<sup>13</sup> This brings us to the year 1509 A. D. "The Master renounced the world in the bright fortnight of Māgha and came to reside at Pūri in Phālgun. (February 20 - March 20, 1509 A. D.) At the end of the month, he witnessed the Swinging ceremony of Jagannātha ..... In Chaitra, He liberated Sārvabhauma. Early in Baisākh, He wished to travel to the South."<sup>14</sup>

We are thus very fortunately provided with a definite chronology of Lord Caitanya's movements.

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12. Chaitanya's life and teachings. - Trans. from CHAITANYA CHARITĀMRITA, by J. Sarker, Intro. p. IX.

13. Ibid, p. xii.

14. Ibid. Chap. v. p. 46.



This travel to the South was early in Baiśakh i.e., April 20 – 18 May 1509 A. D. The last known record of Vīra Nṛsimha, brother of Kṛṣṇarāya is dated in Śaka 1431, Śukla and in the month of Vaiśākha. Pratāparudra must have, therefore, invaded Vijayanagara sometime during the last months of Vīra Nṛsimha's reign, or close on his death.

So soon after his accession, Kṛṣṇarāya was confronted with this war with the ruler of Orissa. Available evidence is too scanty to enable us study the different stages of this war. Pratāparudra does not seem any the gainer for this invasion. His armies broke and fled, leaving Kṛṣṇarāya, the Gajapati Gaja-Kūṭapākala, the victor on the battle-field.<sup>15</sup>

15. The Hampi stone inscription shows the forces that Kṛṣṇarāya had to contend against before he could secure the throne of Vijayanagara. In them perhaps lay the secret of Saluva Timma's anxiety that Kṛṣṇa and not the minor son of Vīra-Nṛsimha should obtain the kingdom. The titles,

गजपति गजकूटपाकलेन .... परिभूतसुरत्राणेन

demonstrate how admirably Kṛṣṇarāya combated the enemies and in that very process laid the foundations for the further expansion of the empire.

## CHAPTER VI.

### PARIBHŪTA SURATRĀṆA

The telling success of Kṛṣṇadēvarāya against Prataparudra, king of Orissa, no doubt, brought Kṛṣṇa's coronation nearer of celebration. But this was not the only hurdle he had to cross. His nephew, the minor son of Vira Nṛsimha, and his other brothers, were still free and could any moment form into nuclei for intrigue and revolt against him. These were at last secured and tucked away in the fortress of Chandragiri. But the Gajapati king had so timed his invasion that it coincided with Kṛṣṇa's wars in the northern reaches of his empire against Yūsuf Adil Shāh and other Moslem Lords of the Dakhan. The Raya had to fight the dreaded Moslem hordes and fight he did. He fought them so thoroughly that their opposition was worn out soon and their attack lost its sting when Kṛṣṇa anointed himself king of Vijayanagara on 23-24 January, 1510 A. D. The Hampi epigraph hails him as the "Paribhūta Suratrāṇa."

Dr. N. Venkataramanayya asserts "It is certain that before January 1510 A. D. Kṛṣṇarāya waged a war upon the Bahmuni Sultan and inflicted a defeat upon him." By implication, Dr. Venkataramanayya

1. "Yavana-rājya-Sthāpanacarya," Jour. O. R. April - June 1930, pp. 161-162.

takes it that the incident referred to in the eulogy must have occurred prior to the date specified therein which is also the date of the inditing of the epigraph. In this I am entirely of his opinion. But it is by no means as easy to accept his conclusion that it was the Bahmuny Sultan who was defeated about that time.

In the history of Vijayanagara's relations with the Bahmuny Power, there appears only one occasion when Kṛṣṇarāya encountered Mahmūd Shah III in force. The Sultan was worsted in the battle and he took a long time to recover from the wounds he received on the field.

The Moslem Historian Syed Ali ascribes this event to 1517 A. D. But the anonymous chronicler of Gōlkonda who describes obviously the same event places it in 1506 A. D. Curiously enough this victory to the Hindu arms does not find even a passing reference in the contemporary Hindu records.

It was a Jihad that Sultan Mahmūd had declared with such disastrous results. Dr. Venkataramanayya argues that "such a combination of all Moslem nobles was anything but possible subsequent to 1510 A. D. The internal chaos of the Bahmuni empire would not permit it at all; for which reason, it must have occurred sometime before March 1511 A.D. For, one of the principal noblemen who is said to have participated in the Jihad, Malik Ahmad Bahri Nizam-ul-Mulk, was dead by some years before 1517 A. D. Though his death is placed by Ferishta in 1508 A. D. and by Syed Ali in 1505—06, there is reason to believe he was alive, in] 1510 A. D., for he

offered succour to Dastur-i-Mamalik in 1510 A. D. ....and his death took place, according to the Arabic History of Gujarat in A. H. 916 (10th April, 1510 - 31st March 1511 A. D.)<sup>2</sup>

Nor is the year 1506 A. D. for this battle acceptable to Dr. Venkataramanayya. For he writes, "the Anonymous Historian dislocates the events from their chronological setting in his anxiety to show that the Bahmuny nobles, specially Quli Qutb-ul-Mulk, asserted their independence only after the death of Mahamud Shah II which event he assigns to 1507 A. D. The death of Mahamud, Shah II took place as a matter of fact not in 1507 A. D., but much later in 1518 A. D."<sup>3</sup>

We are not so certain that the Anonymous Historian entertained any such ambition to vindicate the loyalty of the Golkonda Sultan to the House of the Bahmuny. We may, however, agree with the Anonymous Historian that Sultan Mahmūd died of a dangerous illness which closely followed his return from the battle. The Anonymous Historian and Syed Ali, both place this war just a year before the Sultan's demise. No argument need be wasted to connect these two events. Even the dangerous illness of the Sultan referred to by the Anonymous Historian might have been an after effect of the injuries sustained by the Bahmuny monarch in course of that fight. If this were true then the Anonymous Historian must have erred, in dating the battle, in 1506. A. D. But to show that Historian in the wrong does not

2. Ibid, pp. 164-5.

3. Ibid, 164.

by itself entitle us to shift the battle on to 1510 A. D. and no farther. This latter supposition stands on nothing but the interpretation of Dr. Venkataramanayya that the Suratrāṇa of the Hampi epigraph refer exclusively to the Bahmuny Sultan and to none other.

In support of his theory, that the "Suratrāṇa" of the inscription was the Bahmuny Sultan, Dr. Venkataramanayya cites Nuniz to prove that Kṛṣṇarāya did not recognise the sovereign status of the Bahmuny nobles that had successfully asserted their independence in defiance of the authority of the Bahmuny Sultan. While referring to events subsequent to the destruction of Kulburga in 1521 A. D., Nuniz wrote that Kṛṣṇarāya "wanted to press forward, but his councillors did not agree to this, saying..... that it did not seem to them that *these Moorish Lords whom they counted as friends* would be otherwise than afraid that the king would take their lands as he had taken those of the others, since they *all served one sovereign*, and that for this reason those lords would probably make friends with the Ydalcao, and together they would come against the king."<sup>4</sup>

There is nothing in the above sentence to denote that the Ādil Khan was one among those Moorish Lords said to have been serving the same sovereign.

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4. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE: Sewell, pp. 357—358.

5. Another sentence from Nuniz would have been more to the point. Even then it only shows how hopelessly Nuniz misunderstood the relations that obtained between the Moslems



These northern Moorish chieftains rejoiced at the discomfiture of the Ādil Khan at the hands of Kṛṣṇarāya, so long as the latter kept himself, south of Kulbarga. For, then, the sovereign whom they all served was yet safe and they themselves in their own possessions. But if the Rāya crossed into the dominions lying north of Kulbarga, he would be attacking their sovereign and if he succeeded in that effort theirs would be the same fate as befell the Lords that had served the Ādil Khan. It was this fear might prompt them to join hands with their erstwhile enemy, the Ādil Khan, in an effort to save themselves from the aggressive Hindu Monarch. His councillors, therefore, urged the king to desist from pressing forward farther north.

Nuniz story of Kṛṣṇarāya's attempt to subvert the Bahmuny succession at Bīdar<sup>6</sup> does not preclude the earlier recognition by the Rāya of Bījapur, Gōlkonda and Ahmadnagara as independent kingdoms. The Telugu works like Kṛṣṇarāya-Vijayamu and Rayavācakamu refer to the stay of Moslem envoys from these kingdoms at Vijayanagara. Nuniz himself recounted how Kṛṣṇarāya received several embassies from

( f. n. Continued from Page 52 )

rulers and the Bahmuny Sultan. Referring to A. D. 1520, Nuniz wrote "... ..Zemulluco and Madremalluco and Destuy and Virido and also..... other lords were like slaves to the king Daquym. " (For Emp. p. 348). That they held themselves in such abject subjection to the Bahmuny Sultan even after the death of Mahmūd Shah III in 1518, is too much for even credulity to accept.

<sup>6</sup>. P. E. p. 358.

these Moslem Kingdoms and how he was even ready to treat independently with the Ādil Khān.<sup>7</sup> It could not be, therefore, that Kṛṣṇarāya observed all these niceties of a policy of non-recognition of a *de facto* situation.

It was Mr. K. V. Lakshmanarao had postulated this theory of non-recognition by the Rāya of Yūsuf Ādil of Bījapur.<sup>8</sup> The basis for his opinion is merely that Kṛṣṇarāya's poem "Āmukta mālyada" refers to the ruler of Bījapur as 'Ādil Khān'<sup>9</sup> and not as 'Ādil Shāh.' But the terms 'Shāh' or 'Suratrāṇa' have nothing very exclusive about them but are only synonyms of 'Rāya', 'Mēdinīmandalēs'wara' and such other terms significant of royalty. And we shall presently see that even this omission of royal titles along with the names of the sovereigns of Bījapur is not absolute.

Varadāmbikāpariṇayam calls the ruler of Mānuva a Suratrāṇa and describes his defeat at the hands of king Nṛsimha (Narasa Nāyaka).<sup>10</sup> From Varāha-purāṇam we learn that Kṛṣṇa's father, Narasa, was praised by the three "Mēdinīmandalēs'waras" of Māṇḍuva,<sup>11</sup> Beḍandakōṭa (Bīdar) and Mahur.<sup>12</sup> We may safely assert, therefore, that the independence of

7. *ibid*, pp. 348-357.

8. VYASAVALI, I, p. 40.

9. Canto I, verse 42.

10. SOURCES OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY - Ed. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar, p. 175.

11. Mānve in the Bījapur territory - See SOURCES, Intro. p. 10 and also 'STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE THIRD DYNASTY OF VIJAYANAGARA: Dr. N. Venkataramanayya' Intro. xxxiii.

12. SOURCES, p. 90.

the ruler of Mānuva had been recognised even in the days of Narasa Nāyaka himself.

This Suratrāṇa or Mēdinīmandalēśwara of Mānuva was no other than Yūsuf Ādil Shāh of Bījapur. Fr. Luis' letter to Dalboquerque written about the end of 1510 A.D. refers to the defeat of Bījapur at the hands of Vijayanagara. Fr. Luis wrote: "..... The Hidalgo (Ismael) would show towards them (Kṛṣṇarāya) that true faith which his father (Yūsuf) had shown towards the king of Narsinga when he took him in battle but released him on his promise to serve him for ever."<sup>13</sup> This incident finds corroboration in Varadāmbikāpariṇayam<sup>14</sup> also. It reads:

....सुरत्राणः प्राणत्राण परायणो दुर्गं मानवदुर्गं तत्क्षणमध्यरक्षत् ।  
त्रासाद्गतं मानवदुर्गमध्ये धृत्वा सुरत्राणवराहपादम् ।  
अमुच्चतानुग्रहं धीस्सधीरो गृहीतमब्धिकिल कुम्भजन्मना ॥

The Sultan, to save his own life, climbed into the impregnable fortress of Mānuva.

There, in the centre of the fort of Mānuva, the king captured the Suratrāṇa. But finding him, in his great fright, resort to the feet of Varaha the Saviour of the Gods (and Varāha was the crest of Vijayanagara), the king, in his benevolence, set him at liberty, as did Agasthya the Ocean, which he had drunk.

13. COMMENTARIES OF AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE, VOL. III, p. 38.

14. SOURCES, p. 175.

Ferishta tells us that Yūsuf Ādil Shāh was a Persian and from 'Pārijātāpaharaṇamu' we learn that the ruler of Mānuva, vanquished by Narasa, was a Persian too.<sup>15</sup> Again an Ādil Khān of Mānuva is stated to have been the contemporary of Vīra Nṛsimha of Vijayanagara. For Bālabhāgavatamu by Dōṇēru Kōṇēri-nātha Kavi dedicated to Cina Timmarāju of Āravīṭi-family, recounts that Ramarāju Timmayya, for his sovereign Vīra Nṛsimha, conquered the Ādil Khān on the battle field at Mānuva.<sup>16</sup> There is, therefore no sanctity about the term "Suratrāṇa", necessitating that it should apply to the Bahmuny Sultan alone and to none other of the independent Moslem rulers in the country of Dakhan.

Dr. Venkataramanayya finds confirmation for his view in the contemporary Portuguese records. Dal-boquerque directed ambassador Fr. Luis to promise the king of Vijayanagara that he would "help him in the war against the king of Decan." Dr. Venkataramanayya identifies the latter with the Bahmuny Sultan.<sup>17</sup> This identification, read with the "Paribhūta

15. SOURCES, p. 107.

"పారసీకునకు దుర్భర మానవత్వంబు  
తొలగించె మానవ దుర్గసేమ."

16. SOURCES, pp. 206-207.

"రాజచంద్రుడు రామరాజు తిమ్మయ్య  
.....  
కడిమిమై మానువకడ రణక్షోభి  
గడుసరి నేదులభాను జయించె"

17. J. O. R. April - June, 1936, pp. 161-162.

Suratrāṇena" of the Hampi epigraph yielded him the conclusion that *Kṛṣṇarāya* inflicted a defeat on the *Bahmuni Sultan* before January. 1510 A. D.

I am certain Dr. Venkataramanayya would not have missed the correct identification of this "King of Decan" had he quoted Dalboquerque a little more elaborately than he did. The passage runs: "After this (the discomfiture of the Zāmorin and the destruction of the Moors of Calicut) is over, I shall give my attention forthwith to the *affairs of Goa, wherein I can help him in the war against the king of Decan.*"<sup>18</sup> Were we to accept the above identification, then it is not easy to understand how Dalboquerque's operations at Goa could help *Kṛṣṇarāya* in his war with the Bahmuni Sultan. Who then was this 'King of Decan' whom Dalboquerque was referring to?

The attempt to distinguish between the king of Bījapur and the king of Dakhan may be traced to Varthema, who went about it clumsily, for to him the Dakhan was a city.<sup>19</sup> Dalboquerque himself was aware of this distinction. Yet evidence is not lacking to show that he meant different persons at different times by the same phrase the "King of Decan."<sup>20</sup> In his instructions to Fr. Luis, however, Dalboquerque intended only the king of Bījapur. My reasons for this contention are many and substantial.

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18. COMMENTARIES, II, pp. 74-77.

19. ITINERARY: Trans. by John Winter Jones, p. 48.

20. COMMENTARIES, IV, pp. 204-205. Dalboquerque speaks of both the Hidalcao and the king of Dakhan.



Since their arrival in India, the Portuguese had hardly any contact with the Bahmuny Sultan. They found Vijayanagara constantly at war with the rulers of Bījapur, rather than with the Bahmuny Sultan. Purchas,<sup>21</sup> Vijayanagaradasāmrajyavū, a Canarese chronicle<sup>22</sup>, and the Telugu works Rāyavācakanu<sup>23</sup> and Kṛṣṇarāyavijayamu,<sup>24</sup> all agree to an incessant war of Vijayanagara against Bījapur, Ahmadnagara and Gōlkonda during the initial years of Kṛṣṇarāya's reign, before the king marched against the Gajapati power entrenched in the Andhradōśa. According to the Canarese chronicle, Kṛṣṇarāya's war with the northern Moslems went on for full three years. As Kṛṣṇarāya is seen in the Unmattur country in September, 1512, A.D.<sup>25</sup> this war must have endured from 1509 to 1512 A.D. Dalboquerque must have had this prolonged war in his mind when he instructed Fr. Luis to assure Kṛṣṇarāya, "I am to destroy the Moors with whom I wage incessant war, as I know he also does."<sup>26</sup> The "king of Decan," therefore, could not have been any other than Yūsuf Ādil Shāh "A king in the country of Decan." It would then be easy to understand the significance of Dalboquerque's promised operations at Goa, how they would detract a part of Ādil Shāh's forces away to Goa from their

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21. FOR. EMPIRE, p. 125, n. i.

22. Dr. Venkataramanayya, YAVANARAJYA STHĀPANĀCĀRYA, J. O. R., April - June 1936 pp. 154 - 155.

23. SOURCES, p. 119.

24. *ibid*, p. 131.

25. 180 of 1913.

26. COMMENTARIES, II, pp. 74—77.

concentrated stand against the king and thus help the latter immensely. What is much more important for my argument, the COMMENTARIES has the following passage referring to Goa:

“.....the Moors for many years gained the kingdom of Daquem from the king of Narsinga and were masters of it: *although they always waged war with the Hindoos of Goa, until the Çabao became Lord of Daquem. they could never overcome them*”.<sup>27</sup>

These considerations make it more probable that the *Suratrāṇa* of the Hampi inscription applied in general to all the independent Moslem kings of the Dakhan and to Yūsuf Ādil Shāh of Bījapur in particular. Read with the relevant passages from contemporary literature, both the Portuguese and the Indian, the “Paribhūta-suratrāṇēna” of the Hampi epigraph points to the one inevitable conclusion. Immediately after his accession to power, Kṛṣṇarāya found himself in the cold grip of a three years’ war against his northern Moslem neighbour of Bījapur and against others. In the course of this war he must have won many an engagement over Yūsuf Ādil Shāh of Bījapur and thus earned not only the title “*Faribhūtasuratrāṇa*” but also an immediate relief from the stress of war which enabled him to celebrate his coronation on 23-24 January, 1510. A. D.

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27. *ibid.*, p. 95.

## CHAPTER VII.

### KRṢṆADĒVARĀYA AND FR. LUIS' EMBASSY TO VIJAYANAGARA

"The king of Narsynga has peace and friendship with

Your Majesty and he also helps the Sabayo against us"

- Albuquerque's letter to Dom Manuel, D. 1, April, 1512 A. D.

quoted from Rev. Heras: Early Relations between Vijayanagara and Portugal, Q. J. M. XVI. No. 2.

Kṛṣṇadēvarāya's accession to the throne opens a glorious page in the history of Vijayanagara. His succession, however, was not above question. For, it was accomplished in open defiance of the claims of the sons of his brother and the late sovereign, Vīraṇṛsimha. Kṛṣṇarāya, therefore, apprehended trouble from his own brothers and nephews. He came into a state of political turmoil, which his predecessors, beginning with Virupākṣa, had left behind. Rebellions within were a common feature. Particularly was it so in the Mysore territory where the Unmattur chiefs bore Cikkarāya paṭṭa<sup>1</sup> and evidently held Sthira-rājya at Terkanambi and the surrounding territory.<sup>2</sup> The empire itself was subject to a rapid disintegration. The

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1. E. C. III, MI, 95.

2. A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 117 and of 1909-10, p. 114.

Gajapatis of Orissa were now masters of the Southern Telugu districts down to the Udayagiri-maṇḍalam. The inimical Bahmuny Power had split into five independent kingdoms. Bijapur took up her role of traditional hostility to the Hindu Empire. Into her hands fell 'Goa, Chaul and Dabul and the other lands of the realm' originally lost by Virupākṣarāya<sup>3</sup> to Muhammad Shah Bahmuny (III). This and their control over the Kṛṣṇā-Tungabhadra doab with the strategical forts of Raichūr and Mudkal endangered the safety of the Empire. What was far more dangerous, Vijayanagara was very often given the go-bye by the Musalman monopolists in horse-trade. They evinced considerable partiality in their dealings towards monarchs of their own creed. Cavalry was the decisive factor in war. The horse, however, did not thrive on the south Indian soil and had to be imported from Sindh, Persia and Arabia. Uncertain of a regular supply of the animal, Vijayanagara was in great straits in her constant wars with the Musalmans. What stayed the hands of Bijapur was the hostility of the neighbouring Moslem rulers and the new threat she had to encounter in the Portuguese that first appeared in India in 1498 A. D.

By the capture of Constantinople in 1453 A. D. the Turks drove the Christians out of the entire trade of India with Europe. The European marts, such as Antwerp, clamoured for spices. The efforts to rehabilitate the European trade, resulted in the

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3. Nuniz, Sowell's FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 306.

discovery of a sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope. Thus, when Vasco da Gama landed off Calicut in May 1498 A. D., the Portuguese were regarded as the commercial rivals of the Musalmans.

As ill luck would have it, the Zāmorin of Calicut owed the extension of his royal power over the whole of Malabar mostly to the help of the Musalmans.<sup>4</sup> Yet he received da Gama kindly. But the latter misunderstood the courteous Zāmorin and antagonised him.<sup>5</sup> Sometime later, in a riot at Calicut, about two score of the Portuguese were killed. This was in a large measure due to the Portuguese ignorance of the local customs and habits.<sup>6</sup> Enraged, Cabral retaliated with the burning of Calicut. The Hindu rulers of Cannanore and Cochin, who feared the hegemony of Calicut, befriended the Portuguese and permitted them to build factories on their soil. In 1506 Francisco de Almeida endeavoured to obtain from Vijayanagara the right to build a fort at Bhaṭkal,<sup>7</sup> in vain. No alternative was left him but to war against the Zāmorin. The greater his hostility to the Zāmorin, the closer grew the latter's alliance with the Moors and the Sultan of Egypt. The combined fleets of the Sultan and of Malabar were, however, worsted in a naval engagement with Almeida in 1509 A. D.

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4. K. M. Panikker: MALABAR AND THE PORTUGUESE, pp. 16 - 17.

5. Whiteway: RISE OF THE PORTUGUESE POWER IN INDIA, pp. 81-86.

6. *ibid.*

7. Sewell: FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 117.



The Zāmorin was conquered, but not subdued. The Portuguese bent all their energies to bring him low. Afonso Dalboquerque took office as the Viceroy of India on Sunday the 5th Nov. 1509. His attempt to destroy Calicut ended in a disaster to the Portuguese. Several of them were killed, the Marshall was lost in the action and Alboquerque was himself wounded. *Fr. Luis' embassy to Vijayanagara* in January, 1510, A. D. within a few months of Kṛṣṇarāya's accession was thus the direct offshoot of Alboquerque's inability to reduce Calicut. This embassy is of great importance and interest to us and before we proceed with it, a peep into the prior contacts of the Portuguese with Vijayanagara becomes necessary.

The anti-Moor and therefore the anti-Zāmorin Portuguese would have easily secured an alliance with Vijayanagara. But unfortunately for themselves, they adopted an attitude of hostility towards the subordinate princes of Vijayanagara. This cast a shadow over all the attempts at rapprochement between them, when, later, they came to see the necessity of it.

On the west coast of India, where the Portuguese were active, the power of Vijayanagara was at its weakest. It was on a decline since the days of Virūpākṣarāya. And by the time of Kṛṣṇarāya, the Central authority could claim effective control only over the Male and Tulu Rājyas in the west.<sup>8</sup> These probably correspond to Barbosa's Danseam

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8. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar : A LITTLE KNOWN CHAPTER.....  
....., p. 45.

Rayen' and Tolinate respectively. The latter extended along the west coast from the northern extremity of Malabar upto the river Ligua in the North. At that river's mouth, on a hill, was a castle named Çintacora. The Ādil Shāh kept this fort well garri-soned to ward off the attacks, if any, from the Hindu neighbours.<sup>10</sup>

The Hindu neighbours were possibly the five kings referred to by Paes<sup>11</sup> as subjects and vassals of Vijayanagara. Nuniz<sup>12</sup> perhaps, meant the same when he mentioned the kings of Bengapore, 'Gasopa' 'Bacanore' 'Calecu'<sup>13</sup> and 'Baticala'. Most of these were constituents of Tolinate, which was, according to Barbosa, comprised of Cumbola, Bacanore, and Bracalor, Majandur, Batical, Honor and Mergen.<sup>14</sup> More than one place belonged to each of the main kingdoms of Bengapore, Gersoppa, Honāwar, Bhaṭkal and Bārakur. Of these, Bhaṭkal was a very rich kingdom yielding great revenue to the Centro. Its importance as a trading port was equalled only by the Moslem Goa and the Zāmorin's Calicut. Thwarted at Calicut, and not intending a direct fight with the Moslems, the Portuguese seem to have turned their eyes to Bhaṭkal.

9. This is stated to be in the back country behind Tolinate.

10. Barbosa, I, p. 182.

11. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 281.

12. *ibid*, p. 374.

13. Probably the Kalas'a country.

14. Barbosa, I, p. 198, n. I.

During his second voyage to India, in 1502 A.D., da Gama came upon some vessels of Timōja, a Captain of the Vijayanagara fleet.<sup>15</sup> Chasing those vessels into the river Onor, da Gama burned them down. Marching further, he secured a landing at Bhatkal by force. The ruler of the place offered submission to the Portuguese. This was accepted on condition that the Turks were prohibited from trading there, that no trade in pepper should be carried on at that port and that none of her vessels should visit Calicut. The king agreed to this and offered in addition a tribute of 1000 loads of rice every year for the Portuguese crews and 500 loads of better rice for the Captains. He excused himself from offering more, for he apparently then remembered that he was only a tenant of the king of Vijayanagara to whom the country belonged.<sup>16</sup>

From that day onwards, the attitude of the ruler of Onor was far from friendly to the Portuguese. However, the superiority of the Portuguese navy, which now began to control the sea, and the submissive attitude of the rulers of Quiloa and Mombasa appears to have cowed down the opposition of Onor. Shortly after the building of a fort at St. Anediva, Almeida visited Onor. On the pretext that he was not well-received by Merlao 'the ruler of the city of Onor

15. Danvers: REPORT, p. 4. He refers to pirates' vessels belonging to Timōja. See his THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA I, p. 1.

16. Danvers: THE PORTUGUESE..... I, p. 82.

only,'<sup>17</sup> Almeida burnt a number of the latter's ships. Merlão fled from the city and Timōja, the governor of the city, interviewed Almeida. He excused the king for the incidents that occurred and offered, in his name, vassalage to Portugal, which offer was accepted.<sup>18</sup>

The woeful spectacle of such an abject submission by the subordinate princes of Vijayanagara to the Portuguese does not seem to have escaped the notice of the Capital. For in 1506 A. D. Almeida's request to king Nṛsimha for a fort at Bhaṭkal was ignored. Father Heras draws our attention to the version of Castenhada.<sup>19</sup> According to this, the king, in his message of friendship threw all ports open for the Portuguese to build forts therein. Bhaṭkal alone was excepted as it had been rented. He even offered to furnish everything necessary for the erection of these forts. It is difficult to accept Castenhada. For we never see the Portuguese taking advantage of so fair an offer. On the other hand, Sowell was probably correct in thinking that no answer was returned.<sup>20</sup> It, however, showed the unwillingness of Vijayanagara to fall in with the Portuguese in their attempts to crush the Zamorin and his Moorish associates. The same reluctance is observable in the attitude adopted by Kṛṣṇadēvarāya towards Fr. Luis' embassy.

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17. Castenhada, drawn from by Heras: EARLY RELATIONS...  
Q. J. M. XVI, p. 65.

18. Danvers: PORTUGUESE..... p. 120.

19. Q. J. M. XVI, p. 66.

20. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE., p. 117.

Albuquerque's *instructions to Fr Luis*<sup>21</sup> were to impress the Rāya with the desirability of an alliance with the Portuguese. Masters of the sea, they would bring the Rāya to enjoy an exclusive trade in the horses of Ormuz. Both vijayanagara and the Portuguese had so far been individually fighting the Moors, who were their common enemy. They could now act conjointly. The Portuguese fleet and the army would now serve the Rāya. An attack on Goa by the Portuguese would divert the Moorish armies and leave the Hindus a free hand in their operations against Bijapur. As a preliminary, Vijayanagara should help the Portuguese with her armies, towns, harbours and munitions and with everything that Albuquerque might require of the kingdom from time to time. This was to take the Zāmorin captive. In this the Rāya would help himself as that would destroy the Moorish influence at Calicut. He asked also for a place between Mangalore and Bhaṭkal, to build a factory thereon.

This embassy did not evoke a prompt reply. In all his relations with Albuquerque, this was apparently the only occasion when the Rāya commanded a better bargaining opportunity. Thereafter he is seen in a supplicating mood. His requests for the refusal of horses always came just too late. By then, Albuquerque had gained a key position and dictated his own terms. If these appearances were true then this did not

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21. COMMENTARIES OF AFONSO DALBOQUERQUE, II, pp 74-77.



adound to the credit of the Rāya. With this in view, perhaps, some historians charge the Rāya that he did not properly size up the Portuguese. He would not war against them nor would he accept their proffered help to destroy his Indian enemies. On the other hand, the generality of opinion credits the Rāya with a correct perspective. Yet they too feel somehow that the Rāya's attitude was unaccountable except in terms of the troubled political conditions of the times. Most of his time must have been taken up with internal adjustments. Again he had to fight the northern Moslems and the Gajapati in the initial stages of his rule. "This progress of Krishnaraya" writes Dr. S. K. Ayyangar, "and his doings during the first two or three years of his reign account for what seems unaccountable in respect of his attitude to the Portuguese." <sup>22</sup>

I am afraid nothing can be accounted for by what happens later on. Nor can the Rāya's reluctance to fall in with Fr. Luis' terms of reference within *a few months* of his accession be explained away by what he did during the *first two or three years* of his reign. Yet, there is much truth in the argument presented above. So far as it asserts of the Rāya that he took a proper measure of the Portuguese, it is quite in keeping. But in as much as it suggests that the Rāya could not and, therefore, did not take the proper line of action towards them, it cannot be accepted. My

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22. YET - REMEMBERED RULER.....Hindusthan Review, 1917  
May - June, p. 889.

present endeavour is to show that Kṛṣṇadēvarāya had pursued a definite policy towards the foreigners. He neither ignored them as merely traders; nor failed to check them because of his own more pressing need of pacifying the country and rendering his position on the throne more secure.

Kṛṣṇarāya knew well the scant courtesy that the Portuguese had shown his subordinate princes on the west coast. They treated with the princes without any reference to Vijayanagara. They imposed such conditions on them that cut at the root of Vijayanagara's sovereignty. It could not be that these subordinate kings were loyal to the Centre so long as they paid the annual tribute and maintained the specified quota of force. But then, that Centre could not come to their rescue. They, no doubt, resented the Portuguese exactions. Yet, they were helpless and had to bow before the inevitable. But with the advent of a strong monarch in Kṛṣṇarāya, these very princes applied themselves to the task of subverting the Portuguese Power in India. Guiding them, the Rāya easily outplayed Albuquerque in the game of diplomacy.

In his eagerness to destroy the Zāmorin, and the Moors, Albuquerque was confident of exploiting the Rāya's enmity to both of them. But Vijayanagara's interests lay in the other way. Any further strengthening of the Portuguese would only make him more dependent on them for his strength in cavalry. To keep them all at war and see that none went

down, would serve him best. They would all get weakened. The Portuguese would be as eager as ever for an alliance with the Rāya. This would ensure a regular supply of horse to him and weaken the Ādil Shāh's cavalry. Kṛṣṇarāya could not alienate the Portuguese; nor was he ready to concede anything on the lines indicated through the embassy. So he adopted dilatory tactics. When Fr. Luis went to the Court of Vijayanagara, he was 'well received by all except the king.' <sup>23</sup>

Albuquerque had made the Rāya's help in the capture of Zamorin the condition precedent to his attack on Goa. <sup>24</sup> The Rāya was taking time to reply. In the meanwhile, Albuquerque wanted to isolate Calicut. He set sail for the Red Sea to cut away Calicut's communications with Egypt. But on his way Timōja met him and informed him that an Egyptian Captain was hurriedly converting Goa into a naval base at the request of the Ādil Shāh. <sup>25</sup> Goa, however, would "die", for the Ādil Shāh was dead <sup>26</sup> and his son away in the interior. Timōja got this information confirmed by a Fakir <sup>27</sup> whom he had himself seized after the capture of Çintacora. The news was at once a threat and a bait. An Egyptian Commander

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23. COMMENTARIES, III, p. 35.

24. *ibid.*, II, p. 76.

25. *ibid.*, II, p. 82.

26. *ibid.* pp. 81—82. Yūsuf Ādil Shah was still alive. See Chapter VIII.

27. *ibid.* p. 87.

operating from Goa would immensely help the Zāmorin. To leave him at Goa was to nullify the very purpose that was leading him to the Red Sea. On the other hand, Goa, sparsely garrisoned and incompletely fortified, was so tempting. Albuquerque changed his plans. And on March 1, 1510 A. D., Goa fell into the hands of the Portuguese, with little fighting.<sup>28</sup> Thus a Portuguese attack on Goa, Albuquerque's conditional offer to Kṛṣṇarāya, was fulfilled. The Rāya, however, incurred no obligations.

The Portuguese victory surprised nobody. For it was known how Timōja had intrigued with the Hindus of Goa to deliver up the city.<sup>29</sup> Timōja, a subordinate of the Rāya, would not act as he did, had he not had specific instructions from above. The Ādil Shāh lodged a protest against the part played by Timōja and other subjects of Vijayanagara. He hoped that they had not acted in accordance with the Rāya's wishes, and begged him for help to regain Goa.<sup>30</sup>

Kṛṣṇarāya understood the remonstrance. He would not, however, dissociate himself from the affair. On the contrary, he claimed responsibility for Timōja's actions. He even proclaimed his gratification to see Goa in the hands of the Portuguese. He warned the Ādil Shāh against any attempts to regain Goa, for then, he would himself be helping the Portuguese

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28. *ibid*, pp. 88-92.

29. *ibid*, p. 144.

30. *ibid*, pp. 138-139.

defend it. On 24th April, Bersore', the king of Gersoppa, through his runner, informed the Portuguese Viceroy of what passed between Vijayanagara and Bījapur. Kṛṣṇarāya had then expressed himself as the brother and friend of the king of Portugal.<sup>31</sup> And now Bersore' too sent in his personal assurances of friendship and aid in case of need.<sup>32</sup> These assurances were not genuine. For when on 17th May, the Ādil Shāh reentered Goa, Albuquerque found himself alone to fight him and perforce retreated.

The *Status quo* was thus restored. But with this difference. Henceforth, Goa definitely became the bone of contention between Bījapur and the Portuguese. For Albuquerque vowed to take his rest again in the place of the Ādil Shāh before that summer would pass.<sup>33</sup> The Ādil Shāh pleaded in vain with Albuquerque to leave Goa alone and accept any other place instead and a lasting friendship with the Moslems. He would gladly forego Goa itself but that his Captains would rebel against him. Albuquerque summarily rejected these offers. He would think of no treaty without the surrender of Goa.

Thus Goa hung fire. Until a war finally settled it, one way or the other, Kṛṣṇarāya could openly side with neither party. Bījapur showed no signs of weakening. And a hostile Bījapur was unwelcome

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31. *ibid.*

32. *ibid.*

33. *ibid.*, p. 187.



particularly at that time. For, Kṛṣṇarāya had immediately to attend to the rebellion of the Unmattur chiefs, who claimed the throne of Vijayanagara as theirs of right. The revolt spread to Penukonda. The Rāya, therefore, sought friendship with Bījapur. Circumstances favoured his general policy. Yūsuf Ādil Shah appears to have died at the time<sup>84</sup> giving place to Ismael. Inexperienced, and confronted with a war with the Portuguese over Goa, Ismael Ādil Shāh hearkened willingly to Kṛṣṇarāya's secret overtures for peace.

On the other hand, the Portuguese were still to justify their claims to be regarded as a superior military power. Nevertheless a Portuguese Goa was a possibility. The possession of Belgaum alone would meet that danger. For without that fortress, one could not keep the kingdom of Goa and all the estate there, safe and secure.<sup>85</sup> But it was then in the hands of Bījapur, which could not just then be antagonised. The Rāya began to explore ways and means to obtain the fort. In the meanwhile, he kept up a friendly attitude towards the Portuguese. In theory, he had already come out as an advocate of their cause. More than ever, Bersore' and Timōja were ingratiating themselves into the favour of the

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84. Ferishta places Yūsuf's death in 1512 A. D. Dr. N. Venkataramanayya believes that his death took place sometime between February 1509, and February 1510 A. D. (J. O. R., April-June, 1936, p. 160). But the evidence available points out a later date for the event sometime between 19th August and Nov. 1510 A. D. (See next Chapter.)

85. COMMENTARIES, III, p. 37.

Portuguese Viceroy. The rulers of Bhaṭkal wooed Albuquerque for an alliance.<sup>36</sup>

Albuquerque recaptured Goa in November, 1510 A. D. This enhanced the prestige of the Portuguese to a high degree. The Hindu and Moslem princes began to pay them homage. For it disheartened them who had contemplated the extermination of the foreigners. The king of Cambaiya came forth with the offer of Diu to the Portuguese. The Zamorin himself prayed Albuquerque to accept a site at Calicut to build a factory thereon. Albuquerque was not supported by Bersore' and Timōja in the capture of Goa. He soon fortified it and began harassing Bhaṭkal. The latter soon would cease to be the principal centre of trade with Ormuz. The situation compelled Kṛṣṇarāya to send his envoys to Goa.

One of these envoys carried a letter from Fr. Luis to Albuquerque. This letter<sup>37</sup> is very important. It initiates us for the first time into what transpired behind the scenes at Vijayanagara. But it is in parts very highly confusing. An elaborate quotation may, therefore, be permitted:—

‘And as for the negotiations which his instructions ordered him to carry out, he had presented them many times without getting any answer to the purpose, but always had been put off; but at last he had told him (the Rāya) that he (Luis)

36. *ibid.* II, p. 225.

37. *ibid.* III, pp. 35-38.

was very much disconcerted at the orders (Ādil Shāh's) for attacking him (Albuquerque) and he might build a fortress at Baticala, for he (the Rāya) said that he was very desirous of his (Albuquerque's) friendship at the very time that he (Luis) knew that it had been entered into with the Hidalcao, but that did not agree with the offers that he (Albuquerque) had made to help him (the Rāya) in taking the kingdom of Decan, which had been his (the Rāya's) of old. And when these interviews with the king were over, the king sent for the governor of the city and blamed him very much for desiring this alliance with the Hidalcao. And that king of Garcopa had written him a letter by virtue of which he could take him (Ādil Shāh) and destroy him if he liked, but as they were now very friendly, he had not done so; but that if this (alliance) was done for money which he (Ādil Shāh) had promised to give him (the Rāya) the Hidalcao would show towards them that true faith which his father (Yūsuf) had shown towards the king of Narsinga, when he took him in battle but released him on his promise to serve him for ever.' <sup>38</sup>

Herein Fr. Luis refers to his 'Interviews' with the Rāya. The letter itself in a way summarises the talks that ensued. After a good deal of delay Fr. Luis got an opportunity to place Albuquerque's proposals before the Rāya. The Rāya gave no answer.

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38. The pronouns in the passage are highly confusing. The apposites within brackets are mine.

Time passed. Slowly, little by little, Fr. Luis got scent of an understanding existing between Vijayanagara and Bijapur. This explained the Rāya's hesitancy to accept his proposals. The Rāya had shown himself capable of playing a double game. His protestations of friendship for the Portuguese were all a show. All the time, he was instigating the Ādil Shāh to fight the Portuguese. He promised to keep peace with Bijapur in return for a certain sum. Bersore's 'information' placed the Ādil Shāh in his power. He knew Ismael was the son of his father, never to be taken at his word. Yet he would not harm him. For it would go against their agreement. Alboquerque offered to help the Rāya to gain the kingdom of Dakhan for Vijayanagara. To take advantage of it, the Rāya would have to denounce the agreement. He did not choose to do so. Fr. Luis suggested that his duplicity was known. The Rāya had been so much pleased to profess that he esteemed the friendship of the portuguese. Fr. Luis asked him to prove it in action. Let him allow Alboquerque to build a factory at Bhaṭkal. That would give them a safe harbour, while Goa might any moment be attacked by the Moslems. The Rāya reprimanded the 'governor' for having concluded a treaty with Bījapur over his head. But this was only a politic denial of his responsibility. It was neither meant nor taken to prove the innocence of its author.

Fr. Luis' letter discloses Bersore' as the trusted servant of the Rāya. He plotted against Bijapur. He was equally scheming against the Portuguese. In this he was ably assisted by Timōja. Fr. Luis advised

Albuquerque not to trust either of them. They were 'men of such bad dispositions.' They had written to the Raya asking for forces. If they arrived in time, they 'would deliver the city (of Goa) over to him before the Portuguese could fortify their position therein.' Albuquerque now realised the futility of his efforts to enlist in his favour the military strength of Vijayanagara. Alive to this danger, Fr. Luis advised the Portuguese Viceroy to 'keep up friendly communications with the king.' The king was getting himself ready with five thousand men on foot and two thousand on horse. It was difficult to understand the drift of all this. The Raya would take the rebel, who had seized Penukonḍa. He would also 'Proceed with all this force of men to his places situated on the edge of the sea.'<sup>39</sup> Goa was close by. Hence Fr. Luis' advice to Albuquerque.

Albuquerque had already realised in experience the faithlessness of Bersore' and Timōja. Fr. Luis' warning only confirmed his worst suspicions. In fact, Fr. Luis had already been anticipated. On his way to Goa, Albuquerque, with his fleet, anchored off Anjediva. While there 'he was advised not to place any reliance upon promised offers of the king of Garçopa and of Timōja, because they were in fear lest things should not turn out well for them and they did not wish to be in worse relation to the Hidalcao than they were already.'<sup>40</sup>

39. COMMENTARIES III, p. 85.

40. *ibid.*, p. 3.



Reference is made to Bersore', how in April 1510 A. D. he assured the Portuguese Viceroy that 'he too was ready with his own body and all the resources of his kingdom to serve him against the Hidalcao whenever it was necessary.'<sup>41</sup> In reply, Albuquerque just thanked him. For he made up his mind to send Bersore' a 'messenger who would tell him all about the proceedings by word of mouth.'<sup>42</sup> He could not put them on paper in black and white. They were so important and confidential. What was the game? Albuquerque himself furnishes the key to the mystery. He wrote to Timōja in September, 1510 A. D.: 'Kiss for me the hands of Garçopa and tell him that I beg he will assist me with all his power ..... I will help him with my person, my horses, arms and people to gain much land from them and I will make him a greater Lord than all the others who are round about him.'<sup>43</sup> This was his bid for Bersore's complete allegiance. Bersore' pretended to be taken in. He got his armies ready. Laurenço Moreno interpreted to Albuquerque that this was 'with the intention of cooperating with him in the Goa expedition.'<sup>44</sup> This hastened Albuquerque to proceed to Goa. Before carrying Goa by assault, Albuquerque waited for them, three days. But they did not appear. He believed that this defection had all been brought about by the Turks.

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41. *ibid*, II, p. 139.

42. *ibid*.

43. *ibid*, p. 228.

44. *ibid*, p. 241.

They had heavily bribed Timōja and Bersore' not to assist the Portuguese. He knew Timōja was artful and was sure to keep on dissembling. The taking of Goa would cost much blood. Until the fall of the city, Timōja would not show himself.<sup>45</sup> Albuquerque had not yet divined the true cause.

A similar experience awaited him with regard to Bhaṭkal. The previous March, her rulers had approached him praying for a treaty. Strongly entrenched at Goa, and intent upon wrecking Bhaṭkal as a trading port, Albuquerque did not answer them. But now, Goa was again to be taken. During the operations, Bhaṭkal was indispensable for supplies. In September, 1510 A. D. Albuquerque sent Laurengo to Bhaṭkal. He had to demand of her rulers a house of stone and mortar built at their expense and an annual tribute of two thousand bags of rice. It was now their turn to reject his proposals. They refused to do anything of the kind suggested without first of all finding what the pleasure of their Lord of Vijayanagara would ordain.<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, Albuquerque took Goa. He was disgusted with the subordinates of Vijayanagara. They seemed never to keep faith with him. Kṛṣṇarāya himself was quite evasive. Albuquerque now turned to Bījapur. He set afoot negotiations with the Ādil Shah to discover how they might both live as friendly neighbours. The Portuguese Goa began to drain Bhaṭkal

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45. *ibid*, III, p. 7.

46. *ibid*, II, p. 241.

of her trade. It was at this time, that Belgaum went over to Vijayanagara. Fr. Luis wrote: 'the principal Hindoos of the city of Belgao (as soon as they heard of the capture of Goa and its fortification by the Portuguese) had broken out into rebellion against the Hidalcao and had cast the Moors out of the city and put themselves under the command of the king'<sup>47</sup> of Vijayanagara.

To do so, the good citizens of Belgaum waited until after the fortification of Goa by the Portuguese. Bersore' and Timōja had promised to deliver up to the Rāya only an unfortified Goa. Since that was no longer possible, they seem to have attended to Belgaum. The Rāya was still playing the friend of Bījapur. So they proceeded with caution. Their relations with Bījapur were already far from friendly. They could not further strain them without exposing the Rāya. We saw them how they collected their forces even by September, as though to support Albuquerque in the capture of Goa. They gave him no help. Belgaum went over to Vijayanagara.

These events seem to be somehow connected. Due to reasons specified above, Bersore' and Timōja could not take Belgaum by force and in their king's name. Timōja was not a novice at intrigue. He must have been carrying on conversations with the principal Hindus of the city. Their armies, however, were got ready. For they would come handy in case the

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47. *ibid* III, p. 86.

intrigue went wrong or the Moslems of the city getting scent of it, tried to foil it at the critical stage. The Rāya could easily risk an open rupture with the Ādil Shāh though he would not wish it. For one thing, Bersore's 'information' gave the Rāya a great hold on the Ādil Shāh. Secondly, a fight with Bījapur would place him as the friend of Portugal, come to her assistance in her prolonged strife with the Moslems.

Over a year, Afonso Dalboquerque had been kept in the dark. He did not know that the Emperor was ever in combat with him. Whichever way he turned, whether it be towards the Ādil Shāh or towards the subordinates of Vijayanagara, he met with some shadowy obstruction. To his credit may be said that he made the best of a bad bargain. A lesser man would have, in despair, left Goa alone, unconquered. Alboquerque captured it. But it was out of his calculations. In his attempts to monopolise the sea-borne trade of India, he intended an attack on Goa as a bait to lure in Kṛṣṇarāya. But then nothing worked to his plan. For Fr. Luis' letter opened his eyes for the first time. The diplomacy of Vijayanagara stood revealed. The Vijayanagara envoys had, therefore, to return as they had come. Alboquerque refused to settle with them the terms of an exclusive trade in horses. He would first await the Rāya's reply to the questions raised by him through Fr. Luis.

The envoys returned with the information that Alboquerque was negotiating a treaty with Bījapur.

One of them, the same as had carried so important a letter of Fr. Luis, carried back instructions to him to dissemble with the king as much as he could and return to Goa immediately.<sup>48</sup> Fr. Luis, however, was not to receive this message. By the time the envoy reached Vijayanagara, Fr. Luis was dead, murdered by a Turk.

The COMMENTARIES refers to the death of Fr. Luis thus: 'It was reported that the Hidalcao had ordered his murder.'<sup>49</sup> There is a letter written, according to Father Heras, by Albuquerque to his sovereign dated 1st April, 1516 A. D.<sup>50</sup> It appears therein is written: 'At Biznagar, one Rume murdered Frey Luis; there is nothing extraordinary in this event.'<sup>51</sup> Father Heras states 'most likely that murder was committed to prevent the pourparlers from taking place between Krishnadeva Raya and the Franciscan Friar about the trade in horses.'<sup>52</sup>

These apparently conclusive assertions have to answer the following question: Who would be the gainer for Luis' death? Or which is the same, Who stood to lose if he were alive?

It may be remembered that scarcely had Goa fallen, but Albuquerque entreated Ismael, for his own

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48. *ibid.*, p. 38.

49. *ibid.*

50. Albuquerque died in December 1515 A. D. Either the date is incorrect or the latter's authorship.

51. EARLY RELATIONS.....Q. J. M. XVI, p. 69.

52. *ibid.*



good, to ally with the Portuguese. With a mere assent, Ismael could deprive Vijayanagara of her horse-supply. For that, no murder was necessary. Supposing the necessity were admitted, even then, why choose a Turk for the role? To have done so, the Ādil Shāh must have had a very poor judgement. For it could easily be turned against him. It was so done, in fact. And again, until he lost Belgaum Ismael was on friendly terms with Vijayanagara. He must have known Kṛṣṇarāya was not a party to the attack on Goa. The Rāya had, therefore no claims to the Portuguese support. Then why this fear of a not very probable treaty between them? Why this murder?

One may reply that Kṛṣṇarāya heard of the negotiations between Goa and Bijapur, for the first time, only after Fr. Luis' death. Broadly, the reply may be accepted. But it only shows the untenability of the motives read into the murder. They were different and deeper. This had already been indicated in the foregoing pages. Kṛṣṇarāya had allowed Fr. Luis several interviews. The ambassador was unguarded in his talks. The Rāya easily gathered from him that the secret of his policy towards Goa and Bijapur was known to him. Just then he was considering the advisability of seizing Goa for himself. Could it be that this too was known to Fr. Luis? Of a sudden, the Friar proved a danger to the Empire, both near the Court and away from it. The only go was to stifle his voice. The murder secured this. To engage a Turk for the purpose was to throw the blame on the Ādil Shāh.

It appears as if there was at Vijayanagara a strict censorship of Friar Luis' letters to Albuquerque. 'After that the Great Afonso Dalboquerque sent Fr. Luis to Narsinga .....he *never received any news* of how things had fared with him.'<sup>53</sup> Not that Luis had not written to him. In his last letter the Friar wrote to Albuquerque; 'relating the manner of his arrival at Narsinga and stating that, *in other letters which he had written*, he had described how he had been well received by all except the king.'<sup>54</sup> This absence of information was not as regards the 'Instructions' alone. Were it so, there was no need for him to relate anew 'the manner of his arrival at Vijayanagara.' That no information ever reached Albuquerque from Luis is, therefore, a safe inference. The letter is a narration of past events and of several talks with the Rāya. It also refers to a rising of the 'Guazils' against the Ādil Shah. Albuquerque might be expected to have known it. The warning against 'Timōja and Persere' came long after Albuquerque suffered from their defection. Evidently Fr. Luis had not heard of it. He was virtually a prisoner.

It appears, however, that Fr. Luis became conscious of his anomalous position. He now made every effort to come into touch with Goa. The envoy of Kṛṣṇarāya was his find to communicate with Albuquerque. The letter that he sent through him is very

53. COMMENTARIES, III, p. 85.

54. *ibid.*

important, full of the official secrets of the Vijayanagara Court. To entrust it to an envoy of the same Rāya, Fr. Luis must have won him over by payment or through promises. That an ambassador should not have had communication with his superior, independent of the Court to which he had been sent, is the last that can ever be imagined. Yet, so it was. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain how Fr. Luis had to approach Vijayanagara's envoy to transmit his letter. That was the last act of Fr. Luis for the benefit of the Portuguese. He had successfully unveiled the diplomacy of Vijayanagara: but his efforts in that direction cost him his life.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THEN DIED YŪSUF ĀDIL SHĀH

The death of Yūsuf Ādil Shāh is a mystery, not because the Moslem and other chroniclers have been so uncommunicative. On the otherhand, they have left too many a word behind, leaving nobody any the wiser for all that. If Kṛṣṇarāya were not vainglorious, Yūsuf must have gone down fighting the "Infidel" king of Vijayanagara.<sup>1</sup> This may perhaps explain the abundance of contradictory stories of the time, place and the circumstances of the death of Yūsuf Ādil Shāh of Bījapur.

Zābirī was referring to this divergence when he wrote, "The death of Yusuf Adil Khan was, according to the author of the *Tabqāt-i-Akbari*, in 913; according to the history of Muhammad Qāsim Ferishta in 916; and according to Rāfi-ud-dīn Shirāji and Mīr Ibrahim Asad Khānī in 925." Add to these, 912, given by Syed Ali Azizullah Tabataba for the event, 910 by the Anonymous Historian of the

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1. Kṛṣṇarāya : AMUKTAMĀLYADA, Canto I, verse 42. The king claims to have defeated the Musalmāns and in what were their territories made a scare-crow of the severed head of Ādil Khān. Ismael, son of Yūsuf, died in 1634, four years after Kṛṣṇa's death. Hence the Ādil Khān of the poem was Yūsuf himself. See K. V. Lakshmana Rao : *VYASAVALI* I, pp. 40 — 41.

Qutb Shahi Kings, and 916, and 914 given by Khāfi Khān.<sup>2</sup> You have a fairly good idea of the picture. Nor is this all. For a similar maze of contradictions confronts us as regards Yūsuf's last moments and the place where he breathed his last. Ferishta writes that Yūsuf died of dropsy at Bījapur.<sup>3</sup> According to the Anonymous Historian "Yoosoof Adil Khan died at Kovilkonda."<sup>4</sup> This latter Historian finds corroboration in that Syed Ali declares that Majlis-i-Rafi Ādil Khan died within sight of Kōvilkonda.<sup>5</sup>

The contemporary Portuguese opinion, however, is strongly at variance with the version of Ferishta. According to them Yūsuf was already dead by 20th February 1510 A.D., when for the first time Afonso Dalboquerque arrived at Goa for the capture of the port. If, on the other hand, Ferishta were reliable, then Yūsuf must have lived on to retake Goa from the Portuguese on the 20th of May 1510 A.D. He must have died shortly after that date. But Dr. N. Venkataramanayya pins his faith to the Portuguese accounts and goes to argue that Yūsuf Ādil Shah must have expired sometime between February 1509 and February 1510 A.D.<sup>6</sup>

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2. Quoted by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya, J. O. R. April - June 1936, p. 160.

3. BRIGGS, III, p. 30.

4. *ibid.*, app. p. 350.

5. BURHAN-I-MAASIR, Ind. Ant. 1899, p. 319. Kōvilkonda was a fort on the frontiers of the Qutb Shahi dominions.

6. J. O. R. 1936, April-June, p. 160.



Dalboquerque set sail from Cochin on 10th February 1510 A. D. The Grand Sultan of Egypt was attempting to land his forces in India to command the favour and assistance of the Moors against the Portuguese. These designs of the Egyptian had to be frustrated. Hence Dalboquerque's voyage. On his way, when off Anjediva, he met Timōja, a commander of the Vijayanagara fleet.<sup>7</sup> Timōja told the Portuguese Viceroy that the "Çabaio, Lord of Goa, was dead."<sup>8</sup> These news were so unexpected and so welcome. Dalboquerque changed his mind and his vessels now started off for Goa. Timōja kept his story going and as they neared Çintacora, he reassured Dalboquerque that "By means of messages and letters that he had received from the Hindus of the city he had been notified of the death of Çabaio and that in Goa there was a captain, named Çufer Guji ..... (who), after the death of the Çabaio, obeyed no one."<sup>9</sup> During the taking of Çintacora, a fakir fell into the hands of Timōja. And this fakir too told Dalboquerque that the news of Goa was that the Çabaio was dead and his son away in the interior of the country."<sup>10</sup> On 1, March, Goa fell into the hands of the Portuguese *with little fighting*.<sup>11</sup> About the

7. Barbosa calls him a pirate, maintained by the Lord of the land (Vijayanagara). Op. cit, I, p. 186. I feel that Barbosa's opinion is not in consonance with Timōja's character and conduct.

8. COMMENTARIES, II, pp. 81—82.

9. *ibid*, II, p. 85.

10. *ibid*. II, p. 87.

11. *ibid*, II, pp. 88—92.

end of the month, two ambassadors, to the court of Çabaio, finding that the latter was already dead, approached Afonso Dalboquerque instead.<sup>12</sup> Dr. Venkataramanayya makes no doubt, that Yüsuf was not alive by 20th of February 1510 A. D. He tries further to circumscribe this occurrence. Now Timōja had told Dalboquerque of a captain at Goa. This was formerly, a captain of the Grand Sultan of Egypt. After the latter's defeat at the hands of Almeida on 3 February 1509 A. D. this captain repaired himself to Goa and made it his Headquarters at the request of the Çabaio.<sup>13</sup> The Çabaio, therefore, must have been living atleast upto the time of his request to the captain. Hence the death of Sultan of Bijapur must have occurred sometime later than 3rd February 1509 A. D., but in no case after February 1510 A. D.

This in brief is the thesis of Dr. Venkataramanayya on the question and as a theory it is quite a plausible one. What is very striking, the ultimate source of this information about Yüsuf is only Timōja. The Fakir who confirmed Timōja's tale cannot be above suspicion, for he had been a captive of Timōja ere he was produced before Dalboquerque. Yet Timōja is found no where to take the responsibility for this news on himself. At Çintacora, he takes pains to impress upon Afonso that his information was what was gathered from messages he had received

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12. *ibid.*, II, p. 106.

13. *ibid.*, p. 82.

from the Hindus of Goa. What was he upto? Was it that he should clear himself beforehand so that if and when Afonso came by the truth, he could shove the blame on to others and himself play the victim of deception? Afonso on his part does not appear to have been completely taken in. For on 27 February 1510, scarcely a couple of days before Goa was taken, we find him exhorting his captains that it would not be much of an exacting job to capture Goa "if Timōja had spoken truly."<sup>14</sup> He had his own suspicions that with an eye to the profit he may derive from the capture of Goa,<sup>15</sup> Timōja was egging the Portuguese on to commit themselves to a policy of aggression in Bījapur, and with this view was luring them with false news of Yūsuf's death. If with all these reservations Dalboquerque still chose to attack Goa, he must have had very good reasons for that. These are atleast open to conjecture. For if Dalboquerque's sole aim was to prevent the junction of Egyptian armies with those of the Ġabaio, this could be achieved as much by the capture of Goa as by an earlier defeat of the Egyptian. Why then should he forego the chance of an easy success nearer his own headquarters, if Timōja were honest? And even if Timōja proved incorrect, an attack on Goa was not so very more difficult than a naval battle in Egyptian waters. With Timōja in the camp, Dalboquerque was assured of the sympathies of all the Hindus of Goa. Hence the decision of the Portuguese Viceroy.

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14. *ibid.*, p. 88.

15. *ibid.*, p. 86.

There are some passages in the Commentaries which, as Dr. Venkataramanayya remarks, are "Very intriguing." A close scrutiny would reveal that they hold the key to the solution of the problem on hand. One of them runs:— "The Hidalcao having recalled to mind that which the Great Afonso Dalboquerque had sent to declare to his father (while that commander was lying in the river Goa..... and when he was no longer able to restrain his temper) that he should *yet* see his words come to pass and the *City in the power of the Christians and Milrrhao, the Hindu, carrying on the Government.*"<sup>16</sup> This declaration which was obviously meant for Yūsuf Ādil Shah rings very like the threat held out by Dalboquerque during the course of his talks with Mustafa Khān, the officer of the Sultan of Bijapur. Dalboquerque warned Mustafa on the occasion that "he would promise him before that summer would pass away that he would be taking rest again in the palace at Goa, and that *he hoped to make Timoja, a very great Lord in the kingdom of Decan.*"<sup>17</sup>

Now these two statements, the Declaration and the Threat, differ in their tenor and also refer to two different individuals, Milrrhao and Timōja. One cannot be mistaken for the other. The Threat, however, must have been *later in point of time*, for Mustafa was the last of the officers of the Ādil Khān to have interviewed Dalboquerque before the latter left the

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16. Ibid, III, p. 187; J. O. R. April - June, 1936, f. n. p. 158.

17. Ibid, II, p. 187.

river Goa behind, to seek further aid for another assault on Goa's battlements. But it is not as easy to chime in with Dr. Venkataramanayya's conclusion that the Declaration was made prior to the first Portuguese attack on Goa.

At the time of the Declaration, the Portuguese Viceroy was highly wrought up and was "no longer able to restrain his temper." Nor could you expect of him to have been calm and collected when he bade defiance at the Ādil Shāh. By then Dalboquerque had not yet crossed the bar of the river and significantly enough, even when the Declaration was made, that Commander "was lying in the river Goa."

The time of Dalboquerque's stay in the river thus assumes great importance. In that duration, Yūsuf Ādil Shāh was still living for it was to him Dalboquerque had sent to declare that Goa would "yet" pass into the Christian hands and its Government be entrusted to Milrrhao.

The Ādil Shāh wrested Goa back from the Christians on 20th of May 1510. Dalboquerque betook himself to his boats in the river Goa but could not cross over the bar *until 16th August*,<sup>18</sup> of that year. This appears to have been the first time that Afonso remained so long in that river. For some days before he set off from Cochin on 10th February 1510 A. D., "Afonso Dalboquerque gave orders to Lional Coutinho and to Bras Teixeira...to make their way to Onor

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18. COMMENTARIES, II Chapters 82—88.



and announce to Timoja that he, Afonso, was getting himself ready with the Indian fleet and with merchant vessels to fall upon Goa before they went off to Portugal, and that he would *ask him permission to be granted for Lionel Coutinho to enter the river in order to ascertain its depth*; and that———he was to hold himself in readiness to be with him in that expedition." To this "...Timoja replied that.....  
.....*as for the river of Goa, there was no need for any one to see it* for he himself had seen it and that was sufficient and that *Goa was alone without any garrison* and all the inhabitants in dreadful apprehension of the Portuguese, and that he, the Marshall, could take the city into his own hands whenever he liked to come and that he himself would be in readiness with his men to cooperate with him in the affair."<sup>19</sup>

Thus it appears that not until Goa was captured in the first instance on 1 March 1510 A.D. did either Dalboquerque or any of his captains cast anchor there long enough even to sound the depth of the river. The Declaration, therefore, must have been made subsequent to 1st March 1510 A. D., when "Goa was alone without any garrison." But within a shortwhile the situation at Goa underwent a change. For when off Anjediva, Timōja informed Dalboquerque that a captain of the Grand Sultan with some Rumes had arrived at Goa and that the Qabaio had made important overtures to this captain to the end that

19. *ibid.*, II, p. 53.

he should settle there. This captain wanted to establish himself strongly at Goa and asked the Sultan for some soldiers.

These soldiers never turned up. The captain hardly had any time to strengthen himself there at Goa. On 27th February 1510 Dalboquerque exhorted his captains immediately to go for it for "if they omitted now to capture Goa....." he said, "and if the Rumes established themselves in Goa and fortified it, then the Çamorin, who was allied with the city, would never, in his opinion, withdraw from it."<sup>20</sup> And when the attack was delivered, Goa fell with little fighting.

The assault on Goa had been contemplated less as an immediate necessity than as a prospective desirability. Afonso was decided to fall upon Goa before they went off to Portugal. For the time, however, the Viceroy was off to engage the Egyptian fleet. But the talk with Timōja, off Anjediva, reversed the original plans. The news of Yūsuf's death was unexpected and not unwelcome. Notwithstanding his doubts of its authenticity, Dalboquerque decided to capture Goa and immediately set about the task. The decision was sudden and the action quick. In all this where does a previous Declaration come in?

An initial success, and a frustration soon after, these were the springs of Dalboquerque's Declaration. In this context, the word "yet" in "he should yet

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20. *ibid*, II, p. 83.

see his words come to pass" gains a new significance and must be taken to mean "In spite of the present discomfiture." Afonso was obviously brooding over his defeat which forced him to take refuge on his boats in the river Goa.

This contention is fully borne out by a letter which Dalboquerque wrote to Ismael Ādil Shah in the moment of his victory. He had just retaken Goa in November 1510 A. D. and he addressed the Young Sultan of Bījapur thus: "..... I wish most sincerely that your father had been living that he know me to be a man of my word".<sup>21</sup> This desire demonstrates that Yūsuf must have died unconvinced of Afonso's ability to make good his word. Or what is the same thing, he must have remained master of Goa to the moment of his death. This is possible in either case, if Dalboquerque had not attempted to take Goa at all, or having seized it, could not retain it when Yūsuf made a bid for its possession. Of these the latter is more natural and reasonable. Dalboquerque's wish looks as the natural outcome of a sense of satisfied power. He wished so because he was certain there could be no further effective challenge from the side of the Musalmans. Assured of the youth and inexperience of the reigning Ismael and puffed up with his recent success, as was Afonso, his wish smacks of an overbearing condescension, a condescension to win over, yet suggestive of unassailable power.

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21. COMMENTARIES III, pp. 20—21.

Afonso continues: "..... for all that the Çabaio, your father, be dead ..... I will be your father, and bring you up like a son."<sup>22</sup> This offer of parental affection can only be for a mere youth, forlorn at his father's death. This offer becomes meaningless if the intended recipient were strong enough to give the Portuguese a thorough brushing and wrest back the fortress of Goa from their hands. Such protestations of affection and sympathy, even in the diplomatic fashion for gaining an ally in the ruler of Bijapur, must have followed closely upon the demise of Yūsuf Adil Shah.

Afonso Dalboquerque himself explains why he desired that Yūsuf were living. It was that Yūsuf might know him to be a man of his "word". This "word" is what is embodied in the Declaration viz., that Goa should be in the hands of the Christians with Milrrhao as the head of its government. In Nov. 1510, after the Portuguese took it a second time, Milrrhao was actually directing the Government of Goa, whereas, after the reduction of Goa in March, Timōja had been the Chief Aguazil and the lessee of the lands of Goa. Nothing is heard of Merlao in that instance. Had the Declaration been made before 1 March, how could Dalboquerque keep Milrrhao out of that high office and yet keep his "word"? Afonso's regrets in that context would be quite unreasonable. Hence we may maintain that the Declaration embodying the "word" must be dated subsequent to 1 March 1510 A. D. But then, what happens to the

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22. *ibid.*

Threat that Timōja shall be a "very great Lord in the kingdom of Decan"? Admittedly, this comes after the Declaration; and in days immediately following, Timōja was certainly not in the saddle. If then Afonso could go back on his word once, he could have so pleased himself even earlier.

True. But then, we must bear in mind two considerations which have a bearing on this aspect of our enquiry. Firstly, Afonso's appraisal of Timōja and secondly the occasion for the outburst.

When Timōja was the subject, Dalboquerque had always hinted a fault and hesitated dislike. After the first seizure of Goa, the Viceroy wished to retain the fortress for his king, without handing it over to Timōja. Timōja was sadly disappointed. But he had already won over the Portuguese captains to his cause. They now unanimously sponsored Timōja. Afonso was surprised at their short sightedness, for in his opinion, Timōja deserved neither fortress nor the revenues should be farmed out to him. "The satisfaction due to him for his services," he explained to them, "should rather resemble that given to a spy who had bravely carried out the commands of his captain or to a subject who had served his Lord loyally than that awarded to a man on whom the safety of every one depended."<sup>23</sup> This remonstrance proved of no avail and Timōja won the prize he had long striven for.

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23. *ibid.* II. pp. 108-104.



Notwithstanding his disesteem for Timōja, if Dalboquerque averred that Timōja, would be a great Lord in the kingdom of Dakhan, the occasion must have had a good deal to do with that. While lying in the river Goa, Afonso found his navy sinking into a miserable plight. Helpless, he awaited the intercession of Providence to chase the victorious Moslems away from Goa. Division and discontent were rife in his camp. Hunger and enemy fire were all the more disconcerting. Dalboquerque was highly agitated. What little self-control still lingered on in him disappeared with the arrival of the insulting charity of the victorious Ādil Shāh in the form of fresh provisions for his hungry soldiers. He sternly refused to accept any charity. His chafed nerves took the message that accompanied the provisions more as a challenge and call to battle than as a simple confession of faith in humane rules of war. "Although there was war between them," the message read, "yet he (the Ādil Shāh) for his part did not wish to carry it on by hunger but with sword in hand."<sup>24</sup> A noble sentiment, nobly expressed, was all lost on Dalboquerque. The Ādil Shāh went further and offered Qintacora to the Portuguese, if they would let Goa alone. But, Afonso would not accept these offers with his hands down. The Ādil Shāh wanted war and he shall have it. Goa must fall, again into the hands of the Christians before any peace parleys could be held. Mustafa suggested an alternative to this. He told Afonso that "he thought that the

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24. *ibid.* p. 173.

THEN DIED  
YŪSUF ĀDIL SHĀH

"Turks would consent to the surrender of Goa, if he would give up Timōja to the Hidalcao, his Lord." <sup>25</sup> This was more than Dalboquerque could bear, for it was an affront to his honour. Should the enemy hold him so low that he could be expected to betray his own followers? Hence his bitter outburst to Mustafa. It was more a retort than a settled plan of action.

The evidence to prove that the Declaration was made after the first fall of Goa and its recovery by the Ādil Shāh is thus very considerable. The Declaration was sent up to Yūsuf Ādil Khān, the father of Ismael. He had successfully reentered Goa, pressing the Portuguese into the river and remained in the fort three days after the departure of the Portuguese from the river on 16th August 1510 A. D. <sup>26</sup> But soon he had to leave Goa because "the lords of the kingdom of Decan had risen up in rebellion against the Hidalcao and should he not go to check them, the prince must lose either one thing or the other viz., Goa or the rest of the kingdom." <sup>27</sup> The Hidalcao, as we have seen was Yūsuf Ādil Khān and not his son Ismael. By the time of the second fall of Goa in November 1510 A. D. Ismael had ascended the throne of Bījapur. We may, therefore, conclude that, Yūsuf Ādil Shāh must have died

25. *ibid*, II, pp. 186-187.

26. *ibid*, p. 202.

27. *ibid*, p. 197.

sometime between 19th of August and November 1510 A.D. <sup>28</sup>

It may be noted, however, that the Commentaries gave occasion to these contradictory theories. Albuquerque himself had not edited his notes on Indian events. His son collected the whole material and classined it in the present form. Hence some honest errors in the course of the compilation. Not all the statements found therein can be accepted as correct if unaided by some independent authority, especially when they seem to contradict one another. The foregoing discussion has thoroughly demonstrated this point of view. Judging from this angle, it is concluded that Yūsuf could not have been dead by

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28. Yūsuf might have died in an action against Kṛṣṇarāya. Purchas says that after the first fall of Goa there was a great invasion of Bijapur by the king of Vijayanagara and that this was a greater danger to Bijapur than the Portuguese. The Moslem Lords, according to COMMENTARIES, who had risen in rebellion against the Ādil Shah, did not cross the river Bheema which was then in floods. All the Portuguese writers aver that there was a continuous warfare between Yūsuf and the king of Vijayanagara. But Fr. Luis' letter to Dalboquerque suggests that there was friendship between Kṛṣṇarāya and Ismael, even in 1510 A.D. According to Amuktamālyada, Kṛṣṇarāya killed the Ādil Khān. The Moslem Lords seeing that Kṛṣṇarāya was engaging Yūsuf in battle must have kept themselves aloof, for though they desired that Yūsuf should fall, they were unwilling to side a Hindu. Kṛṣṇarāya, having killed Yūsuf, appears to have assisted Ismael Ādil Shāh to succeed to the throne of Bijapur. This explains their initial friendly relations.

THEN DIED  
YUSUF ADIL SHAH

1st March 1510 when the Portuguese attacked Goa.  
He lived much longer to give a trying time for the  
Portuguese until his death, in the interval between  
19th August and November of 1510 A. D.

## CHAPTER IX.

### INCEPTION OF ĀMUKTAMĀLYADA

(1)

Āmuktamālyada easily ranks with the greatest of the Telugu Prabandhas. In brevity of expression and nobility of theme, it' brooks no rival.

The date of its inception, like that of its authorship, has been a point of much dispute. Kṛṣṇarāya's authorship of the poem may<sup>1</sup> at once be conceded. Yet the total absence of any mention of this in the contemporary or in the immediately later compositions is very striking. None can reasonably attribute it wholly to Allasāni Peddana. Still it admits of Peddana's active cooperation in this noble work of his royal patron. As a consequence, the aspect of the whole poem must have markedly changed. His personality must have been so imprinted throughout, that the contemporary poets could not reconcile themselves to declare the royal authorship. Most of them kept silent over it, and those, who would not, - Tenāli Rāmakṛṣṇakavi is of them - unhesitatingly ascribed it to Peddana.<sup>1</sup>

The work undoubtedly belongs to Kṛṣṇarāya's reign and whichever of them be the author, the historical

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1. For a thorough discussion of the authorship, See Āmuktamālyada, Ed. with Commentary by Sri Vēdam Vēnkata Rāya Śāstri, Intro. pp. 67-72.



value of the Poem does not suffer at all. Nor does the dating of its inception strikingly alter the character of the socio-religious life of the times. The present investigation may, however, serve to elucidate the order of some of the political events of Kṛṣṇarāya's reign.

Our present enquiry is greatly facilitated by an interesting passage in the introduction of the Poem. Therein Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya states that formerly, while he had been to the conquest of Kalinga country, he stayed at Vijayavāṭi (Bezavāda) for some "*Vāsaras*", proceeded thence to worship God, Āndhramadhumadhana, of Śrīkākula, and there observed the *Harivāsara* fast. During the fourth watch of that propitious night, he had a dream<sup>2</sup> and the inception of Āmuktamālyada was its outcome.

An inscription from Śrīkākula,<sup>3</sup> dated in Śaka 1440, in the cyclic year Bahudhānya, Phālguna, Śu. 10, Saturday, presents the king as a devotee of Telugurāya of Śrīkākula to whom he gifted five villages belonging to the Kondavīṭi Sīma. It synchronises the Royal visit with the auspicious day of Kumbhasankramaṇa.

Now Ēkādaśī is a day of fast for the Hindus. With this in mind and on the basis of a copy of the above record in Elliot collection, Mr. K. V. Lakshmana Rao slightly corrected the time of the record to

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2. AMUKTAMĀLYADA, Canto I, Verse 11.

3. S. I. I. Vol. IV, No. 981.

Phālguna, Śu. 11, Friday<sup>4</sup>, for Phālguna, Śu. 10 was a Thursday and not a Saturday. The day as corrected fell on February 11, 1519 of the Christian era; and Mr. Lakshmana Rao equated it with the Hari-vāsara referred to in Āmuktamālyada.

This date is, no doubt, very close to the time of the grant of the villages by the Rāya to God Telungurāya. But there was by no means a Kumbhasamkramaṇa at the time. For in no year of Kṛṣṇarāya's reign did Kumbhasamkrānti occur on Phālguna Śu. 10. But in Śaka 1440, Bahudhānya, it occurred on a Thursday in Māgha, ba. 11, which is January 27, of 1519 of the Christian Calendar.<sup>5</sup> On that day, Kṛṣṇadēvarāya was staying at Śrīkākula and he would not have done otherwise than observe the fast. Does this not corroborate the king's avowal in Āmuktamālyada, argued K. Īśwara Dutt, that he went on a fast on a Harivāsara while at Śrīkākula? So Mr. Īswara Dutt concluded that 27-1-1519 A. D. was a landmark in the development of Telugu literature, for the king's dream of that night inspired him to compose the Poem.<sup>6</sup>

I am afraid that the above reasoning does not accord with the facts of the situation. For the Śrīkākula epigraph nowhere refers to an Ēkādaśī nor to any fast kept by Kṛṣṇarāya. It mentions only the Kumbhasamkrānti. Āmuktamālyada refers to no

4. VYASAVALI (in Telugu). pp. 33--35.

5. 'INDIAN EPHEMERIS': L. D. Swamikannu Pillai, Vol. V.

6. 'Date of Āmuktamālyada': Jr. A. H. R. S. IX, Pt. 1, pp. 39-40.

Kumbhasamkrānti at all, but speaks of what the king did on a Harivāsara of an unspecified year.

The equation of Kumbhasamkrānti with an Ēkādaśī only accentuates the irregularities of the date on the grant. If Śaka 1440, be the expired year, the Kumbhasamkrānti happened to be Ēkādaśī, but all details of the date on the record are given the go-bye. If, on the other hand, Śaka 1440 were the current year, then the details of the date come off correctly, but the cyclic year would be Is'vara, Kumbhasamkramaṇa falling in Māgha ba. 1 Wednesday (27-1-1518 A. D.). Why go after these difficulties and not posit more than one royal visit to Śrīkākula, one on a Kumbhasamkramaṇa day, a second on a Hari-vāsara and so on?

The equation of Kumbhasamkrānti with an Ēkādaśī is itself based on the assumption that Ēkādaśī and Harivāsara are interchangeable terms. The name Hari-vāsara signified Hari's partiality for the day. Ēkādaśī is likewise held dear to Viṣṇu, for it is also known as Haridina. If it were supervened by Kumbhasamkrānti as well, then it must have been twice favoured of Hari. For the Kumbha (Aquarius), like the R̥ṣabha (Taurus), the Simha (Leo) and the Vṛścika is specifically known as a Viṣṇupada.<sup>7</sup> If, therefore, the Kumbhasamkrānti of the grant were on Ēkādaśī or Haridina that came off on 27-1-1519 A. D. may we not conclude, that it was verily the Harivāsara of Āmuktamālyada?

<sup>7</sup>INDIAN EPHEMERIS', Vol. I, pt. 1, p. 58.

So presented, the theory looks quite plausible. We may even accept it, provided Haridina is the perfect synonym for Harivāsara. But these two are two distinct terms, with different connotations. During both the years Īsvara and Bahudhānya (Śaka 1430 current and expired respectively) Kumbhasamkrānti ensued in the month of Magha, on 1st and 11th days of the dark fortnights, respectively. *But the appellation Harivāsara is associated only with Suddha dvādaśis of Aṣāḍha, Bhādrapada and Kārtika months when they accompany the stars Anūrāḍha, Śravaṇa and Rēvati respectively.*<sup>8</sup> The *Dharmasindhu* has it that God Viṣṇu takes very great fancy for Aṣāḍha, Śu. 12 and that the worship of Vāmana on that day is remunerative of the merit derived from *Naramēdha* or mansacrifice. The *Caturvarga Cintā-maṇi* of Hēmādri comes out with the declaration "Dwādaśī cakrinastathā." That is how it came to be designated also as the *Vaiṣṇavatithi*.<sup>9</sup>

Every Ēkādaśī is a Haridina. Yet only those of the bright fortnights of Aṣāḍha, Bhādrapada and Kārtika months are known respectively as Viṣṇusayani, Parivartini and Prabōdhini.<sup>10</sup> Every month has a Śivarātri on the 14th day of its dark fortnight. But only in the month of Māgha, it is specifically known as Śivarātri and Mahā Śivarātri. Similarly, it is

8. E. H. Lüders, E. I. Vo. VI, No. 12. p. III, n. 4.

9. Quoted by Prof. F. Kielhorn, I. A. XXVI, No. 17, p. 333. and also note 8 on the same page.

10. 'INDIAN EPHEMERIS': I, pt. I. p. 56.

easily possible that there be a Harivāsara quite distinct from Haridina and that the term should go with Śu. Dwādasi of either of the months of Aṣāḍha, Bhādrapada and Kārtika, coexisting respectively with Anūrādhā, Śravaṇa and Rēvati of the Nakṣatras.

We may also, note that within that very brief sentence quoted from Āmuktamālyada, the word "Vāsara" occurs twice. It was not as though the Great Poet was struggling for expression and had to use the same word twice in the same sense and in that short interval. It appears he must have employed it to mean differently, first to denote the ordinary day and next in its definitive sense to indicate the special days referred to above.

In this context, the Kumbhasamkrānti of the Śrīkāṅkula epigraph need not have been an Ēkādaśī. It was certainly not the *Harivāsara* of Āmuktamālyada. Our search for the initial date of the Poem must, therefore, lie outside the scope of the above inscription.

( 2 )

During the night of that Harivāsara, in the fourth watch, God Andhraviṣṇu appeared to Kṛṣṇadēvarāya in a dream.<sup>11</sup> The God was aware that the king was an author of repute. But his works, *Madālasa Caritra*, *Satyāvadhūpariṇiyam*, *Sakalakathā Sāra Sangrahaṃ*, *Jñāna Cintamani* and *Rasamañjarī* had all been written in Sanskrit. The King should now

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11. A dream in the fourth watch is indicative of quick fulfilment.



compose a poem on God's own marriage to Gōḍādēvi,<sup>12</sup> in Telugu, the best of the languages of the country.

Next morning, the king consulted the wise of his court. With one accord, they declared that the dream held out great promise for the king. Intenser will grow his devotion to God, greater his literary output, much larger his treasures, the extent of his sovereignty and his retinue of feudatory princes. The king would live to enjoy many more summers and add to his wives and progeny. He had deserved no less of God, and for one of his stature and attainments, the work would be easy to bring through.

Those wisemen of Kṛṣṇarāya's Court took that opportunity to sing the praises of the earlier exploits of the king<sup>13</sup> which included the Rāya's *Pūrva* and Kalinga digvijayas. Verse 36 of Canto I of the Poem recapitulates most of the king's victories during the campaigns. Udayagiri, Konḍaviḍu, Jammilōya, Kōṇa, Koṭṭamu, Kanakagiri, Gautami Poṭṇūru, Māḍemulu, Oḍḍadi and Outtack, these had tasted of the Rāya's Prowess. The adverbial adjuncts, "Coludolta" (at first), "Mari" (then), "Aṭa Sāgi" (Proceeding thence), and "Avala" (next), indicate the order of these conquests. A look into the map would reveal that the campaign had taken a devious route. Hence Kṛṣṇarāya's valour was compared to a wild fire.<sup>14</sup>

12 Gōḍa or Āṇḍal was the daughter of Viṣṇucitta Periyālwar, one of the twelve Vaiṣṇava saints of the south.

13. AMUKTAMĀLYADA, Canto I, Verses 33-34.

14. *ibid*, verse 36.

The verses following recount more poetically the same achievements and describe the flight to Rajahmundry of the Utkala Kṣatriyas defeated at Konḍaviḍu, how the Lakṣmi of Oriya kingdom joined her legitimate Lord, Kṛṣṇarāya, how the frightened Gajapati king took to the wilds and how Kṛṣṇarāya erected a pillar of victory at Simhādri - Poṇṇūru. Then follows the story of the destruction of the Moslem forces of Kulbarga and Sagar and of the killing of the Ādil Khan.

In these introductory verses, king Kṛṣṇa's conquests are not given in the order of occurrence. For the Ādil Khān who met his end in a fight with Kṛṣṇarāya was obviously Yūsuf, who did not live later than November, 1510. A. D. The King's campaign, with such grave consequences for the Sultan of Bījapur, would not be placed after the conquest of Kalinga.

( 3 )

A comparison of the Introductory verses of Āmukta-mālyada with the Colophons thereof would reveal some differences. The colophons describe Kṛṣṇarāya as

- (i) He of sturdy arms that sustain the Karnaṭa country and to whom the seizure of the Gajapati's Udayagiri was a soft job;
- (ii) Whose mighty arms fastened, like Rāhu's, upon the Gajapati prince Vīrabhadra, who had radiated power on the eastern mountain fortress of Konḍaviḍu;

- (iii) Of heroic endeavour, and whose snake-like sword convoluted the heart of Konḍapalli ;
- (iv) Whose lovely name stands inscribed on the pillar of victory at Poṭnūru ;
- (v) Who marches at the head of his armies out to break down the rampart walls encircling Kembāvi ;
- (vi) The rider ahead of his elephant corps that sped like mad, dashing down the richly and capering palaces of the Moslem ruler of Nairāmana ; and
- (vii) Who, with his arms rendered more vigorous by the benign looks of Balabhadra and Subhadra of Nīlācala, heralded his victorious march with War drums that struck terror into the heart of the Gajapati king.

The colophons may be seen to describe in addition the capture of Konḍapalli, Kembāvi and Nairāmana. The king had taken Konḍapalli long before he reached Poṭnūru. Its mention is only to indicate one more of the important fortresses he had captured during his northern campaigns. The Kembāvi and Nairāmana incidents do not form part of the achievements of Kṛṣṇarāya, extolled in the Introductory verses and, therefore, may have to be dated subsequent to the day of the Harivāsara of the poem. These will be discussed later. But what has intrigued the historians, the sacking of Cuttack described in the Introductory verses is apparently ignored in the Colophons. Clear evidence abounds to prove Kṛṣṇarāya's march

to Poṭṇūru. But his expedition to Cuttack is not so well authenticated. With this in view, historians deny the Rāya's claim to have gone so far north as Cuttack. They explain verse 36 of Canto I saying that therein the king's valour is likened to the tongue of a wild fire. To have extended it to distant Cuttack, the Poet must have been under the spell of the hyperbole.

(4)

Kṛṣṇarāya's initial successes against the Moslems and the Gajapati had comparatively established his position on the throne of Vijayanagara. He was rapidly acquainting himself with the administration and "for his own safety, he stayed in the city of Bisnaga for a year and a half."<sup>15</sup> He now got his forces ready to subdue a rebel who had occupied Penukonda and claimed the Vijayanagara throne as his of right.<sup>16</sup> This rebel, the Gangarāja of Unmattur, was worsted in a grimly fought battle and by 22nd September 1512 A. D., Kṛṣṇarāya recovered the whole land extending from Sivasamudram to Penukonda.<sup>17</sup> Rid of his internal enemies, the Rāya pursued his campaign against the Orissan power.

15. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 316

16. Fr. Luis' letter to Dalboquerque, COMMENTARIES, Vol. III, p. 35.

17. 180 of 1913 from Bakkapaṭṇam states, that Kṛṣṇarāya had been to Sivasamudram on "State business." He ordered that the 'Lakṣadāhana' ceremony might be performed at Penukonda, and the Devādāya and Brahmādāya lands below the tank of Kotta Ceruvu be exempted from paying taxes. See also "The Amaravati Inscription," edited by Lüders, EPIGRAPHIA INDICA Vol. VII, pp. 17-22.

Udayagiri, the southernmost stronghold of the Gajapati king fell <sup>18</sup> on 9-6-1513 A. D., after a siege of a year and a half. <sup>19</sup> During this long interval, Kṛṣṇarāya went about the neighbouring country visiting the sacred shrines there. On 2nd May 1513 A. D. he was at Tirumalai - Tirupati, paid obeisance to God Vēṅkaṭanātha and presented him with ornaments and Kirīṭams. <sup>20</sup> On the same day he went to Kālahasti, <sup>21</sup> when he returned to the battle front. He 'crushed and pierced' Pratāparudra Gajapati as far as Konḍavīḍu, took possession of the fortress of Udayagiri and on his way back to his capital, went up to the top of Tirupati - Tirumalai again on 13-6-1513 A. D. <sup>22</sup> He was back again in his capital some time before 20th September of that year.

Under Rāyaśam Konḍamarasu, the newly appointed Governor, Udayagirimandalam rapidly got settled

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18. Nellore Inscriptions: Butterworth and Venugopala Chetty, U. Nos. 37-38-40 and 41. Also, EPIGRAPHIA INDICA Vol. VII, pp. 17-22.

19. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 316. Nuniz states that an aunt of the king of Orissa was taken captive (E. I. p. 317). According to Āmuktamālyada and the inscriptions, the prisoner was the uncle of Pratāparudra. His name, however, is differently given, Tirumala Kāntarāya (Nellore Inscriptions, U. 38, 40 & 41,) Tirumala Rāghava Rāya (Ibid, No. 37), Tirumala Prēyātarāya Mahāpātra (Amarāvati Inscription, E. I., VII, p. 17 f.)

20. Inscriptions Nos. 1, 41, 95, and 96 T. T.

21. No. 151 and 162 of 1924.

22. T. T. 459.



down.<sup>23</sup> The king, however, would not rest long. He would penetrate a "hundred leagues into the kingdom of Orya."<sup>24</sup> On his way to Konḍaviḍu by a single assault he carried the enemy forts of Addanki, Vinukonḍa, Bellamkonḍa, Nāgārjunakonḍa, Tangēḍa, Kētavaram and others.<sup>25</sup> The fort of *Konḍaviḍu* offered stout resistance under Vīrabhadra, the son of Pratapa Rudra. But mainly due to the efforts of Saluva Timma, the Prime-Minister, Kṛṣṇarāya's armies escalated its walls, broke into the defences and took the fort on 23-6-1515 A. D.<sup>26</sup> Prince Vīrabhadrarāya, Naraharipātra the son of Kumāra Hammīra Mahāpātra, Rācūru Mallūkhān and Uddandā Khan, Rācīrāju of Pūsapāḍu, Śrīnātharāju and Lakṣmīpatirāju, Kasavāpātra of Janyāla, Bālacandramahāpātra of the West and other nobles and feudatory chiefs

23. Nel. Ins. No. 1197 records his grant of date equivalent to 20-8-1514.

24. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 317.

25. S. I. I. Vol. VI, No 248 For a different list of fortresses taken, see PĀRIJĀTĀPAHAṬANĀMU. Canto I, verse 23. The seizure of Velupukonḍa, Jallipalli, Anantagiri and Kambamēṭla is true of the Kalinga campaign of the Rāya.

26. S. I. I. Vol. IV, Nos. 706 and 708, the Konḍaviḍu and Mangalagiri records. See E. I. Vol. VI, pp. 108-133. The duration of the siege is variously given; 1½ days according to Rāyavācakamu, 2 months according to Nuniz (E. I. p. 318.). Nuniz writes of Kṛṣṇarāya's fight with Pratāparudra Gajapati's forces that had advanced for the rescue of Konḍaviḍu. The river with salt water, four leagues from Konḍaviḍu, where the battle took place (E. I. pp. 317-318) is not yet identified.

were all taken captive by the victorious Krṣṣna-dēvarāya.<sup>27</sup>

After this success, king Krṣṣnarāya went on to pay homage to Gods Amarēśvara of Dharanikōṭa<sup>28</sup> and to Mallikārjuna of Śrī Parvata.<sup>29</sup> The Rāya then took a brief rest: but before the year was out,<sup>30</sup> he started again on the Kalinga expedition.

The subjects of Kalinga, north of the river Krṣṣṇā, had believed that they were safe from the Rāya's armies. They were now taken by surprise. "Taking and ravaging all the country" which had

27. S. I. I. Vol. VIII, No. 165, *ibid*, No. 495, and S. I. I. Vol. VI. No. 248 of Tiruvannāmalai, Kalahasti, and Amarāvati respectively. Mr. H. Krishnasāstri thinks that Śrīnātharāju and Lakṣmīpatirāju were probably identical with Śrīnātharāju Rāmāyā Samanta Singāramahāpātra and his son Lakṣmīpatirāju mentioned in a Kētavaram record, dated Saka 1474, Sewall's Lists Vol. I, p. 65 (A. S. R. 1908-09, p. 178, n. 6).

28. S. I. I. Vol. VI. Nos. 241 and 248. The latter is a very near translation into Telugu of the Sanskrit one of the same place, edited by Prof. Lüders, E. I. Vol. VII, p. 17. f.

29. 18 of 1915.

30. The king's Ahōbilam inscription states that the Rāya paid obeisance to God Ahōbilanātha during his campaign against Kalinga. Its date is equivalent of 21st December 1515 A. D. See 64 of 1915.

31. Amuktamālyada recommends to the king the practice of pillaging of the enemy's territory (Canto IV, Verse 267). Rāyavācakamu speaks of eighteen groups of tribesmen from hills that followed Rāya's armies pillaging the the districts

( f. n. Continued )

no reason for expecting him," King Kṛṣṇa "arrived at a city called Condapally where were all the chiefs of the kingdom, it being the chief city in that kingdom" <sup>32</sup> of Orissa. The fort was taken and its commander Praharēs'wara Patra with many of the other Utkala Chieftains were made prisoners, <sup>33</sup> "amongst whom was a wife of the king (of Orva)" whom he sent by road to Vijayanagara. <sup>34</sup> Finding no one to bar his progress, Kṛṣṇarāya penetrated into the Gajapati territory, seized one after the other the fortresses of Anantagiri, Undrakonda, Urlagonda, Aruvapalli, Jallipalli, Kandikonda, Kappulavāyi, Nalagonda Kambhammettu, Kanakagiri, Sankaragiri and other fortresses and strongholds in the country of Telingāna, and at last arrived at Simhāchalam. <sup>35</sup> For months he stayed there waiting for Pratāparudra Gajapati to come and battle with him, <sup>36</sup> but in vain. the Orissan king never appeared. During his stay there, Kṛṣṇarāya made offerings to the temples and erected therein a very grand temple to which

( f. n. Continued from Page 114 )

of Konḍavidu, Konḍapalli, Bellamkonda, Vinukonda, Nagarjunakonda, and others, the people there fleeing their homes leaving all their possessions behind to be plundered by the enemy. (p. 92.)

32. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 318.

33. Amuktamalyada, Colephon, Canto III.

34. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 318.

35. *ibid.* p. 319.

36. Nuniz gives 6 months' stay of the king at Simhachalam. The king's first Simhachalam record (694, S. I. I. Vol. VI is dated 30-8-1516 A. D. The king was back in Vijayanagara in the month of June of the same year.

he gave much revenue. Tired of waiting, the king returned by way of Rajahmundry and reached Vijayanagara sometime before 29-6-1516 A. D.<sup>37</sup>

In all his wars against Pratāparudra Gajapati, increase of dominion had not been the sole and unvarying objective of Kṛṣṇarāya. That was true of his attempts to subjugate lands south of the Kṛṣṇā. But once he crossed north of the river, a different aim and a different hope guided him in his wars. The Kālingas must either pay him allegiance or seek his alliance or somehow be shorn of all ability to endanger Vijayanagara territories. They could not be reckoned as vanquished, until that was achieved. To enforce his paramountcy, rather than to expand his dominion, became his anxious concern and numerous were the Rāya's exploits in the regions lying north of the river Kṛṣṇā. That very desire took him to distant Poṭnūr Simhāchalam to fight a decisive battle with Pratāparudra. He knew the difficulties of this venture, in lands so far removed from his capital, in a hostile country, where to cut off his supplies and retreat would not be much of a job for the enemy. The first Minister of his realm, the Great Sāluva Timmarasu, had warned him off this adventure.<sup>38</sup> Kṛṣṇarāya did not take the advice, for he was for a swift and short action and hoped to march back with equal expedition. The Telugu works Rāyavācakamu and

37. 457 of 1928 (The Kanekkal inscription). See T. T. Report, p. 176 Also E. C. Hasan 18.

38. KRṢṢNARĀYA VIJAYAMU. Canto III. Verse 67.

Kṛṣṇarāya Vijayamu describe the king's marriage with the Gajapati princess and his return home even from Poṭnūr - Simhāchalam. Nuniz places this marriage after the king's return to Vijayanagara.<sup>39</sup> The time and place of the marriage apart, both the Telugu and the Portuguese sources agree that the king did not stay very long at Simhāchalam and that the marriage brought in a definitive treaty between the two warring powers, by the terms of which "Crisnarao restored the lands on the other side of the river (Kṛṣṇā) and kept those on the hither side for himself."<sup>40</sup>

But this happened much later than 30-3-1516 A.D., the date of the first record of Kṛṣṇaraya at Simhāchalam.<sup>41</sup> While the Rāya enjoyed himself paying visits to the numerous shrines of the land, his armies were engaged in a bitter war against the forces of the Gajapati ruler. A good number of inscriptions refer to the exploits of Vijayanagara Generals and forces in the distant regions of the north. A record from Kommūru in the Bapatla Taluk of the modern Guntur district<sup>42</sup> dated in Śaka 1438 Dhātu (12th March 1517) indicates the Rāya's march as far as Cuttack in the course of his invasion of Kalinga. A grant from Chōlasamudram of Śaka 1439, Īvara,

39. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE pp. 319-20.

40. *ibid.*

41. S. I. I. Vo. VI, Nos. 694 and 696 dated in Śaka 1438, Dhātu, Caitra ba. 12.

42. 824 of 1922. "Kaṭakammēragānu pa .....jam Cōyānganu"



## KRṢṆDEVARĀYA

praises Kondamarasu as the hero, who had erected for his Lord Kṛṣṇarāya pillars of Victory at Simhādri and Śrīkūrmam.<sup>43</sup> At Simhāchalam itself is found Kṛṣṇarāya's own grant, dated in Śaka 1441 Pramāthi, Śrāvaṇa, Śu. 13 (– Monday 8-8-1519 A. D.)<sup>44</sup> It records the Raya's gift to the Lord of Simhāchala of some villages taken from a "Dandapaṭa" of Pratāparudra Gajapati. What is more conclusive, the seventh colophon of Āmuktamālyada speaks of the war drums which heralded Kṛṣṇarāya's victorious march from Puri that frightened the Gajapati king. This march could only be towards Cuttack and certainly not in a southerly direction. In view of so much evidence to prove that Kṛṣṇarāya's armies marched far north of Śrīkūrmam and Pūri, the sacking of Cuttack cannot be implausible.

( 5 )

The conquest of Kalinga was still unfinished in January 1519 A. D., the time of Kumbhasamkrānti referred to in the Śrīkākula record. The first inscriptions of Kṛṣṇarāya to appear at Simhāchalam belong to the end of March 1516 A. D. His next record there belongs to August 1519 A. D., three years and a half later. All through the duration, there must have been an incessant war between both the armies. Though Vijayanagara had the better of it, her final success had not yet become certain.

43. 87. C. of 1912. and A. R. 1912, para 55, p. 80.

44. S. I. I. Vo. VI no. 695.

The conquest of Kalinga could not have been finished by the time of the Kumbhasamkrānti of the Srikākulam record. Had it ended by the date of Kumbhasamkrānti, the king's "Kalingadēsa Vijigīṣā-manīṣa" must have been likewise satisfied.

Mr. K. Iswara Dutt admits that according to Kṛṣṇarāya's own statement "his visit to Srikakulam must be shortly after an expedition against the Kalinga ruler." But this Simhāchalam epigraph occurs full seven months after the royal worship of God Āndhra Viṣṇu. Mr. Iswara Dutt, therefore, argues, "the grant might have been made from Vijayanagara after he returned to the capital. This makes us believe that the Emperor, for reasons that we are not aware, had to wage a war against the Kalinga ruler and went so far to Vijayavati and returned back to the capital via Srikakulam, after a definite understanding with the Kalinga ruler"<sup>45</sup>

This reasoning is far from convincing. The war with Orissa started as early as 1512 A. D. Kṛṣṇarāya took more than four years to reach Simhāchalam. The Gajapati was a tough enemy and would still show fight. Would he be cowed down now that Kṛṣṇarāya had arranged army manoeuvres in distant Vijayavati? He took severe beating, no doubt; but he was not humbled. If Manucaritra had styled Kṛṣṇarāya as "Asakṛnmādyat Kalingānganā Bandigrāha." it would mean only that the ladies of

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45. Campaigns of Śrī Krishnalēvarāya, J. A. H. R. S. Vol. IX,  
. 4. p. 61

Kalinga were very often in mortal fear of the Rāya. It would not indicate repeated invasions of Kalinga by the Sovereign of Vijayanagara. If it does, all those invasions must have occurred prior to the Harivāsara mentioned in Āmuktamālyada. Otherwise, the phrase "*Vijigīṣāmanīṣa*" used by the king would lose all significance.

The conquest of Kalinga was over by 8-8-1519 A. D. to which date belongs the later epigraph of Kṛṣṇarāya at Simhāchalam. Only subsequently did the king worship the Āndhramadhumathana or Teluṅgarāya at Śrīkākula, fasted there on the Harivāsara and that night dreamt that eventful dream. We may, therefore, be definite that the Kumbhasankrānti of the Śrīkākula record does not at all answer to the Harivāsara of Āmuktamālyada.

(6)

Kṛṣṇarāya's marriage to the Kalinga princess is described, with minor differences in detail, by Nuniz and the authors of Rāyavācakamu and Kṛṣṇarāya Vijayamu. All of them agree, however, that the marriage came off at the end of the conquest of Kalinga. Paes, another Portuguese chronicler, asserts that out of the twelve lawfully wedded queens of the Rāya, only three were regarded the most important and of them was a princess of Orissa.<sup>46</sup> Now Paes was in Vijayanagara about September. 1520 A. D.<sup>47</sup>

46. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE. p. 247.

47. *ibid.* p. 141.

# INCEPTION OF ĀMUKTAMĀLYADA

So the Harivāsara of Āmuktamālyada must have occurred sometime between 8-8-1519 A.D., and September of 1520 A. D.

Within these limits in time, there was only one Harivāsara, on 3rd November, 1519 A. D.<sup>48</sup> It was in Śaka 1441, Pramāthin, Kārtika, Śu. 12, Thursday. The day previous was a Viddhaikādaśi, the sun having risen over what was the last tenth of the Daśami. Vaiṣṇavas hold it a sin to fast on such a day. They do so the day following which at the time under discussion came to be a Thursday. It was a Harivāsara too, for excepting the first one tenth of it, the whole of the remaining day was associated with the Nakṣatra, Rēvati.

We may, therefore, conclude that Śaka 1441, Pramāthin, Kārtika, Śu. 12, Rēvati, Thursday which was the equivalent of November 3, 1519 A. D., was the Harivāsara, which found king Kṛṣṇarāya fasting at Śrīkākula. That auspicious night occurred the Royal dream, so memorable for the inception of Āmuktamālyada.

48. L. D. Swami Kannu Pillai: INDIAN EPHEMERIS, gives the following readings for November 3, 1519 A. D. Śaka 1441, Pramāthin. Kārtika, Śu. 12, Thursday:—

		Tithi ending moment.	Nakṣatra ending moment.
Wednesday.	2 } 10	.09	
	} 11	.99	25 .17
Thursday.	3 12	.89	26 .10

## CHAPTER X

### 'RACHOL'-ITS IDENTIFICATION

Kṛṣṇadēvarāya's conquest of 'Rachol' has been narrated at length by the Portuguese chronicler, Nuniz. Mr. R. Sewell identified the place with Rāichūr, in the centre of the Dakhan. His identification has long been accepted as correct, until in 1930 A. D., Rev. H. Heras preferred to question the same.<sup>1</sup> He argues that for Nuniz and for the other Portuguese writers as well, 'Rachol is..... nothing else than 'Rachol, the fort city of the peninsula of Salsette.'<sup>2</sup>

Nuniz assigns the conquest of 'Rachol' by Kṛṣṇarāya to May 1522 A. D.<sup>3</sup> Ferishta describes a battle for Rāichūr dated A. H. 927<sup>4</sup> (December 12, 1520 - December 1, 1521 A. D.) Mr. Sowell believes that these are two versions of the same event.<sup>5</sup> This would not be admitted by Father Heras, for Ferishta was clearly referring to Rāichūr by the river Kṛṣṇā and, to accept it, would be to admit that 'Rachol' is identical with Rāichūr.

1. 'Krishna Deva Raya's conquest of Rachol': PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ORIENTAL CONFERENCE, pp. 348-354; J. R. A. S., 1931, pp. 142-147
2. PROCEEDINGS, p. 349.
3. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 326.
4. Briggs: FERISHTA, III, pp. 48-51.
5. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 153.



He holds that they are different because the dates do not coincide. <sup>6</sup>

Father Heras advances several reasons that prompted him to conclude that Nuniz' 'Rachol' was no other than that of the Salsette basin. Methinks, these are more political than geographical. But, much more real than anything else, geography is inexorable and cannot be got over. We shall show presently that the theory of Rev. Heras founders irretrievably against the geographical surroundings Nuniz gave for 'Rachol'.

Earlier than Nuniz, Paes had spoken of 'Rachol', while specifying the lands that bordered the empire of Vijayanagara. "*Paes here mentions*" comments Father Heras, "*Three Countries* as the limits at which the Vijayanagara mountains arrive. These three countries run *from east to west*. *The Kingdom of the Deccan (Viz. Golkonda), the Kingdom*

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6. PROCEEDINGS, p. 348 and 351. Father Heras appears to have agreed with Mr. Sewell when the latter, for reasons we shall discuss elsewhere, assigned 19th May, 1520 A. D. (F. E. 147) for the battle ascribed by Nuniz to May 1522 A. D. For, like Mr. Sewell (F. E. p. 142) Rev. Heras states that Ruy de Mello seized the mainlands of Goa subsequent to the battle, some time between February 1520 and February 1521 A. D.

Heras is wrong in taking A. H. 927 to correspond to 1519 A. D. (PROCEEDINGS, 348). It really begins with 12th December, 1520 and ends with 1st December, 1521 A. D. (INDIAN EPHEMERIS, L. D. Swamikannu Pillai.)

of Ydallcao (Bijapur) and the city of Rachol.' That by the kingdom of the Deccan, Paes meant the kingdom of Gōlconda is evident from another passage of his chronicle, when he points out the northern boundaries of the empire of Vijayanagara. These boundaries are the following:—the territory of Bengal, the kingdom of Oriyya, the kingdom of the Dekhan, the lands of the Ydalcao and those of the Ozemelluco (Nizām-ul-Mulk of Ahmadnagara); now it appears that the kingdom of the Deccan is between the kingdom of Bengal to the East and the kingdom of Bijapur to the west.

Such kingdom cannot be another than Golconda; accordingly *The city of Rachol is placed by Paes west of the Kingdom of Bijapur viz., in the present Goa territory.*"<sup>8</sup>

This inference that 'Rachol' is to the west of Bijapur territory was necessary for Father Heras if his theory were to stand at all. But the relevant passages from the chronicle of Paes do nowhere warrant such a conclusion. "and this Kingdom (of Narsymga)" records Paes, "Marches with all the territory of Bengal and on the other side with the kingdom of Orya, which is to the east, and on the other side to the north with the Kingdom of the Dakhan, belonging to which are the lands which the

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7. Was the city of Rachol a country?

8. PROCEEDINGS, pp. 349-350.

*Ydallcao has, and Ozemelluco*".<sup>9</sup> It is plain that Paes is here placing the Dakhan on the northern reaches of the empire. This Dakhan is also stated to have *comprised* the territories of Bījapur and Ahmadnagara.

There is absolutely no need to hazard the identification of the Dakhan with Gōlkonda,<sup>10</sup> to demonstrate that the kingdom of Bījapur reached to the west. By 1520 A. D., Bījapur extended her sway to the very gates of Goa. The real problem, therefore, is how to prove that 'Rachol' was to the west of the kingdom of Bījapur. Hereunder is given the passage from Paes by which Father Heras takes his stand. On the northern side, '*The Serras reach as far as the kingdom of Daquem, and border upon the territories belonging to the Ydallcao, and upon a city called Rachol, that formerly belonged to the king of Narsymga; there has been much war over it and this king took it from the Ydallcao. So that these ranges are in a way the cause (of the*

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9. Sewell. p. 239.

10. Father Heras evidently took the 'Belonging to' of the passage to mean, not 'comprising of', but 'ranged with' and went on to identify the Dakhan with Gōlkonda. But to state that Paes too must have meant the same is to assert that Paes knew of Gōlkonda, but not by its proper name, and that he was equally unaware of the Dakhan that it had split into five different kingdoms including Gōlkonda. It is more probable that Paes' knowledge of the Dakhan was confined to only two of its constituent kingdoms, viz., Bījapur and Ahmadnagara.

two kingdoms) never uniting and always being at war' <sup>11</sup>.

If the Dakhan were the kingdom of Gōlkonda and Nuniz' 'Rachol' the fort city of the Salsette basin, Father Heras is left to locate a hill range that starts in the Salsette basin, and runs to the east, cutting right across the plateau to divide the empire of Vijayanagara from the kingdoms of both Bijapur and Gōlkonda. But for his impossible identifications, the passage itself is easily understood. These hill ranges touch the Dakhan where the lands belong to the Ādil Shāh and not on those of the Nizam Shāh. Even among them, they border upon a city called 'Rāchol'. This city had long been a bone of contention between Bijapur and Vijayanagara. The king of Vijayanagara was bent upon having it, for formerly, it was part of the Vijayanagara dominion. Just then it happened to be in the hands of the Ādil Shāh from whom Kṛṣṇarāya wrested it. Bijapur, however, did not cease to covet it. So that these kingdoms could never ally. This conflict was to a large extent due to the hill ranges that reached Bijapur at that city of 'Rachol'.

There has been much war over this city; and in this particular Paes is confirmed by Nuniz. Nuniz' 'Rachol' was a fort which was claimed by both the kingdoms with equal tenacity, at least from the time of Sāluva Nṛsimha. Nuniz refers to a testament of that monarch 'in which the king desired that .....

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11. Sewell, p. 248.

whoever should inherit this kingdom of Narsymga ... should capture three fortresses that at his death remained in revolt against him.....; One of them was called Rracholl and another Medegulla.<sup>12</sup>

In the historical accounts of this part of the country, Rāichūr and Mudkal appear usually together. They are not removed one from the other by any considerable distance. In fact, Nuniz is definite that ‘Rachol’ was a boundary of Mudkal. He refers to a subordinate of Kṛṣṇadēvarāya in these terms – ‘*Bajapanoyque is Captain of Mumdoguel, which was a fortress of the Ydalcao and was taken from him by Crisnarao when he took Rachol, which was a boundary of it.*’<sup>13</sup>

Nuniz supplies yet another landmark by which his ‘Rachol’ may be placed. On his way to ‘Rachol’, Kṛṣṇarāya is said to have pitched his camp ‘At the town of *Mollambandym*, which is a league from the city of *Rachol*’.<sup>14</sup> According to Mr. Sewell, the Mollambandym is Malliābād, as now called, close to Raichūr.<sup>15</sup> If Mr. Sewell were correct in his surmise – and Father Hieras does not challenge his identification – there is only one possible conclusion, that Nuniz’ ‘Rachol’ is no other than Raichūr of the Kṛṣṇā-Tungabhadra doab.

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12. Sewell, 816.

13. *ibid.*, 889.

14. *ibid.*, 829.

15. *ibid.*, n. 1.



Throughout, geography was very unkind to Rev. Heras' theory. This is proved to demonstration when he tries to equate the two 'Great rivers', between which lay Nuniz' city,<sup>16</sup> to the almost unknown Zuarim and the Paroda of the Salsette basin. Near the angle formed by the union of these two rivers, writes H. Heras, 'there stand still the ruins of the ort of Rachol.'<sup>17</sup>

Mr. Sewell naturally identifies these two great rivers with the Kṛṣṇā and the Tungabhadra. Nuniz requires of his 'Rachol' that it should be in the middle of the doab so that 'From each river to the city is three leagues'.<sup>18</sup> True of Raichūr, this is wholly untrue of Rachol. This latter is admittedly 'Near the angle' formed by the union of the Zuarim and the Paroda. Actually it may be seen on the map about seven miles down the confluence of these rivers. The surroundings affirmed of 'Rachol' by Nuniz are thus wholly absent in the case of Rachol, the fort city of the peninsula of Salsette.

We shall now consider how Revd. Heras sets out to prove the proximity of 'Rachol' to Goa. Kṛṣṇarāya defeated the Ādil Shah and was returning to the siege of 'Rachol,' when there came to meet him Christovão de Figueiredo,<sup>19</sup> who took some Arab

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16. *ibid.*, p. 331.

17. PROCEEDINGS, p. 353.

18. Sewell, p. 331.

19. *ibid.*, p. 343; Sousa referred to by Heras, *o. c.* p. 350.

horses to be sold to the Rāya. Father Heras 'gathers' from the Spanish original of the author, Faria Y Sousa, that Christovão had intended proceeding to Vijayanagara, but that, only after leaving Goa, he heard of the king's proximity while besieging 'Rachol'.<sup>20</sup> He goes on to remark 'Now supposing that Krishna Deva Raya was then conquering Raichur, Figueiredo, while going to Vijayanagara, could not meet the Emperor, since Raichur is farther from Goa than Vijayanagara itself.'<sup>21</sup>

Apart from what Father Heras has gathered from the Spanish account of Faria Y Sousa, we obtain no evidence to prove either Figueiredo's intentions to proceed straight to Vijayanagara or his journey direct to 'Rachol' without visiting Vijayanagara on his way. We prefer Nuniz to Faria Y Sousa. He allows no scope for making any such suppositions.

He is quite definite that Christovao 'Was at that time in the city of Bisnaga with horses'<sup>22</sup>, whence he proceeded to 'Rachol' to meet the king. There is nothing here, to forbid an identification of 'Rachol'

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20. Strangely, Heras finds confirmation of this in Correa, (PROCEEDINGS, 350). According to Correa, Governor-Lopo Soares sent Christovão, in 1517 A. D., to Vijayanagara with horses and elephants (LENDAS DA INDIA, II, pp. 509-510). Heras notes, however, that 'the date does not seem to agree' (Op. cit., p. 350. n. 3). Why then, does he find in this a confirmation of what happened more than three years later?

21. PROCEEDINGS, p. 350.

22. Sowell 343,

with Raichūr. For distance is not of any consequence in this context.

But then, if 'Rachol' were Raichūr and not the Rachol of the Salsotte basin, and also if the latter were still garrisoned by the Muslims, Father Heras would argue, the capture of the mainlands by the Portuguese 'Would not have been carried out with such speed.'<sup>23</sup> Mr. Sewell states that it took a mere ten days.<sup>24</sup>

To this the answer is two-fold. Firstly, one may remember that Ruy de Mello took advantage of the Ādil Shāh's difficulties consequent to his defeat at the battle.<sup>25</sup> He appears to have taken the suggestion of the Rāya to seize the mainlands.<sup>26</sup> Nuniz tells that at the battle of 'Rachol' both Assud Khān of Belgaum and Ankus Khān of Pomda were present. Naturally, the *Tanaduris* around Goa were left with a poor defence. What little opposition there could be to de Mello's occupation was much further weakened by the discomfiture of the Ādil Shāh at the battle; and probably by the knowledge that the Portuguese had the backing of the Rāya in what they did. Rev. Heras himself writes 'Certainly the capture of Raichur would have

23. PROCEEDINGS, 352.

24. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE 148.

25. Souza and Barros, quoted by Sewell, pp. 144-5.

26. Krṣṇarāya sent a message to Ruy de Mello (Correa) asking him to take possession of the mainlands (Ostenhada), promising to confirm this later in a solemn treaty (Osorio)-Sewell, pp. 143 and 145.

enfeebled the power of Adil Shahi Sultan in the neighbourhood of Goa.’ But he would still maintain that ‘..... the conquest of the fort of Rachol in the strategic corner of the peninsula of Salsette deprived the Sultan of his main stronghold beyond the river Zuarim. This explains the rapidity of the conquest of Salsette and probably other continental lands.’ <sup>27</sup>

The second part of the answer, therefore, is that if as a consequence of the battle of Raichūr, the *Tanādāris* on the mainlands adjoining Goa were left undefended, the fort city of Rachol, if it were there, could not have been an exception. What is much more important, the Fort City of Rachol in the peninsula of Salsette was not in existence at that time, but came into being at a much later date. Speaking about the years 1533-35 Mr. Frederick Charles Danvers writes, ‘Nuno da Cunha seized upon the country on the mainland opposite to Goa, for the protection of which a *fort was erected at Rachol*, but not without opposition.....’ <sup>28</sup>

Father Heras sees in Kṛṣṇarāya’s offer of the mainlands of Goa to the Portuguese a ‘Real donation’. He refers to Correa <sup>29</sup> to prove that it was a ‘Free gift.’ <sup>30</sup> He then argues that this would not be possible for the Rāya ‘had not had any territory in that

27. PROCEEDINGS, 351-52.

28. ‘THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA’ I, p. 418.

29. Correa II, 658.

30. THE ARAVĪḌU DYNASTY, 59-60.

peninsula' of Salsette; but 'if you prescind of this conquest of Rachol no campaign of the Rāya in that region is ever mentioned.'<sup>31</sup>

In truth, krṣṣnarāya was not prompted in this transaction by any motives of altruism or of a self-denying friendship. Castenhada clearly states that Krṣṣnaraya desired full compensation in the form of a monopoly of 'all the horses that came to Goa'.<sup>32</sup> The hard bargaining of a trade pact has been given the glosses of friendship, demanding reciprocity. This 'donation' of the emperor would have been only a conditional renunciation of his rights over those lands as having been Vijayanagara's of old.

The territories of both Goa and Belgaum had originally belonged to the kings of Vijayanagara. But later, Mahmūd Gawan captured them for his master 'Mahammud Shaw' Bahmuny.<sup>33</sup> Then they passed into the hands of Yūsuf Adil Shāh of Bijapur. But about the end of the year 1510 A. D. as soon as they heard of the capture and fortification of Goa by the Portuguese, 'The principal Hindoos of the city of Bilgao had broken out into rebellion against the Hidalcao and had cast the Moors out of the city and put themselves under the command of the king of

31. PROCEEDINGS, 852.

32. Sewell 148, Osorio states that this arrangement had to be ratified. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 145.

33. Belgaum was captured in 1474 A. D. - Burhan-I-MA' ASIR (IND. ANT., 1899, p. 286). Ferishta assigns the event to A. H. 877. i. e., A. D. 1474-8.



Vijayanagara.<sup>34</sup> A letter of this period from Fr. Luis to Afonso Dalboquerque at Goa, refers to the Rāya's preparations to 'proceed with all this force of men to his places situated on the edge of the sea,' and advises the Viceroy to 'keep friendly communications with the king.'<sup>35</sup>

Castenhada states of Kṛṣṇarāya that "He had taken Belgaum by force of arms from the Hidalcao, with all the land appertaining to it as far as the Sea....."<sup>36</sup> But hardly had Kṛṣṇarāya turned to the conquest of the East from the Gajapati of Orissa, the Musalmans appear to have re-asserted their power around Goa.<sup>37</sup> Belgaum and the lands appertaining to it were slowly conquered back by the Musalmans. Kṛṣṇarāya's ambassador, "Retelim Chetim"<sup>38</sup> approached Dalboquerque on 8th November, 1514 A. D., for a "treaty of peace and friendship .....; to wage war against the Turks in the kingdom of the Deccan ....."<sup>39</sup> Nothing came out of this embassy

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34. COMMENTARIES, III, p. 86.

35. *ibid*, p. 85.

36. Sewall, 143. Castenhada placed this event prior to 1520 A. D. Kṛṣṇarāya is not seen in any other campaign against this part of the country.

37. In January, 1512, Dalboquerque, on his return from Malacca, found Goa and suburbs invested by the Musalmans.

38. Ratnappa Vodeya. See Mr. G. V. Rao, "KRISHNA DEVA RAYA AND THE PORTUGUESE" - J. A. II. R. S. X. p. 81. Father Heras thinks that "Retlim Chetim" stands for Radalingam Chetti' - See "EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN VIJAYANAGARA AND PORTUGAL," Q. J. M. S. XVI. p. 78

39. Danvers. *op. cit.*, p. 307. See also COMMENTARIES chap. XXVII.

and Kṛṣṇarāya started on his invasion of the Kalinga country.

In the beginning of the year 1515 A. D. Dalboquerque vainly tried to persuade Ādil Shāh to make over to the Portuguese the mainlands opposite to Goa and the pass of the land of the Ghaut.<sup>40</sup> Since then, the Portuguese appear to have looked on to that territory with desire. When in the year 1520 A. D. hostilities broke out between Vijayanagara and Bijapur, they came into a tacit understanding with the Rāya over those lands. In his turn, Kṛṣṇarāya most probably found it convenient to renounce his title over what was not his possession at the time. It was much more desirable that he should do so, for besides getting rid of a much disputed tract, he would be assured of a monopoly of all the horses that came to Goa.

View it how we will, on no grounds, either geographical or political, can the identification of Nuniz' "Rachol" with Rachol the fort city of the peninsula of Salsette be maintained. Mr. Sewell drew the most obvious and natural conclusion that when Nuniz wrote of the conquest of "Rachol" by Kṛṣṇarāya, he had meant none other than Raichūr, the fort most strategically situated in the middle of the Kṛṣṇā-Tungabhadra doab.

40. COMMENTARIES, IV, p. 127 and Note.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE BATTLE OF RĀICHŪR

ITS DATING BY NUNIZ.

(1)

Nuniz places the battle of Rāichūr on the New Moon Day of the month of May, 1522 A. D.<sup>1</sup> It was also a Saturday.<sup>2</sup>

Of these, Mr. Sewell accepts only the week day and the month. For reasons that will be presently recounted, he declares 'the date given by Nuniz..... is wrong by two years, and should be 1520.' And he adds, 'the moment of the occurrence of the New Moon in May 1520 was 2-27 A. M. on the morning of Thursday, May 17.'<sup>3</sup> But on Saturday, May 19, the crescent of the new Moon first made its appearance just after sunset.' Nuniz was "not a skilled astronomer," and mistook it for the New Moon Day.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Sewell would, therefore, conclude that the fight was on Saturday, 19th May, 1520 A. D.

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1. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 326.

2. *ibid*, p. 337.

3. *ibid*, p. 146.

4. *ibid*, p. 147.

Dr. S. K. Ayyangar entirely agrees with Mr. Sewell as regards his date for the war. "Nuniz is in error" is his verdict.

(See Yet-Remembered Ruler: H. R. 1917 July, p. 18.)

## KṚṢṆADEVARAYA

Still, we are unable to believe it possible that Nuniz should forget the very year of the Christian era, while remembering the month and the week-day and to an extent even the phase of the Moon. We may be permitted, therefore, to quote the relevant readings from the Indian Ephemeris.

May 1522.		Tithi ending moment Viśākha, ba.	Nakṣatra. ending moment.
Friday	23	13. .75	2. .44
Saturday	24	14. .66	3. .39
Sunday	25	A. .56	4. .33

The figures given above clearly show that Nuniz was not very wrong with his astronomical data. Strictly speaking, Saturday preceded the New Moon Day. Yet a full third of that very Saturday comprised the New Moon Day. A day with a duality of 'tithis' would be confusing enough to the sons of the soil. Small wonder if there be a slight discrepancy in a foreigner's record of an astronomical detail. Moreover one may remember that the stress was more on the week-day. For, according to Nuniz, Kṛṣṇaraya intended to give battle to the enemy on a Friday. But 'the men of the council said that that day was an unlucky day, and ..... they asked him not to attack till Saturday, which they hold for a lucky day.'<sup>5</sup>

5. *ibid*, p. 337, Nuniz writes (F. E. 379) 'Every Saturday the dancing girls are obliged to go to the palace to dance and posture before the king's idol.....' and again 'The people of this country always fast on Saturdays.....'

( 2 )

Evidently Mr. Sewell was guided by factors other than the actual inaccuracy in the date given by Nuniz. One such was the presence of Paes at the Court of Vijayanagara 'subsequent to the date of Kṛṣṇa Dēva's conquest of Rāichūr.'<sup>6</sup> Mr. Sewell quotes a passage from Paes, where Rāichūr is described as a city 'that formerly belonged to the king of Narsymga; there has been much war over it, and *this king* took it from the Ydalleao.'<sup>7</sup>

Now Paes attended two of the great festivals held at Vijayanagara. One began on the 12th of September and lasted nine days.<sup>8</sup> The second occurred on the 12th of October. 'At the beginning of the month of October,' writes Paes, 'when eleven of its days are past ..... On this day begins their year; it is their New Year's day ..... They begin the year in this month with the New Moon and they count the months always from Moon to Moon.'<sup>9</sup> Mr. Sewell worked these days out for all the years of Kṛṣṇarāya's reign and fixed on 1520 A. D., in which year alone the 12th September and the 12th October both coincided, respectively with

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6. *ibid.* p. 141.

7. *ibid.* p. 248.

8. Paes must have meant the Mahānavami Celebrations. *ibid.* p. 286

9. *ibid.* pp. 281—2.



the first day of Āsvīja and the first day of Kārtika.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, he concluded that 'the battle and capture of Raichur must have taken place before the month of September in that year' " 1520 A. D.

Paes' reference to the capture of Rāichūr by Kṛṣṇarāya has nothing about it to show that its seizure belonged to an *immediate* past. He mentions it casually, while describing some hill ranges which were "in a way the cause (of the two kingdoms) never uniting and always being at war." For, he continues 'the serras ... .. border upon the territories belonging to the Ydalleao, and upon a city

10. *ibid*, p. 141. Mr. Sowell writes that the New Year's Day in the time of Paes was evidently celebrated on the 1st of the month of Kārtika, as was often the case in former years (see also F. E. p. 98). He is obviously wrong. (See Dr. B. A. Saletore: SOCIAL & POLITICAL LIFE IN VIJAYA-NAGARA EMPIRE, Vol. II, p. 373, n. I; and p. 374, n. I.). I believe that Paes mistook Dipavali for the New Year's day. His reference to the wearing of new, rich and handsome clothes of variegated colors, to the payment of great gifts of money (probably tributes) to the king and to the distribution a little later of the annual pay among his troops by the king (*ibid*, p. 288), all point out clearly that Paes meant that the 12th of October began the Financial year and certainly not the Indian New Year which begins invariably with the 1st day of the bright half of the month of Caitra.

Nuniz also refers to the Nine days' festival observed in September (F. E. p. 376). He states that the captains pay their land rents to the king at this time. From the monies then received, the king probably distributed the annual salaries among his own troops at the time of Dipavali.

11. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE. p. 141.

called Rachol that formerly belonged to the king of Narsymga; there has been much war over it, and this king took it from the Ydallçao.' <sup>12</sup>

At the most, Paes may be taken to assert that in September, 1520 A. D. Raichūr belonged to Vijayanagara. That it had been so more than eight years in the hands of Kṛṣṇarāya is borne out by several writings. Ferishta speaks of Raichūr, how it passed over to Vijayanagara in about 1512 A. D. <sup>13</sup> Purchas places the Portuguese capture of Goa in December 1510 A. D., in between two invasions of the Bījapur territory by 'the king of Narsinga.' <sup>14</sup> The Telugu works, 'Rāyavācakamu' <sup>15</sup> and 'Kṛṣṇarāya Vijayamu' <sup>16</sup> and the 'Vijayanagarada Samrajyavu' <sup>17</sup> in Kanarese, all attest to the capture of Raichūr and Mudkal by Kṛṣṇaraya in the initial years of his reign. Paes' presence at Vijayanagara subsequent to the Raya's capture of Raichūr is, therefore, not inconsistent with his stay there during the feasts of 1520 A. D., prior to the Battle of Raichūr recounted by Nuniz in such a vivid fashion.

Mr. Sewell makes another inference, which again cannot be accepted. Paes visited the Royal court in

12. Paes, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 243.

13. Briggs: FERISHTA, III, pp. 44-45

14. F. R. p. 125 n. l.

15. SOURCES, p. 118.

16. *ibid*, p. 181.

17. J. O. R. April-June, 1936, pp. 154-155. A three year's war with Golkonda, Ahmadnagar and Bījapur is mentioned and not specifically the capture of Raichūr.

the company of Christovão de Figueiredo. The 'magnificent reception' accorded to the latter and the exceptional kindness' shown the Portuguese by King Kṛṣṇarāya, were, according to Mr. Sewell 'on account of his (Figueiredo's) invaluable aid at the siege of the city (Rāichūr), and for the fact that but for him the war might have lasted much longer.'<sup>18</sup>

While stating this, Mr. Sewell obviously had in mind Nuniz's description of Christovão's part in the battle of Rāichūr.<sup>19</sup> His inference may be true on the assumption that his dating of the battle in 1530 is correct. But since this dating itself is now called into question, the reason for Christovão's reception, as found by Mr. Sewell, falls to the ground. Again, that his part in the battle was the only cause of the Rāya's favour towards him, no one can assert. For Paes himself speaks of Christovão as the bearer of some letters from the Captain-Major and of 'certain organs' and other 'delightful things' which he presented to the king.<sup>20</sup> From Nuniz may be found that Christovão was staying at Vijayanagara even prior to the battle of Rāichūr. While Kṛṣṇarāya was returning to the fort of Rāichūr after his success over the Ādil Shāh, writes Nuniz, 'there came to meet him Christovão de *Figueiredo*, who was at that time in the city of *Bisnaga* with horses .....'<sup>21</sup> The feasts and the welcome Christovão was given at

18. Mr. Sewell, F. E. p. 142.

19. F. E. pp. 843—846.

20. F. E. p. 251.

21. *ibid*, p. 843.

the court of Vijayanagara could as well be prior to the battle of Raichūr on 24th May, 1522 A. D.

( 3 )

Mr. Sewell bases his theory 'mainly' on the date when the Portuguese obtained the mainlands opposite the island of Goa.....<sup>22</sup> He brings in considerable testimony from other Portuguese sources<sup>23</sup> to show that *the battle* between Bijapur and Vijayanagara and the subsequent siezure of the mainlands by Ruy de Mello, both occurred during the absence of the Governor-General, Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, in the Red Sea - between February 13, 1520 and February 9, 1521 A. D.

Underlying Mr. Sewell's argument throughout is the assumption that the battle ascribed to 1522 May by Nuniz was the same as the one described by Ferishta as of the year A. H. 927 (December 1520 to December 1521 A. D.). In the following pages, it will be my endeavour to prove that this assumption was based on an inadequate appreciation of the data that the battle of Raichūr under discussion was but an incident in a major war with more than one action; and that the war may be said to have exten-

22. *ibid*, p. 142.

23. F. E. pp. 142—145: Castenhada, Lib. V, C. 57: Correa Lendas da India II, 581: Barros, Dec. III, E. IV, cap. 4; cap. 5; cap. 8; cap. 10.

Faria Y Souza, Asia Portuguesa, I, Pt. III cap. 4 and cap. 10 (Stevens' trans.) and cap. 4, sec. 5.

Osorio, F. E. 145; Lafitan, Histoire des Descouvertes et conquêtes des Portugais.

ded over three long years, ending with the destruction of Kulburga in about the end of the year 1523 A. D. Against such a back-ground, the time of the seizure of the mainlands of Goa by de Mello proves nothing beyond when the seizure took place and leaves Nuniz and his date for the battle untouched.

Let us bear in mind that by September 1520 A.D., the fort of Rāichūr was in the undisputed possession of the Raya of Vijayanagara. Ferishta is perfectly intelligible, therefore, when he states that in A. H. 927 (- Dec. 1520 - Dec. 1521 A. D.) the *Ādil Shāh* 'made preparations for marching to recover Moodkul and Rachore from the Ray of Becjanuggur'. He found, on the Southern bank of the river Kṛṣṇā, a superior Hindu force awaiting him. He hastily crossed the river, gave battle to the enemy; but worsted in a gallant fight, he narrowly escaped, mounting an elephant along with Nursoo Bahādur and Ibrahim Bey. Only seven out of the 2000 of his soldiers that fought survived the battle. 'As Mirza Johangeer had fallen in the action', the Sultan consulted *Assud Khān* who recommended a retreat to Bijapur. The Sultan 'conferring the dignity of sipahsalar on Assud Khan, added several districts to his jaguer and made him henceforward his principal counsellor in all important affairs.' <sup>24</sup>

Ferishta does not mention any battle of Rāichūr in 1522 A. D., nor does Nuniz refer to the battle of 1520-21., at Rāichūr. But Mr. Sewell finds in the two narratives 'too many points of coincidence to

24. Briggs; FERISHTA III, pp. 48-51.



leave any doubt in the mind that each chronicler is writing of the same event.'<sup>25</sup> He would also confess that 'as to which of the two is more accurate, it is impossible now to decide;' <sup>26</sup> and yet declared that "As to Ferishta's date, I believe it to be wrong by one year." <sup>27</sup>

Mr. Sewell's identification of the two different narratives is very unfortunate. This comes out of his wrong evaluation of the differences between them, which he does not fail to note. The differences to be sure are more substantial than are the coincidences pointed out. None need be surprised at the vastness of the host that was the Hindu army. The Ādil Shāh's advance to the banks of the kṛṣṇā, the crossing of the river and the huge loss in men, while attempting to recross the river, all these needs must be common where the defeat is common to both and the physical contour of the field of action is the same. Small wonder again if the escape of the Ādil Shāh on both occasions were narrow, where the defeats were routs. An agreement of any sort of importance between the versions is the high position attained by Assud Khan in the counsels of the Ādil Shāh sub-

25. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE, p. 158.

26. *ibid.*

27. *ibid.*, p. 146.

Father Heras states (PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ORIENTAL CONFERENCE, I, p. 351) "they must be two different actions unless many and weighty reasons (which in the case do not exist), would suggest an identification."

sequent to the battle. This shall be discussed a little later in the sequel.

The first and foremost difference lies in the very origin of the battle each described. While Ferishta attributes the war to the desire of the Ādil Shāh to recover Mudkal and Rāichūr from the hands of the Rāya, Nuniz depicts the Rāya attempting to wrest the fortresses back from the possession of the Musalmans.<sup>28</sup> Ferishta is consistent in that he describes the Sultan's loss of Rāichūr in 1512 A. D. The theory of the identity of the two battles, added to his unreasonable selection of the month out of the total date supplied for the battle by Nuniz, forced Mr. Sewell to pronounce his inability to resolve the conflict<sup>29</sup> between Nuniz and Ferishta with regard to the motive of the war each recounted.

Ferishta may be more truly said to have related a battle of the Kṛṣṇa than of Rāichūr. For him, there was no siege of the fort of Rāichūr at all. The Ādil Shāh met with opposition from a Vijayanagara general immediately he crossed the Kṛṣṇa, on the very banks of the river. But Nuniz is completely at variance with this. According to him, Kṛṣṇarāya himself was in command. He had invested the fort of Rāichūr for three months<sup>30</sup> before he heard of the arrival of the Ādil Shāh on the banks

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28. *ibid.*, p. 323.

29. *ibid.*, p. 127.

30. *ibid.*, p. 330.

of the river. He then advanced and fought the enemy, nine miles south of the river and drove him across with heavy losses.<sup>81</sup>

Ferishta rendered Ādil Shāh's flight as recommended by 'none but the pure exigencies of the battle. It was dictated by necessity. If a capture by the enemy or death at his hands were to be avoided, Ismael had but one go. That was a precipitate flight. Accompanied by Nursoo Bahādur and Ibrahim Bey Ismael left the battle field, Mirza Jehangeer having already died. But Nuniz sounds altogether a different note. He describes, how the cowardice of Ismael's flight was 'enough to destroy an army' and how it was Assud Khan caused the Ādil Shah to flee.<sup>82</sup> What till then was a reverse turned into a defeat. Salabat Khan, the captain-general of all the Bijapuri forces, elected to fight on and die rather than be conquered. He was taken prisoner.<sup>83</sup>

One other discrepancy between the actions recounted by Ferishta and Nuniz, and this list may close. It is the number of troops employed. Ferishta states that the Sultan had 50,000 horse, besides a vast host of foot; but *that less than 2000 accompanied him across the river to oppose the enemy of 30,000.* But Nuniz' estimate of the Sultan's army far exceeds that of Ferishta. He puts it at 1,20,000 men on foot.

81. *ibid*, pp. 336-339.

82. *ibid*, p. 355.

83. *ibid*, p. 342.

archers and musqueteers and men with shields and spearmen and 18,000 cavalry and 150 elephants besides a great strength of artillery.<sup>84</sup> This whole army was led by Ismael to the attack on the Rāya's forces, some nine miles south of the river Kṛṣṇā. No longer can the theory be maintained that the accounts of both Ferishta and Nuniz relate to the same battle. They have no doubt certain necessary coincidences. But they are few, dictated by the common geographical position. The discrepancies are many and so very substantial to preclude any mistaking one for the other.

(4)

But then another question would arise. Were it true that in A. H. 927 (- Dec. 1520 - Dec. 1521 A. D.) the Ādil Shāh failed to retake Raichūr and Mudkal from Kṛṣṇarāya, how came it that in May 1522 A. D. Kṛṣṇarāya is seen besieging the fort of Raichūr?

For reasons that we may conjecture and not confidently assert, Nuniz has not described the engagement of 1520-21 A. D. May be because he was not informed of it or if informed, he ignored it deliberately as it left matters where they were. It may again be because in the battle of 1522 A. D. alone, the Portuguese, 'renegades' or otherwise, played a prominent role.

Subsequent to the Battle of the Kṛṣṇa in 927 A.H. Ismael Ādil Shāh appears to have gained control of

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84. *ibid* pp. 385--386.

Raichūr. By what means he achieved this is not known. But it is certain that Raichūr went over to Bijapur at this time. For, according to Nuniz, shortly before the Rāya laid siege to the fort, a Captain of Ādil Shāh at the head of some troops got admitted into Raichūr.<sup>85</sup>

The Battle of the Kṛṣṇā was only a limited 'disaster' for Ismael Ādil. It did not disable him for long to reassert his power. It may be remembered that the negligible number of survivors of the battle was out of the mere 2000 as could cross the river on the floats at two embarkations. The main body of his troops did not join the fight and was in tact. Yet Ismael did not press them into action. He elected to withdraw to Bijapur, for after his flight, when he consulted Assud Khān, the latter advised him that 'as his loss was great and the troops dispirited, it would be *advisable to return for the present to Beejapoor.*' Much time was not lost to retrieve this mishap.<sup>86</sup> Scarcely a year passed before the Raichūr garrison went over to the side of the Musalmans. Getting news of this, the Rāya marched his troops into the doab in the beginning of the year 1522 A.D. He arrived before the walls of Raichūr in the middle

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85. *ibid.*, p. 381.

86. It appears from FERISHTA that he advised Ismael to lay aside all thoughts of revenge till he could ally himself to Burhān Nizām Shāh and remove Amīr Barīd from his border. (III, p. 51). It will be shown in the sequel that Ismael got busy immediately to secure Burhān's alliance which occurred by the end of C. 1521 A. D.



of February. But in the meanwhile, the defenders got reinforced by a contingent from Ismael Ādil Shāh.

The close of the Battle of the Kṛṣṇa saw Assud Khān rise to preeminence in Bijapur. He was made the commander-in-chief of the armies, several districts were added to his 'jageer' and he was raised to be the Sultan's principal adviser<sup>37</sup> in all important matters. Yet it is interesting to note that at the battle of Raichūr in 1522, it was Salabat Khān and not Assud was the 'Captain-general of all the troops of the Ydallāo.'<sup>38</sup> There is reason to believe that by this time, Assud Khān had begun to fall in the favours of the Sultan. This is fully reflected in the supreme command going to Salabat Khān in May, 1522 A. D.

As a step to avenge this defeat of A. H. 927, Ismael Ādil Shāh desired an alliance with Burhān Nizam Shāh.<sup>39</sup> With this in view he sent Syed Ahmud Hirvy as ambassador to Ahmadnagar. 'Letters and civilities having been previously interchanged,' the kings of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar met in an interview

37. Nuniz does not speak of Assud Khān's rise to prominence at the close of the Battle of Raichūr in 1522 A. D., though he suggests that Assud was one of the advisers of the Sultan. See FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 355.

38. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 342.

39. See Briggs, FERISHTA, III, p. 51; and also Mr. K. K. Basu's 'THE HISTORY OF ISMAEL ADIL SHAH OF BIJAPUR'—from Busātin-us-Salātin—INDIAN CULTURE IV, p. 7.

( f. n. Continued )

at Shōlapur, where, on being asked, Ismael gave his sister, Muryum, in marriage to Burhān Nizam Shāh.

*Ferishta* places the rejoicings in honour of this alliance in the month of Rujub, A. H. 930 (May 1524).<sup>40</sup> Nuniz seems to suggest that this marriage took place earlier than May 1522 A. D. According to him, on the eve of his march against Rāichūr, Kṛṣṇarāya made known his project to the other Musalman rulers of the Dekhan, which project gained their approbation. But 'as to the Zemelluco' writes Nuniz, 'he could find no excuse for not sending some troops to the aid of his sister who was wedded to the Ydalleao.'<sup>41</sup> Obviously Nuniz was mistaken of the bride. For it was the sister of the Ādil Shāh married Burhan Nizam Shah and not the other way round. That apart, the marriage itself may be seen definitely placed by Nuniz prior to Kṛṣṇaraya's invasion.

*Ferishta* is strangely silent over other political developments relative to Bijapur during the interval between A. H. 927 and A. H. 930. It could not be

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(f. n. Continued from Page 148)

He states that Assud Khān 'wished to cultivate Friendship with Burhān Nizam Shāh' and then to march against Timrāj, the Hindu ruler of Vijayanagar.' The author has also stated that it was Assud sent 'Hirwi' to Ahmadnagar.

*Busātin-us-Salātin* closely follows *Ferishta* in events and their sequence, but gives no dates.

40. Briggs III, p. 52. The later *Busātin - us - Salātin* follows *Ferishta*. There is no mention of this alliance at all in *Burhān-i-māasir*, trans. by T. W. Haig (See IND. ANT. XLix).

41. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 326.

that this alliance by itself took up the whole of the intervening period. We have already referred to one of Ismael's captains how he gained entry into the fort of Rāichūr. The battle of Rāichūr itself was fought in May, 1522 A. D. Nuniz has again some more of important events to relate of this same period. This will be dealt with presently. But we may at once state that this duration of about three years or more - Dec. 1520 - Dec. 1521 to 1523 A. D. - was for Bijapur a long tale of humiliation and defeat at the hands of Vijayanagara, broken but once by the short-lived mastery over Rāichūr. Even this was beset with apprehension of an invasion by Kṛṣṇarāya. No doubt, Ismael's political sense brought about this marriage. It procured for him a contingent of Nizam Shāhi troops when a little later, in May 1522 A. D., he opposed Kṛṣṇarāya on the battle field near Rāichūr.

A regular 'treaty of alliance' <sup>42</sup> forwent the marriage. And what is more important for our present enquiry, Assud Khān had much to do in its shaping. It was while engaged in this, evidently, Assud earned the displeasure of his monarch. Writes Ferishta, 'Assud Khan of Belgam, the envoy on the part of Ismael Adil Shah, had promised in his master's name to give Sholapoor as a dowry with his sister; but as that Prince afterwards denied having authorised such a condition, Boorhan Nizam Shah, at the intercession of Shah Tahir, was induced to drop the demand, and to return to Ahamudnuggur.' <sup>43</sup> But the next

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42. Briggs. FERISHTA III, p. 52.

year the demand was renewed and a war broke out.<sup>44</sup>

Ādil Shāh thus disavowed any responsibility for the offer of Shōlāpur to Ahmadnagar. In making such an offer, Assud Khān had gone definitely beyond his powers. The demand was not pressed. But this might be done any time, thus defeating the very purpose of the matrimonial arrangement. Ismael must have, therefore, got greatly displeased with Assud Khān. He would not do him any harm. But, surely, such a one could not be trusted to lead his armies in the supreme fight that was now on with Vijayanagara. Hence Assud Khan had to stand down to Salabat Khān, who was now made the captain-general of the forces of the Ādil Shāh.<sup>45</sup>

The foregoing discussion might have proved by now (i) that in A. H. 927 (Dec. 1520 – Dec. 1521 A.D.) Kṛṣṇarāya warded off an attack from Ismael, who wanted to take Rāichūr. (ii) Subsequently, Bijapur obtained control of the fort. (iii) Kṛṣṇarāya recaptured the place in the middle of 1522 A. D. and taught Ismael a good lesson at the Battle of Rāichūr mentioned by Nuniz.

43: *ibid.*, FERISHTA III p. 216. Shōlāpur included 5½ districts.

(See note on page 52, III Briggs.)

44. *ibid.*, p. 52.

45. Assud bore a grudge against Salabat. He was instrumental in bringing about the defeat of the armies under Salabat. Later when Salabat was in prison at Vijayanagara, Assu successfully persuaded the Raya to order Salabat's death.

And now we may turn to the question of the main-lands of Goa, when and how, the Portuguese came by them.

(5)

All the Portuguese writers referred to by Mr. Sowell are agreed in that the capture of the mainlands of Goa by de Mello was at the end of a battle between Vijayanagara and Bijapur. The hostilities began while de Sequeira was absent in the Red Sea - sometime between February 1520 and February 1521 A. D. Barros is definite that on his return from the Red Sea, which was about the end of January 1521 A.D., de Sequeira found the mainlands already taken over by de Mello; we learn from Paes that in September-October of 1520 A. D. Rāichūr belonged to Kṛṣṇarāya. Ferishta placed a battle between Ismael Adil Shāh and Vijayanagara in A. H. 927 which began with December 1520 A. D. We may, therefore, infer that the hostilities between Bījapur and Vijayanagara broke out in December 1520 and the Portuguese occupation of the mainlands took place about the beginning of the year 1521 A. D. <sup>46</sup>

It had been a vain endeavour of the Portuguese to obtain the Raya's permission to build their fortress at

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46. These Portuguese writers erred in ascribing Nuniz' description of the battle of Rāichūr to the pre-February, 1521 battle which must have been their subject. Consequently, while Nuniz was right, these others were wrong in believing that the war ended with the recapture of Rāichūr by Kṛṣṇarāya.



Bhatkal, the rival of Goa on the West Coast. The astute Dalboquerque, therefore, looked with covetous eyes to the mainlands adjacent to Goa and the pass of the land of the Ghaut.<sup>47</sup> With a view to secure them he sent Joao Goncalvey de Caster-Branco as ambassador to the Bijapur Court,<sup>48</sup> on the eve of his own departure for Ormuz in the beginning of the year 1515 A. D. Dalboquerque returned seriously ill and died on 16th December 1515 A. D., without gaining his object. His successor, Lopo Soares de Albergaria (1515 - '18 A. D.) was a failure as a military leader.<sup>49</sup> During his governorship the Moslems strengthened their hold on the territory surrounding Goa. While he was absent in the Red Sea, Dom Goterre de Monroyo, the Commander at Goa, came into conflict with Ankus Khān, the Bijapur general at Ponda. On his return, de Albergaria ordered an attack on Ankus Khān. But it proved a miserable failure. The Ādil Shah retaliated and Goa was reduced into dire distress from which the Portuguese were saved by the timely arrival of three ships from Portugal.<sup>50</sup>

Correa writes that about this time, 1517 A. D., de Albergaria sent Christovão de Figueiredo to Vijaya-

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47. COMMENTARIES, IV, p. 127.

48. *ibid.*

49. Danvers : I, pp. 884—885.

50. *ibid.*, pp. 886—887.

nagara as factor with horses and elephants.<sup>51</sup> We do not know whether de Figueiredo was required also to enlist the Rāya's support for the Portuguese. No particulars are forthcoming. Yet in the course of his duties as factor, he appears to have become fairly known to and liked by the Rāya. It is no wonder, therefore, that during de Sequeira's Governor-Generalship, he was entrusted with some papers by Ruy de Mello to be submitted to Kṛṣṇaraya. Together with his troupe - and Paes among them - he was admitted to the Royal presence and given a place of honour during the Mahānavami festivals of 1520 A. D.

What these papers related to is again not known. And we are left to surmise. Ismael's preparations to march against Rāichūr could not have been unknown at Vijayanagara. The Rāya must have renewed his negotiations with Goa for the refusal of horses. Either in reply to this or on their own, to get rid of the Musalman menace at the very gates of Goa, the Portuguese appear to have submitted their proposals to the Rāya. The papers carried by de Figueiredo very likely contained these proposals in addition to a probable request that the Portuguese should be aided in their designs against the mainlands,<sup>52</sup> in exchange of their

51. *Lendas da Índia*, ii, 509-10; F. E. p. 251, n. 1; Senhor Lopes doubts the truth of this assertion (Intro. to his *Chronica*, IXXXII, note). The scepticism of Lopes has no foundation (Mr. G. Venkat Rao: *KRISHNADEVARAYA AND THE PORTUGUESE*, J. A. H. R. S. X, 1937, p. 83, n. 51).

52. Mr. G. Venkat Rao, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

trade in horses exclusively with Vijayanagara. Hardly two months passed before the war was on. In the month of December, 1520, the Ādil Shāh marched his troops into the doab. The Raya had to beat him off, before he could come to any agreement with Goa. After this was done, however, according to Correa, the Hindu king sent a message to "Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa," regarding the mainlands of Goa.<sup>53</sup> Castenhada writes that the king 'wanted all the horses that came to Goa. He, therefore, said that the captain of Goa could enter and take possession of the Tanadaris'.<sup>54</sup> Osorio adds that the king offered these lands 'promising after the return of Sequeira to send a regular embassy to conclude a solemn treaty!'<sup>55</sup>

By the close of this battle, which we have termed 'the Battle of the Kṛṣṇā, 'many of the Tanadaris near Goa on the mainland were left undefended..<sup>56</sup> Assud Khān of Belgaum and probably Ankus Khān of Ponda also were among those 'many of his tributaries' who joined the Ādil Shah while he 'stationed his camp on the bank

53. *Lendas da India*, ii, 581; Mr. Sewall states (*F. E.* p. 143) that Correa does not distinctly mention when this took place, but that an edition of 1860 at the head of the page has the date "1521". On our showing this date is correct. But Mr. Sewall remarks a little further down that this date 'must be an error on the part of the editor, for in May 1521, Sequeira was not absent.' Mr. Sewall, is not correct in taking it to have happened in May. This really happened in January 1521 A. D.

54. *F. E.* 143.

55. *ibid.*, 145.

56. Castenhada quoted by Sewall, *F. E.* 142.

of the Krishna.' <sup>57</sup> This defeat left Ismael and his troops much dispirited. He felt the need to ally with Burhān Nizam Shāh and also to get rid of the Bārid on his frontiers. These difficulties of the Ādil Shāh and the comparatively defenceless state of the Tanādāris 'enabled Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa, to take the mainlands of Goa.' <sup>58</sup> The occupation took a mere ten days. <sup>59</sup>

On the banks of the Kṛṣṇā, Bijapur suffered less in numbers than in prestige. And Assud Khan of Belgaum, now the principal adviser to Ismael, could not have let this Portuguese challenge to his power pass unanswered. But he desisted from immediately retaliating. For he must have clearly seen the hand of Kṛṣṇarāya behind the Portuguese move. To attack the Portuguese would unwisely split the forces of Bījapur and what is worse, might simultaneously bring the whole might of the Rāya against the Bijapur territory. To crush the Rāya thus became his main and primary concern. He even persuaded himself to believe that his was a 'holy war' against the Rāya 'which was obligatory on every true believer and pillar of Faith.' In his anxiety to enlist every ounce of strength in this behalf, while effecting an alliance between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar he went beyond his terms to promise Sholapur to the

57. Briggs *PERISHA*, III, p. 49.

58. Quoted from Barros by Mr. Sewell, *FORGOTTEN EMPIRE* p. 144. Faria Y Sousa refers to de Mello that he took advantage of Ādil Shāh's difficulties to seize the mainlands (F. E. p. 145)

59. As from Castenhada, by Sewell, *FORGOTTEN EMPIRE* p. 148.

latter Power. Consequently he lost the command of the forces of Bījapur in the action about Raichūr in May 1522 A. D. Perforce Assud left the Portuguese undisturbed in enjoyment of their new acquisition. But this was only for the time being, as will be shown a little later.

The Rāya does not appear to have sent the promised embassy to Goa to conclude a regular treaty with the Portuguese. Or if one were sent, it did not bring any treaty into being. For after his return from the Red Sea, de Sequeira almost immediately left for Diu in February 9, 1521 A. D., and thence went upto the Persian Gulf.<sup>60</sup> About the very end of the year he again returned but this time to hand over the Government to Dom Duarte de Menezes on the 22nd of December, 1521 A. D.<sup>61</sup>

But in the meanwhile, Bijapur was buzzing with activity. She entered into a matrimonial alliance with Burhān Nizam Shāh and ensured his support in case of need. By some means, she won over the garrison of Raichūr and placed therein a captain of her own with a strong body of troops to defend the fort against Vijayanagara. For she knew that Kṛṣṇarāya would never consent to be despoiled of a strategic fortress on his frontiers but was sure to attack in force. Kṛṣṇarāya in his turn, knew that Bījapur, in alliance with Ahmadnagar was now stronger than

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60. Danvers : I. p. 348.

61. *ibid.* p. 352.



## KRṢNADEVARĀYA

ever. He set afoot parleys with other Musalman sovereigns of the Dakhan to wean them away from helping Bījapur. From the Portuguese he would obtain every horse that was available. Christovão de Figueiredo's presence at Vijayanagara ensured him their supplies from Goa.<sup>62</sup> For lack of a regular treaty with Goa, Kṛṣṇarāya was not likely to suffer for some-time to come. He did not elect, therefore, to assert his claims to the mainlands of Goa on the ground that he had not abandoned them in any agreed treaty. Sometime later, however, after this war of Rāichūr ended with the destruction of Kulbarga, Kṛṣṇarāya tried to get back these mainlands for himself, as will be shown in the sequel.

Here our present enquiry may conveniently close. We are unable to reject Nuniz' dating of the battle of Rāichūr, notwithstanding Mr. Sewell's 'bold' belief to the contrary. Mr. Sewell's three-fold attack is not convincing. For the date given by Nuniz is more true to the astronomical details supplied by himself. During his long stay at the court of Vijayanagara from September 1520 A. D., Paes could have been a witness to the so-called battle of Rāichūr, more appropriately termed here as that of the Kṛṣṇa. The time of the Portuguese occupation of the mainlands of Goa has nothing about it to disprove, Nuniz'

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62. Nuniz states that de Figueiredo 'who was at that time in the city of Bignaga with horses ..... ' went to Rāichūr and there met Kṛṣṇarāya while that monarch was returning to the walls of Rāichūr after his success against Imael in May, 1522 A. D. - FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 343.

## THE BATTLE OF RAICHŪR.

dating of the battle of Rāichūr. All the objections, raised by Mr. Sewell to the acceptance of the chronology supplied by Nuniz for the battle, lose force against the background of events depicted above. All the same we are thankful to Mr. Sewell for the information he has culled from various Portuguese sources, which information has definitely enriched our knowledge of the interplay of political events at the time of the Raichūr battle.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE BATTLE OF RĀICHŪR AND AFTER

(1)

The causes of this war over Raichūr have been often repeated and would not merit another reference here, but for certain of the observations Nuniz made in this connection. In the events preceding this engagement and which we have tried to depict at great length, Nuniz apparently does not find any reasonable basis for this war. According to him, the Testament of Sāluva Nṛismha set the ball rolling. The Capture of Raichūr among others had been enjoined on the successors of that monarch and Kṛṣṇarāya ardently desired to fulfil that wish.<sup>1</sup> But for the seizure of Raichūr a war with Bijapur was inevitable; and standing in Kṛṣṇarāya's way was a treaty of peace, of forty year's duration. It could not be broken for no cause whatsoever. The king was in a fix and to his rescue came the Prime Minister, Timmarasu. The latter pointed out that the treaty had provided for the reciprocal extradition of criminals and debtors. "Since many land-owners and debtors to His Highness had fled into the Kingdom of the Ydallcao," the king might as well demand their surrender. But this suggestion did not carry conviction with the other counsellors and the king let it go for the time being.

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1. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 828.

Nuniz then describes the affair of 'Cide Mercar'<sup>2</sup> which brings once again to the forefront the same procedure recommended by Timmarasu but with a very, very slight difference. Nuniz has it as though 'it happened at this time.' Barros opines that it was definitely a trap laid out by Kṛṣṇarāya to catch the Ādil Shāh.<sup>3</sup> The Syed had seen service with the king for a good many years and was one 'in whom the king of Bisnaga confided on account of various affairs with which he had already been entrusted.'<sup>4</sup>

At the bidding of the Rāya, Syed Mercar left for Goa with forty-thousand pardaos to buy of some Persian horses. This was much advertised. Kṛṣṇarāya even wrote letters to the Portuguese Captain at Goa 'on purpose so that the affair might become widely known to all.'<sup>5</sup> As soon as the Syed arrived at Pomda, 'two leagues from Goa,' he fled to the Ādil Shāh with all this huge amount of gold. Rumours said that the Ādil Shāh had sent letters to the Syed. Barros suggests the possibility of temptation. But in all this, the Syed may be seen serving the cause of the Rāya, unswervingly. The Ādil Shāh is stated to have bestowed the 'Tanādāri' of Dabul on him as he was of the family of the Prophet. In a few days, however, the Syed disappeared from there. Now Kṛṣṇarāya demanded of the Ādil Shāh the

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2. *ibid.*, pp. 323 - 325.

3. *ibid.*, p. 325, n. 2.

4. Nuniz F. E. p. 323.

5. Barros, F. E. p. 325, n. 2.

immediate restoration of Syed Mercar; and as he had expected and hoped for, got a refusal.

Kṛṣṇarāya thus clearly demonstrated his appreciation of the procedure recommended by Saluva Timma. He saw in the opposition to that proposal an unwillingness to take advantage of the clause in the treaty which had never been appealed to there-to-fore. Hence this affair of the Syed. The freshness of the incident would certainly silence all dissent. So the king seems to have thought. Still the cause of the war was considered frivolous by some. But the king took Ismael's refusal as a personal affront and was all rage against the Ādil Shāh. He held that the peace was broken and that the question should be solved by an appeal to arms. The stoutest of the dissentients could but meekly advise the king not to go by the way of Dabul but to march straight against the fort of Raichūr.

As a cause of the war the affair of the Syed does not look so very absurd, for we have a worse one in the 'Drunken draft' of Muhammad Shāh, Bahmuny. But the story of the affair is so very inconsistent in itself and incongruous in relation to the other portions of Nuniz' chronicle. Never before had the chronicler referred to a treaty of peace of such a duration between the two kingdoms. Had he mentioned one, the facts would have belied the same. Again there was absolutely no place for qualms of conscience in the scheme of things, especially when

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6. Briggs: FERISHTA, II, pp. 308-9.



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the seizure of Raichūr was the objective. Its possession would confer great security to the Empire and if in the hands of the enemy it constituted a threat and a danger. Such mental unrest or hesitation had never been attributed to the Raya when it was the question of capturing Udayagiri from the Gajapatis of Orissa. What is worse, the advice of the wavering Counsellors not to go against Dabul gives the show away. If true, this would mean that the king was wholly oblivious of the very purpose of all these manoeuvres, viz., to capture Raichūr in deference to the injunctions of Saluva Nṛsimha's testament. Much more relevant and important was the fortress itself. After the battle of the Kṛṣṇa, Bījapur obtained sway over the fort somehow and was strengthening herself through alliances with her neighbouring powers. Events were thus definitely heading to a trial of strength between Vijayanagara and Bījapur.

Nuniz' narrative is the only detailed account of the battle of Raichūr extant. Great as was this Hindu Victory from the military point of view and important in its ultimate consequences, this event has been passed over by historians. Even the native literature and Kṛṣṇarāya's own inscriptions, save one, keep silent over it. Without labouring the point, we may straight away conclude that the contemporaries did not attach any great importance to this battle. Might be because they esteemed the power of the Adil Shāh very low in comparison with that of the Gajapati. Unlike the Pūrva and Kalinga campaigns, the wars against Bījapur brought no extension of the

Vijayanagara territory nor what was like a permanent peace. This much understood, we may now proceed to the few references to the battle we obtain in other than Portuguese chronicles.

In an inscription from 'Tirukkadaiyur' in the Tanjore District, Āpatsahāyar, a brahmin, is stated to have taken part in the war against 'Raichūr and Vijayanagara'. Commenting on this, Mr. V. Venkayya, the Epigraphist, writes, '..... It is, however, not impossible that by Vijayanagara, Bijapur is meant, because Krishnaraya advanced not long after the battle of Raichur to Bijapur, the Adil Shahi capital and occupied it for sometime.'\*

Here, but for the identification of Vijayanagara with Bijapur, the reasoning of the epigraphist cannot be accepted, for by implication, it accepts the dating of the battle by Mr. Sewell. And we hope to have satisfactorily proved Nuniz in the right as regards the date. But the record under reference is dated in the year Vishaiya (Vṛṣa, March 27, 1521 - March 28, 1522 A. D.) And the battle of Raichūr which preceded the Rāya's visit to Bijapur, had not yet begun by the end of Vṛṣa. It was fought some months later, on May 24, 1522 A. D. The explanation is that the reference in the inscription is not to an attack on the city of Bijapur but to a fight with the Bijapuri forces. In between the two battles of

7. 47 of 1906.

8. A. R. 1907, p. 71.

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the Kṛṣṇa and of Raichūr - i. e. between December 1520 and May 1522 A. D. - there were smaller skirmishes between the Bijapuri and Vijayanagara forces, both at Raichūr and elsewhere, in some of which Āpatsahāyar must have distinguished himself.

This is more probable, since in that interval, Raichūr was won over by the Ādil Shāh from the control of Kṛṣṇarāya. It is only suggestive of many more efforts made by Ismael to recover his possessions in the Doab. This contention gains support through an inscription from Bijapur.\* The inscription was issued on the command of the Ādil Shāh by one of his captains entrusted with the siege of a fort under 'Kishnan Rai'. It is dated 'on the twentyfourth of the month of Rabi-II, year nine hundred and twenty eight of the Hijra era (i.e. A. D. 1522, March, 23). "By the help of divine favour and the relies of the saints, the accursed Kishnan, on the 4th day of the siege, considering defeat a gain, took to flight."

Dr. M. Nazim remarks that 'the language of this inscription is incorrect and barbarous. It probably records the capture of the fort of Mudgal by Ismail Adil Shah'. Beyond doubt, this captain was merely referring to some of Kṛṣṇarāya's forces and not the king himself. Kṛṣṇarāya had started by then on his victorious campaign against Bijapur and was at the time camping before the walls of Raichūr.

9. Memoirs of the Arch. Sur. Ind. No. 49, Bijapur inscriptions, p. 47, No. 487.

(2)

Kṛṣṇarāya started cautiously. In the event of his war with Ismael, he desired to know how the other Moslem Lords of the Dakhan would take it. Nuniz states, in continuation of the affair of Syed Mercar, that the Rāya sent 'letters to Madre Maluco, and Demellyno and Desturvirido' and other superior lords giving them an account of what had

10. Madre Maluco is the Imad of Birar. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar takes 'Demellyno' for the Qutb-ul-Mulk of Golkonda (H. R. July 1917 p. 17). This seems untenable. Mr. Sewell rightly identifies him with the Nizam Shah (F. R. p. 325, n. 3). Demellyno is the same as Zomelluco (Nuniz, F. R. pp. 348 & 349). Desturvirido stands for two persons - Destur and Virido (Nuniz, F. R. p. 348). Nuniz refers to them again as Descur and Verido (F. R. 349). Verido is the Barid of Bidar.

Mr. Sewell infers that Destur, Destur or Descur must mean the Qutb Shah of Golkonda. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar on the other hand identifies him with Dastūr-ul-Mulk, the son of Dastūr-Deenar of Kulburga, Sagar and Nuldrug.

According to Ferishta, Dastūr Deenar died in a battle with Yūsuf Adil Shāh, 'after the death of Kāsim Barid in A. H. 910 (1504 A. D.) (Briggs II, p. 547). Yūsuf wrested all his possessions. But after Yūsuf's death, Barid took Kulburga in A. H. 920 (A. D. 1514) and conferred it on *Jahangeer Khān*, the son of the late Dastūr Deenar, for whom he procured the title of *Dustoor-ool-Moolk*. (Briggs II, p. 549) But later in the year, Kulburga and all the country taken from Bijapur were conquered back for Bijapur (Briggs III, p. 54-56). Shortly after, the betrothal of Ismael's sister with prince Ahmud, son of Mahmūd Shah, was celebrated

( f. n. Continued )

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taken place in the matter of the Ydallcao, and how he had determined to make war on him; from which lords he received answer that he was doing rightly, and that they would assist him as far as they were able. As to the Zemelluco, at the time when the messengers returned this answer, he could find no excuse for not sending some troops to the aid of his sister who was wedded to the Ydallcao.' <sup>11</sup>

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( f. n. Continued from Page 166 )

in Kulbarga itself (Briggs II, p. 550). After 1514, Dastūr-ul-Mulk, does not figure any more in Ferishta's account.

But according to *Burhān-i-Ma'asir*, Hamīd Khān Habstu, the son of Dastūr Deenar was killed in the siege of Bidar, during the year 921 (1515) A. D. But about the end of the year, the Bahmuny Sultan sent a Farman to Adil Khān about pacifying Dastūr. To the latter the Sultan restored his former 'jagir' which was Kulbarga. (ed. Major King, pp. 143-4). This Dastūr accompanied the Bahmuny Sultan in his 'jihad' of 1517 A. D. against Vijayanagara (ed. Major King, p. 146).

Nuniz states that Kulbarga was taken from Bijapur by Kṛṣṇarāya. This was about the end of the year 1522 A. D. So if the version of *Burhān-i-Ma'asir* be true, then Ismael must have seized Kulbarga and districts between 1517 and 1522 A. D. Were Dastūr still alive at the time of the battle of Raichūr in 1522 A. D., then he must have been staying at the court of his ally Bārid or more probably with the Qutb-Shah. Now between them, the Bārid 'had strengthened the bonds of friendship' (*Burhān-i-Ma'asir*, p. 143). The Qutb-Shāh either had not mixed himself up with this affair or is included in the other supreme lords of the Dakhan.

11. *ibid*, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE 325-326.



The reactions of the Moslem Lords of the Dakhan to Krṣṣnarāya's proposed invasion were thus not uniform. The Nizam Shah alone struck a different note. This was as it should be. Yet Krṣṣnarāya found it prudent to address the Nizam Shah too in this connection. The obvious suggestion is that the Emperor thought there was at least a remote chance of Burhān not coming to Ismael's aid. The Rāya must have heard of the frayed feelings between Burhān and Ismael over the cession of Shōlapur. These had not yet developed into a positive rupture and Krṣṣnarāya's hopes in this quarter were not realised.

With the other Moslem Lords of the Dakhan, the Emperor was highly successful. Their troops were never needed. And their good will was easily earned. This was possible because the Ādil Shāh was never liked by his neighbouring rulers. Nuniz states that 'the Ydalleao was hated by them all as being a more powerful chief than they (for there is little faith amongst the Moors, and they bite one another like dogs and like to see one after the other destroyed).<sup>12</sup> The Barid was the 'natural enemy' of the Ādil Shāhs.<sup>13</sup> The Imād of Birār had had soft feelings towards Bijapur but now probably got estranged from her because of her recent alliance with Ahmadnagar. Religious sectarianism again intensified their political hostilities. Unlike Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, these powers were of Sunni persuasion. The Qutb-Shāh, himself a

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12 FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 326.

13. Briggs, FĒRISHTA III, p. 51.

Shiah by faith, could not possibly forget that Bījapur was the originator of the treaty of partition of the Dakhan, by which his possessions were marked out as Bīdar's sphere of conquest. A combination of these States with Bījapur could, therefore, never materialise. Thus assured, Kṛṣṇarāya confidently set his men on move.

It was a huge army, totalling 703,000 foot 32,600 horse, 551 elephants and 'several cannon.' This number was again swelled in the later stages of the march by an 'infinite of people.' The dry season facilitated such a heavy traffic across the country. All precautions were taken that 'none of the people should die of thirst' on the road. 'Some ten or twelve thousand men with water skins, 'filled from time to time, preceded the armies, and placed themselves along the road 'to give water to those who have no one to bring it to them.'

During their onward march, the regiments were to be guarded against surprises from the enemy. With this view were sent some fifty thousand men to scout. They kept themselves in advance of the army by three or four leagues. While they spied out the country in front, their flanks were secured by two thousand mounted bowmen.

Oamānāyque, the chief of the guard, led the advance with thirty thousand infantry - archers, men with shields, musqueteers, and spearmen - and a thousand horse, and sixteen elephants. Following him

with their different commands were the Chiefs of the realm Trimbicara, Timapanāyque, Ādapanāyque, Comdamara, Comāra, Ogendraho the Governor of the city of Vijayanagara, three eunuchs the favourites of the king, the king's page of the betel, Comarberca and numerous other captains, the king himself bringing up the rear with six thousand horse and forty thousand foot, the pick of all his kingdom, and three hundred elephants. The troops marched on and arrived at 'Mollambandym - the modern Malliābād - a league from the city of Raichūr. There the king pitched his camp. Numerous other contingents from the Capital and Domar joined the royal forces. While the men rested after the fatigues of the march, and everything was put in order, all the details of the siege of Raichūr were settled. On a day dear to Gods, the armies advanced and invested the fort of Raichūr.

(3)

That fortress was so designed that it could withstand the strongest siege. On the north and south, natural rocks precluded any attack, which could come only from the east. The defences were impregnable. 8000 men, 400 horse and 20 elephants constituted the garrison which was strengthened by some troops from Bijapur under a Captain of their own. These men were further armed with 200 heavy cannon besides several small pieces of artillery. 30 catapults from on the walls would hurl heavy stone on and do the greatest damage to the enemy. The city was well

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supplied with provisions that would last full five years. So situated, the armies within the walls bade defiance to the besiegers.

Many shots from heavy cannon and firelocks and countless arrows and musket-shots greeted the attackers. The first victims were probably the Moors in the royal services that led the van under Cāmānāyque who had pitched his camp nearest the ditches of the fort. The attack grew slack and the king was obliged to have recourse to lavish gifts and strategems. He set a price on every stone brought from the walls and towers of the fort. The price ranged from ten to fifty panams each. The attack became bolder and the resistance more stubborn. The siege dragged on for three months, when information was received in the royal camp that the Ādil Shāh was come up with reinforcements, composed of 120,000 infantry 18,000 horse and fifty elephants with a distinct superiority in artillery.

Kṛṣṇarāya forbade any movement of his army, but kept a watchful eye on the enemy's positions. Tired of waiting and kept guessing of the Rāya's intentions, the Ādil Shāh crossed the Kṛṣṇā and pitched his camp within three leagues of the Vijayanagara forces. His rear was to the river and the camp was strengthened by means of trenches and all the artillery in front.

Now Kṛṣṇarāya ordered a general advance of all his troops. Comārberya, his father in law, and the

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king of Seringapatam, was in command. The attack was delivered two hours after the sunrise on a Saturday which was a New Moon Day in 1522 A. D. May 24. So deadly was the enemy's fire that the royal forces were thrown back in utter confusion, seeing which the Moors charged all amongst them. The king's personal courage alone saved the day. The fleeing men rallied round their king and set on the enemy suddenly and with much weight. The pursuing foe was caught up in great disorder. The much praised artillery turned innocuous.

The Bījapur army broke and fled. It was a rout, Salabat Khān, the Commander-in-chief, and his five hundred Portuguese alone making any stand. These latter, one and all, fell fighting and Salabat was taken prisoner. Assud Khān of Belgaum with his four hundred cavalry had kept aloof all the while and when the battle went against, contrived to be selected by Ismael as his guard and with his king made his escape. The destruction wrought on the Bījapuri forces was so great that the king stopped their pursuit beyond the Kṛṣṇā. The killed of the enemy far exceeded the king's own who numbered sixteen thousand and odd.

The spoil of the war included 4000 horses of Ormuz 100 elephants, and 400 heavy cannon, besides small ones. There were also 900 gun-carriages and many tents and pavilions. Numberless were the sumpter-horses, oxen and other beasts taken by the king. After the close of this battle, the king ordered the



release of numbers of men, women and children that were taken prisoners, during the fight.

Kṛṣṇarāya's departure, away from the fort walls to meet Ismael, appears to have given rise to a difference of opinion, among the forces within. They must have debated the desirability of attacking the Vijayanagara armies from behind while the latter were engaged in a gruesome fight with Ismael's battallions. Presently from among the garrison, a captain<sup>14</sup> sallied out of the fort with a party of 200 horse and the required complement of men and elephants. What motives this captain had to take the step he did, are not known. For he never joined the fight. At a distance from both the camps, entirely along the river-bank and on the king's flank, he stayed, keeping himself fully informed of what all passed in the king's camp. Probably he wanted to join the Ādil Shāh only if his victory were assured. On the contrary, if the fight went against Ismael, this captain would regain the safety of the Rāichūr fort. And when he actually knocked at the gates of Rāichūr, he was refused entrance. For many believed that the captain within hated to share the command of the fort with any other. Thus balked, this captain with his party moved away from Rāichūr, crossed the river

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14. There is no knowing who this captain was. More probably he was the same as had been sent from Bijapur. He must have tried to persuade the garrison to sally out and fall on the enemy. But when this failed, prestige must have driven him to take the step he had himself recommended. This he did with many mental reservations.

further down by a distant ford, and was no more heard of.

The Emperor returned to renew the siege of Rāichūr. On his way, he met Christovão de Figueiredo who had come from Vijayanagara with some horses to sell to the Rāya. This Portuguese dealer in horses proved of immense help to the king in the capture of Rāichūr. Though as a result of his success over Ismael, there was a great accession to his strength in cannon and artillery, the Rāya suffered for want of good marksmen. These were supplied by Christovão and his twenty men. They were very good shots and in no time kept the enemy away from the walls of the fort. This enabled the royal forces to breach the walls in many places. The Captain of the fort himself died of a ball from Christovão's musket. On the 20th day after the battle with Ismael (13th June, 1522), Kṛṣṇarāya received the surrender of Rāichūr.<sup>15</sup> He showed greatest clemency to the inhabitants of the place. He garrisoned the fort with his own men and restored order in the city. He had not started homeward, but there arrived at Rāichūr envoys from the Nizām, Imād, Destūr and the Bārid. These Lords began to be fearful of their own safety and through their envoys they assured the Rāya of their cooperation but demanded the restoration to Ismael of what all was taken from him. They hoped that the king would not refuse to comply with their request, and

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15. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE. p. 346.

thus compel them to turn against him and join the Ādil Shāh in an attempt to recover what had been lost. The Rāya paid no heed to this courteous threat. In a single letter to them all, he answered:—

“I have seen your letters and thank you much for what you have sent to say. As regards the Ydalleao, what I have done to him and taken from him he has richly deserved; as regards returning it to him, that does not seem to me reasonable, nor am I going to do it; and as for your further statement that ye will all turn against me in aid of him if I do not do as ye ask, I pray you do not take the trouble to come hither, for I will myself go to seek ye if ye dare to await me in your lands.”<sup>16</sup> This spirited and defiant reply cowed down those Lords of the Dakhan and they desisted from any further interference in the matter. Having made all the arrangements necessary for the governance of Rāichūr, Kṛṣṇarāya returned to the city of Vijayanagara.

(4)

Kṛṣṇarāya retired into the new city, Nāgalāpur, situated two miles away from Vijayanagara proper. He was informed that an ambassador from the Ādil Shāh had been eagerly awaiting his audience; but he put this off by a month and more. And when he could no longer disregard the importunities of the Moslem envoy, who was called Māṭucoṭam, he appointed a day for the interview. When this time

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16. F. E. 349.

arrived, the ambassador delivered himself of his monarch's message. This depicted the Sultan of Bījapur as all-supplicating and only desirous of sheer justice from the 'most true and powerful prince in all the world and one possessed of most justice and truth.' The Ādil Shāh pleaded ignorance of what caused the Rāya to wage such an unreasonable war against him, in disregard of their peace treaties. The siege of Rāichūr and the destruction of the country round about forced the Ādil Shāh to come to their defence. Of his own accord he would never have allowed himself to seek a conflict with the Rāya. He would, therefore, beg Kṛṣṇaraya 'to make amends therefor, and to send back to him his artillery and tents, his horses and elephants with the rest that was taken from him, and also to restore his city of Rāchol.' If the king would give him the satisfaction for which he prayed as to his property and all other things, he would have him always for a royal friend: but if not, the king's action would be evil, eventhough pleasing to himself. <sup>17</sup>

The king could not be convinced of the justice of this message and its implications. However, he was willing to restore everything that was taken from Ismael and also release Salabat Khan 'provided the Ydallcao would come and kiss his foot.' It is wrong to read into this stipulation any arrogance on the part of the Rāya. For, as Dr. Ayyangar remarks that phrase is 'more Musalman in character than Hindu and means no more humiliation than a surrender at

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17. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE pp. 351—2.

discretion.' <sup>18</sup> The Ādil Shāh showed himself willing to do so but that he could not come to the distant Vijayanagara. Assured of Ismael's sincerity by the Moslem envoy, Kṛṣṇarāya himself proceeded as far as Mudkal. But the Ādil Shāh would not show himself. The Rāya moved further into the enemy's territory and arrived at Bījapur itself. Even there, Ismael disappointed him. This was an affront to him. He would gladly prolong his stay at Bījapur but the Moslems made it difficult for him to remain there. They drained away the two lakes on which the city depended for water-supply. And when at last the king left Bījapur, it was a ruined city.

Ismael Ādil Shāh saw what befell his city. Himself to blame, he repented of his false assurances to the Rāya, and more than ever desired to cultivate an understanding with him. Assud Khān volunteered to bring this about and with the Sultan's assent, started for Mudkal where the king was resting at the time.

In this Assud had an axe to grind. <sup>19</sup> Salabat was his deadly enemy. He had held Assud's advice cowardly and solely responsible for the disgrace and defeat of the Ādil Shāh and if released would be the worst and most powerful foe that Assud would have to reckon with. Hence Assud's visit to the Rāya. On his arrival at Mudkal, he got an audience with the king. In a short time, his soft and cunning

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18. H.R. 1917 July, p. 22. See Burhān-i-Ma'asir ed. King.  
'the *amirs*, having kissed the Sultan's feet.'

19. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE 355.



words convinced the Rāya that Ismael's prevarications were all due to Salabat Khān. Unthinkingly and hastily, the king got Salabat beheaded.<sup>20</sup> And when shortly after he came to see Assud's treason and sought him, Assud had already eluded him by a prompt retreat to Bijapur. There Assud assured the Ādil Khān that the Rāya could not be believed in and that if he could escape with life from Vijayanagara, it was only after running great many risks.<sup>21</sup>

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The personal hatreds of an ambitious courtier thus betrayed his master's interests. Ismael had hoped and prayed for a peace with Vijayanagara, and an escape from the humiliation and suffering consequent upon a continued war with that power. But he obtained the very same in abundance. Deceived by Assud Khān, the Rāya yet went to the extremity of his territory to find Ismael there as Assud had given him to understand. This never happened. Kṛṣṇarāya would not be played with. *He marched straight to Kulbarga, seized it and razed it to the ground. 'In the fortress belonging to it,'* writes Nuniz, *'the king took three sons of the king of Daquem. He made the eldest king of the kingdom of Daquem, his father being dead, though the Ydallcao wanted to make king one of his brothers-in-law .....*; for this reason, he had kept these

20. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE 356.

21. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE. p. 357.

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three brothers prisoners in that fortress. He whom he thus made king was received by all the realm as such, and obeyed by all the Great Lords and even by the Ydalleao owing to his fear of the king. The other two brothers, he took with him and gave them each one an allowance, to each one every year fifty thousand gold pardaos; and he holds them and treats them as princes and great Lords, as indeed they are. ' <sup>22</sup>

Kṛṣṇarāya's expedition against Kulburga as narrated by Nuniz has been criticised by historians <sup>23</sup> as chronologically wrong and historically inaccurate. Before we consider their view in detail, *we may note that*.

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22. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 358.

23. *Mr. Sewell* (F. H., notes on p. 157 and p. 358): Dr. S. K. *Ayyangar* discredits Nuniz and assigns an earlier date (not specified) but later than the Gajapati campaign, for this raid on Kulburga which, he thinks, was the same as is found in both AMUKTAMĀLYADA and RĀYAVĀCAKAMU. (Yet-remembered Ruler, H. R. 1917 July pages, 16 and 22) Mr. K. V. *Lakshmanarao*, like others, takes that there was only one such raid by Kṛṣṇarāya and plumps for 1514 A. D. as the time of the occurrence. (VYASĀVALI, pp. 41—44). Mr. K. *Iswara Dutt* places it in 1518 A. D. prior to the battle of Rāichūr and immediately after the Kalinga Campaign. (BHĀRATI, Vol. 7, part ii, pp. 489-90, 1930 Sept.). Dr. N. *Venkataramanayya* very nearly agreed with Mr. K. V. Lakshmanarao at first (BHĀRATI, Vol. VI, No. 10, October, 1929, p. 619) but later changed his opinion and agreed with Nuniz in placing it subsequent to the battle of Rāichūr. The date given is 1520-21 A. D., for with Sewell he assigns the Rāichūr battle to May, 19, 1520 A. D. (BHĀRATI, VII, part ii, pp. 284-9) The

( f. n. Continued )

*this incident should not be confused with what is described in Manucaritra, Āmuktamālyada and Vijayanagarada-Sāmrājyavu. Not one of these writings mentions the taking of the three Bahmuny princes. The relevant verse in AMUKTAMĀLYADA occurs immediately after the one wherein the Rāya is stated to have killed the Ādil Khān in battle. This was Yūsuf, who had conquered Kulburga in 1504 A. D., and retained it until his death in the second half of 1510 A. D. His death, as also the destruction of Moslem legions at Sagar and Kulburga, must have formed part of a single campaign, in C. 1510 A. D. AMUKTAMĀLYADA is definite that the event had already happened before the Rāya first thought of composing*

( f. n. Continued from Page 179 )

correctness of his conclusion is, however, vitiated by the process of reasoning adopted. As shall be shown above, AMUKTAMĀLYADA, MANUCARITRA, and the VIJAYANAGARADA SAMRAJYAVU do not support his contention, though he takes it that they do so. His observations based on KELADI NRPAVIJAYAM cannot be accepted. For its version is in direct opposition to the version of S'IVATATVARATNAKARA which is in accord with the available epigraphical evidence. These latter show that the Vijayanagara Emperor whom Sadāsiva Nayaka assisted in the Campaign against the rulers of Kalyana, Kulburga and Bijapur, was not Kṛṣṇarāya, as K. N. Vijaya would have it, but was Rāma Rāya. (See 'The Nayaks of Keladi: N. Lakshminarayana Rao Office of the Government Epigraphist for India, Ootacamund VIJAYANAGARA COMMEMORATION VOLUME, pp. 255-258). Apart from these defects, the Doctor's conclusion may be accepted.

One may remark that none of the historians cited above agrees with Nuniz as regards the capture of the Bahmuny princes by the Rāya.

his great poem, which act has been ascribed to November 3, 1519 A. D.

VIJAYANAGARADA-SĀMRĀJYAVU states that Kṛṣṇa-  
raya came to the throne a little earlier than 7th  
August 1509 A. D. Since then he 'waged a three years'  
war with three Moslem Lords of the Dakhan, viz.,  
the Qutb Shāh, the Nizām Shāh and obviously the  
Ādil Shāh. Of this war, the march on Kulbarga  
was an incident. The war must have ended by  
Srimukha, Chitri, Śrirāmadāsami (the date intended  
was probably 27th March 1512 A. D. on which day,  
the Rāya set off against the Gajapati. On the authority  
of the above document, VIJAYANAGARADA-SĀMRĀ-  
JYAVU, the march to Kulbarga must be earlier  
than March 1512 A. D. .

But according to the two works Rāyavācakamu  
and Kṛṣṇarāya Vijayamu, the Rāya was strongly  
advised not to cross to the north of the Kṛṣṇā, and  
he acted accordingly. Dr. Venkataramanayya, therefore,  
rejects the chronology supplied for the expedition by  
VIJAYANAGARADA-SĀMRĀJYAVU, but makes the event to  
conform to the date given by Nuniz.

The RAYAVĀCĀKAMU and KṚṢṆARĀYAVIJAYAMU, both  
refer to an incomplete victory of the Rāya over  
the Moslem rulers of the north. It was incomplete  
in the sense that the retreat of the Moslems was more  
due to an initial reverse and the unexpected floods of  
the river Kṛṣṇā. The Rāya could not drive his vic-  
tory home, but had to undertake a campaign against  
the Gajapati to secure his rear. Again, these works



place this battle subsequent to the capture of Unmattur by the king. This does not appear to be accurate. For on the basis of an inscription<sup>24</sup> from Bukkapattanam, the seizure of Unmattur has to be placed about the September of 1512 A. D. The VIJAYANAGARADA-SĀMRAJYAVU does not refer to Unmattur at all but allows time for it in between the closure of the Rāya's war with the Moslems and his other one against the Gajapati. The authenticity of this document is above question as is proved by the regnal years it provides for Kṛṣṇarāya and his successors on the throne of Vijayanagara, which is in complete accord with the available epigraphical evidence.<sup>25</sup> The document states that the Rāya came to an understanding with the Moslem Lords of the north, after the Kulburga Campaign, returned to the capital, rested there awhile and later undertook the conquest of the Gajapati. The reference to Kulburga clearly agrees with the statements to the same effect as are found in AMUKTAMĀLYADA and MANUCARITRA. It cannot, therefore, be set aside.<sup>26</sup> *The event they narrate belongs to the year 1510-11 A. D.*

24. 180 of 1918.

25. BHARATI, Vo. VI. 1929, p. 620.

26. 'On the 12th May of the month of Tai in the year Prajōtpatti' runs the SĀMRAJYAVU, 'the Rāya set off against the Qutub Shah and the Nizām Shāh. During a campaign of three years, he fought the three powers, set up a pillar of victory at Kulburga, levied tribute on the three kingdoms..... entered the city of Vijayanagara.' (BHARATI, VI, 1929, p. 622)

( f. n. Continued )



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Mr. K. V. Lakshmana Rao notes this probability. He is equally aware of the different character of the Kulbarga expedition described by Nuniz. Unfortunately he started on the assumption that Kṛṣṇarāya must have been to Kulbarga only once. He rejected both 1510-11 A. D., and 1522 A. D., given for the occurrence and preferred to assign it to 1514 A. D. In doing so, he took his stand by a passage from RAYAVĀCAKAMU. Therein is stated that success accruing to the Rāya in his affairs with the Northern Moslems, he returned to his kingdom. While he was at Tirupati, news was brought to him that the Moslems of Kalyān and Kulbarga bade him defiance. Enraged, the king marched against Kulbarga and captured it by escalading its walls. The captain of the fort, with the six thousand of his horse and cavalry men was taken prisoner. The Rāya left the fort in charge of one Gujjari Kalyāṇa Rao and repaired back to Tirupati.<sup>27</sup>

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(*f. n. Continued from Page 182*)

The date of the King's march against the Qutub and the Nizām Shāh is equivalent of January 9, 1512 A. D. We need not be tempted to infer that Kulbarga incident should be a subsequent one. The order of the sentences is not the order of events spoken of. Else the Rāya's war with the Moslems must extend over three years beginning with 9 January, 1512 A. D. This is impossible. The sentence, with the reference to Kulbarga within, must be taken to state in brief the achievements of the king against the Moslem rulers during the three years of its duration. The Rāya's fight with the Qutub and the Nizām Shāh about 9th January 1512 must have brought the war to an end.

27. RAYAVĀCAKAMU: ed. by J. Ramayya Pantulu, p. III.

Mr. Lakshmanarao argues that the Rāya was at Tirupati in Śaka 1436 i.e., A. D. 1514.<sup>28</sup> The same year, Amīr Barīd wrested Kulbarga from Bījapur. Therefore, possibly by invitation from Barīd, or on his own, Kṛṣṇarāya must have gone to assist the weakling on the Bahmuny throne and defeated the Bījapuri army. The Moslem historians must have omitted the name of Kṛṣṇarāya in this connection and attributed the success wholly to Barīd.<sup>29</sup>

These inferences are the outcome of reading the relevant passage out of context. It is also probably due to an unquestioned acceptance of the date given in RĀYAVĀCAKAMU, prior to which Kulbarga is stated to have fallen. This date viz., Śrīmukha. Ās'vīja, Śu. 12. is equivalent to 12th October, 1513 A. D. This is hopelessly incorrect. For RĀYAVĀCAKAMU is definite that a good many events viz., Kṛṣṇarāya's conquest of the Gajapati, whose daughter he espoused, a sort of agreement with the rulers of Gōlkonḍa, Bījapur and Ahmadnagar, his visit to Tirupati, had all gone before the capture of Kulbarga.<sup>30</sup> 12th October, 1513 A. D., the date given in RĀYAVĀCAKAMU can never form a safe basis for chronological deductions.

We may observe, however, that in the sequence of events depicted, the Rāyavācakamu goes to support Nuniz. The Telugu Poem, KṚṢṆARĀYA VIJAYAMU also

28. VYASĀVALI, p. 48.

29. Mr. Lakshmanarao instances Nos. 53 to 55 of 1889 to support this statement. VYASĀVALI, p. 48, n. 2.

30. RĀYAVĀCAKAMU, pp. 109-112.

conforms to this in so far as it places the capture of Kulbarga after the Rāya's marriage with the Gajapati princess.<sup>31</sup> But Nuniz is not similarly confirmed in his further statement that the Rāya took three Bahmuny princes at Kulbarga, the eldest of whom was raised to be the king of Dakhan. Mr. Sewell remarks that this affair 'does not seem very exact from an historical standpoint.'<sup>32</sup> Dr. S. K. Ayyangar appears hesitating at first but finally agrees with Mr. Sewell. He argues: "Here again, perhaps, is a confusion in post-dating a previous incident. Krishna might as well have attempted this when he made the raid against Gulbarga from Tirupati after the wars against the Gajapati. If such an attempt had actually been made successfully, as Nuniz would have us believe, inscriptions of a later date would give indications in giving him title such as the Daksina Suratana or Kalvarga Suratana - Sthapanacharya, or some equivalent of it. These documents are silent ..... These transactions have to be dismissed as ill-founded, if not actually unfounded. Nor is the part of the year between the 10th of June and the end, enough for a return to Vijayanagara, then a return to head-quarters and a further invasion of Gulbarga.'<sup>33</sup>

Here the argument based on insufficiency of time appears to have been an after-thought. For in elaboration of this contention, the Doctor has no where

31. KRṢṢNARĀYA VIJAYAMU, Canto IV, Verse 140.

32. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 358, n. 1.

33. HINDUSTAN REVIEW 1917, July, p. 22.

tried to supply his own chronology for the movements of the king. According to Nuniz, the Rāya must have returned to Vijayanagara, about the end of June. Nearly a month passed before he received the ambassador from the Ādil Shāh. The king's march to Bijapur must, therefore, belong to the end of that August. His stay there was a short one, for a few days. Thence he returned to Mudkal.<sup>34</sup> This introduces the first half of September. While the King was here, Assud Khān arrived on behalf of his sovereign, Ismael, but took several days to obtain audience with him. This secured, he compassed the death of Salabat Khān and escaped to the Ādil Shāh, who must be presumed to have been not farther away from Mudkal.<sup>35</sup> This would take at the longest the whole of the month of October. From Mudkal, Kulburga is removed by hardly a hundred miles. It cannot be suggested that two months were too short for such a march into the Ādil Shāhi territory, especially when 'the Ydallcao had lost so many men and so much honour, and had lost indeed all his power .....'<sup>36</sup> Time-factor, therefore, does not enter the argument against Nuniz in his version of the Kulburga expedition by Kṛṣṇarāya.

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34. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 356. What does "headquarters" mean for Dr. S. K. A. ? Vijayanagara, or Mudkal?

35. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 356. As Assud left for Mudkal to interview the Rāya, 'Ydallcao went with him as far as the river.'

36. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 340.

So far as the capture of the Bahmuny princes is concerned, Nuniz is not so severely alone. He is supported in detail by a Sanskrit poem, 'Sangīta-Sūryōdayam' by Bandāru Laksmīnārāyaṇa, a poet-musician of Kṛṣṇarāya's own Court.<sup>37</sup> In the introduction to his work, he described the king's conquest of Kalinga and his marriage with the Gajapati princess. Subsequent to this, the king is stated to have come out victorious in his fight against Sapāda-the Ādil Khān. A verse narrates next Kṛṣṇarāya's exploits north of the river, Kṛṣṇā. Crossing the river, the Rāya set fire to a number of villages of the Yavanas and took the fortresses of Ferōzābād and Sagar. He defeated and put to shame the Persian, Sapāda, and destroyed the town of Kulburga, where from he took out, by the strength of his arms, *three sons of the Sultan.* (त्रीन् सुरत्राण पुत्रान्)<sup>38</sup>.

Two independent writers, Nuniz and Lakshmīnārāyaṇa, one a disinterested observer at the capital and the other so intimately connected with Kṛṣṇarāya and his court, both bear witness to the capture of the three Bahmuny princes by the king. We cannot,

37. Sri Kṛṣṇadēvanāyala Vidyā Gōṣṭhula: V. Prabhakara S'astri  
BHARATI, II, No. 4, April, 1925.

38. *ibid.*

Kṛṣṇamuttīrya Sōz-yam Yavanajanapadam Vahni-  
sātkṛtya Sarvām

Bhaṅktvōccalī Pāras'ikam Kalubaragapurim drāksapādā  
damanah

Kānta (Kṛāntva ?) Vyākṛṣṭavām dōrbalaghanamahimā  
threeen Suratrānaputrān "



therefore, lightly dismiss their evidence as unfounded. Yet, great many difficulties stand in the way of its acceptance.

The scanty material available leaves us to conjecture how it came to pass that three of the Bahmuny princes were held captive at Kulburga. Dr. S. K. Ayyangar seems to maintain with Nuniz that the princes 'sometime earlier were under honourable surveillance in Gulbarga.' <sup>39</sup> There was only one occasion when Ismael could have taken them. In the year A. H. 920 (-1514 A. D.), Amir Bārid obliged the Bahmuny Sultan to invade Bījapur, that had lately expelled his forces from Sagar, Etgeer and the surrounding country. The battle that ensued resulted in a total defeat to the Bārid. The fleeing forces left behind them '*Mahmood Shah and his son, the prince Ahmud, who both fell from their horses during the action*.....Ismael Adil Shah, on hearing of the situation of the princes, went to pay his respects to them.' <sup>40</sup> He delivered his sister, Beeby Musseety to Prince Ahmud] in marriage at Kulburga. The Sultan and the new couple returned to Ahmudābād (Bīdar) accompanied by 'an escort of five thousand cavalry' <sup>41</sup> of Bījapur.

The author of Burhān-i-Māasir ignores this event altogether. And Ferishta is silent so far as the other sons of the Sultan are concerned. He does not state

39. HINDUSTAN REVIEW 1917 July, p. 22.

40. Briggs III, p. 46.

41. *ibid*, p. 47.

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whether or no they accompanied the Sultan during this campaign. Inconclusive in itself, Ferishta's silence is suggestive. Might be, he referred to Ahmud specifically, because the Prince's marriage with Ismael's sister had to be described presently. Probably there was not much to relate of the Princes as the prisoners of Ismael. The circumstances of their release, if Nuniz were true, were not such that would please the historian of the Bījapuri court to describe.

Nuniz sounds convincing when he asserts that the Ādil Shāh detained the princes in Prison, with a view to promote the succession of his brother-in-law to the Bahmuny throne. The Bārid had been wielding an increasing influence over the Sultan, in whose name he tried to dominate the other Lords of the Dakhan. Ismael, in his turn, wanted to check this menace of the Bārid by keeping the Bahmuny throne in obligation to Bījapur. The five thousand Bījapuri cavalry that escorted the Sultan to Ahmudabād Bīdar after Ahmud's marriage is illustrative of Ismael's interest to secure the release of the Sultan from the hold of the Bārid. This latter was further reduced as a potential danger by leaving only Ahmud to succeed Mahmūd Shāh, while keeping all his rivals in prison at Kulburga. Ismael followed this up and kept his own man, Azamat-al-Mulk, in attendance with Sultan Mahmūd Shāh.<sup>42</sup> This Azamat, as the deputy of the Ādil Khān, was the Wazir<sup>43</sup> of the Government

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42. *Burhan-i-Māasir*: ed. King. p. 148.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

of the Dakhan. These precautions, were, powerless to extricate the Sultan from the clutches of the Barid. They could, however, ensure, the accession of Ahmud to the Bahmuny throne.

Ahmud Shāh came to the throne about the end of 1518 A. D.<sup>44</sup> He soon realised what it was to be dominated by Amīr Bārid, the sworn enemy of Bījapur. He could use the Palace and the Royal jewels. He was allowed a daily allowance which fell short of his expenses. So that Ahmud had to get the jewels broken up and sold in the markets of Vijayanagara. However well-kept, this secret reached the ears of Amīr Bārid. The Sultan's sympathisers were all put to death and the Sultan himself was subjected to ill-usage. Unable to bear the oppressive Barid, Ahmud appealed to his brother-in-law, Ismael for help. Ismael 'despatched ambassadors with presents to Court; but before their arrival, Ahmud Shah II died, two years after his accession to the throne, in the year 927'<sup>45</sup> (- December 12, 1520 — December, 1, 1521 A. D.).

This date is significant. For in that very year, about the end of December 1520 A. D., Bījapur fought

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44. Sultan Mahmūd Shāh III Bahmuny died, according to Ferishta in A. H. 924, Zilhuz 4 (- December 7, 1518 A. D.) - Briggs II 552. The author of *Burhān-i-Maasir* allows him a few more days and assigns his death to Zi-ul-Hijjah 24, A. H. 924 (- December 27, 1518 A. D.) — ed. by Major king, p. 147. The discrepancy is quite insignificant.

45. Briggs, Ferishta, II, p. 554.

Vijayanagara on the banks of the Kṛṣṇā and got the worst of it. One may remember *Assud Khān's* advice to *Ismael* to 'Lay aside all thoughts of revenge till he could strengthen himself by an alliance with Boorhan Nizam Shah, and remove his natural enemy *Ameer Bereed* from his border.' <sup>46</sup> Ferishta describes how this Bijapur - Ahmadnagar alliance was effected but is strangely silent over the steps taken by *Ismael* to remove the *Bārid* from his border. Nor does Ferishta connect *Ismael* with any engagement with *Bārid* earlier in 1524 A. D. <sup>47</sup> Could *Ismael* be expected to feel the need, yet do nothing, to meet the menace of the *Bārid*?

*Bārid* was *Ismael's* natural enemy. He had to be removed from the frontiers of Bijapur. Ferishta suggests as though, at this time, *Bārid* had concentrated his troops on the Bijapuri side of *Bidar's* frontiers. If this were the case, then *Bārid's* object must have been to attack *Kulburga* and wrest the Bahmuny princes away from the control of Bijapur. *Ismael* was hardly out of a disastrous fight against Vijayanagara and could not be in a position immediately to enter into hostilities with *Amir Bārid*. His need above all was an alliance with Ahmadnagar. But in the meanwhile, *Bārid* had to be kept away. Hence probably, he must have set the Bahmuny prince *Alā-ud-Din* at liberty. *Bārid* at first was very unwilling

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46. Briggs: FERISHTA, III, p. 51.

47. That year, *Amir* aided the *Nizam Shāh* in a war against *Ismael*.

to acquiesce in this new situation consequent upon Alā-ud-din's release. 'Ameer Bereed kept the throne vacant nearly fourteen days after the death of Ahmud Shah, and then,' writes Ferishta, 'instead of ascending it himself, *he deemed it prudent* to place the crown on the head of one of the Bahmuny family; accordingly Alla-ood-Deen the second<sup>48</sup> was selected for that purpose.'<sup>49</sup>

Mutual suspicion appears to have ruled the relations between Alā-ud-Din Shāh and Amīr Bārid. The Sultan vainly tried to get the Bārid murdered: and 'the king was deposed after a short reign of two years and three months, placed in confinement, and shortly afterwards murdered.'<sup>50</sup> We are thus ushered into year A. H. 929 (—commencing with 1922 November 20). It was to the beginning of this very year (A. H. 929) that Nuniz assigns the capture of the Bahmuny princes at Kulburga by Kṛṣṇarāya. If we were to believe Nuniz, the Rāya must have assisted Alāuddin's brother Waliullah, on to the Bahmuny throne.<sup>51</sup>

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48. On a coin dated in A. H. 927 Alā-ud-Din is stated to be the son of Ahmud Shah. ('The coins of the Bahmuni kings of the Dakhan on p. 341 of THE CHRONICLES OF THE PATHAN KINGS OF DELHI, by Edward Thomas). This looks very suspicious.

49. Briggs, II, p. 555.

50. *ibid*, p. 556.

51. Khwājah Nizāmuddin Ahmad the author of the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbari* gives a different chronology for the later Bahmuny

( f. n. Continued )



Nuniz is definite that the new Sultan, crowned due to the intercession of Kṛṣṇarāya was not the brother-in-law of Ismael Ādil Shāh.<sup>52</sup> Obviously, therefore, he had not meant Ahmud, when he wrote

(*f. n. Continued from Page 192*)

Sultans. Mahmud Shah died in 927 A. H., having reigned for forty years and two months and three days. (Trans by Brajendranāth De and ed. By Bani Prashad, BIBLIOTHECA INDICA, work No. 225, Vol. III, part I, p. 182.) Mālīk Barīd placed Ahmud Shah on the throne and he ruled for two years and one month and died in 929 A. H. (ibid, pp. 182-83). His successor Ala-ul-Din reigned for one year and eleven months (p. 183.) The reign of his brother, Sultan Wali-ul-lah, 'did not reach a year.' (ibid p. 184.) Then 'the helpless Kalim-ul-lah, was made Sultan; and he was kept, under guard like his brother in the city of Bidar.' (ibid, p. 184)

As per Nizamuddin, Ala-ul-Din must have ascended the Bahmuny throne in 929 (A. H.) which commences with 20 Nov., 1522 A. D. Nuniz ascribes Kṛṣṇarāya's intervention in the Bahmuny succession to this period. If, therefore, Kṛṣṇarāya were instrumental in the crowning of Ala-ul-Din as Sultan, Nuniz' further claim that this Sultan had two brothers is found correct. For these latter were Wali-ul-lah and Kalim-ul-lah. But it is difficult to prefer Bahmuny chronology as given by Nizamuddin to that of Perishta.

52. The passage from Nuniz suggests that Ahmud was alive but was not made king; both of which suggestions are contrary to fact. Nuniz states that the Raya made 'the eldest, king ..... though the Ydalleno wanted to make king one of his brothers-in-law ..... ' This latter was Ahmud who had married Ismael's sister Booby Musseoty. But Ahmud had long been dead and had had two year's rule to his credit. (see *infra*.)

(*f. n. Continued*)

of the eldest of the sons of the king of the Dakhan. Nor could Alaud-Din be intended, for by then he had died. *But if Waliullah were to answer to Nuniz's description, the question would arise, who were the two younger brothers of his, who together with him were taken prisoners by Kṛṣṇarāya?*

Nuniz writes as though he saw these Bahmuny princes at the Hindu capital. But he does not vouch whether and when either both or the one immediately younger to Waliullah was released in time to ascend the Dakhani throne in his turn. Nor does Nuniz give out their names. We are thus thrown into a difficult predicament, unable totally to accept or reject Nuniz out of hand. The categorical assertion of Bandaru Lakṣminārāyaṇa that Kṛṣṇarāya took three 'Suratrapuṭraṇ' precludes the dismissal of Nuniz' story.

The opinion has long been held that Waliullah was the third and the youngest son of Mahmūd Shah III Bahmuny. Recent researches have shown that he had a younger brother in Kalimullah. The uncertainty of the latter's parentage is greatly due to

(f. n. Continued from Page 193)

Mr. Sewell (F. R. p. 157, note) and Dr. S. K. Ayyangar (H. R. July 1917, p. 22) both understood the eldest of the sons of the Sultan, referred by Nuniz, to be Ahmud, on the assumption that the relevant events belonged to the end of 1520 A. D. Nuniz was, however, dealing with events after the battle of Raichūr which according to our calculation took place in 1522.

Ferishta who speaks of Kalimullah as the son of Ahmud Shah by the Bijapuri princess, Beeby Musseety.<sup>53</sup> But on page 729 of the Bombay Lithograph, Ferishta himself is seen terming Kalimullah as the son of Mahmūd Shah.<sup>54</sup> An unique coin of the Hyderabad Museum proves beyond doubt that Kalimullah was begotten of Mahmūd Shah.<sup>55</sup>

Yet the versions of Nuniz and Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa require that another brother of Kalimullah be placed. But such another is not so far known to have existed. While we are thus forced to depend, upon future discovery to prove Nuniz as wholly authentic, we may observe that the harems of the Bahmuny Sultans were not all defined. Not all the legitimate and illegitimate offspring of the Sultans by their numerous wives and concubines could have made themselves important enough to be historical figures. The Bahmuny rule, even in name, ended with Kalimullah. And no wonder if his brother, if there were one, is unknown for purposes of historical studies. We may, therefore, conclude that even after it is shorn of all the improbabilities that might go with a foreigner's attempt to record Indian events and persons, Nuniz' story of Kṛṣṇaraya's capture of three Bahmuny princes at Kulburga and his intervention

53. Briggs II, p. 558.

54. PROCEEDINGS, 7th Oriental Conference 1933, p. 739. 'Rare and important coins of Bahmani kings': Khwaja Mahmud Ahmad.

55. *ibid.* Wolsey Haig: CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA III p. 431. and 708.

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in the Bahmuny succession cannot be dismissed as devoid of truth.

A mighty military exploit, the Raichūr war was by no means a political success for Vijayanagara. Peace with Bijapur was not secured, nor were frontiers fixed; nor was there the final cessation of war. For scarcely five years passed before Ismael Ādil Shāh returned to attack Raichūr with success. No doubt, for the time being, Vijayanagara won immunity from invasion by the Dakhani Moslem rulers. The Hindus fostered a false sense of security, and developed a superiority complex. This meant that the Moslems could plan and carry out a scheme of rehabilitating their shaken power without arousing any suspicion in the minds of the Hindus. Kṛṣṇarāya had conquered Bijapur but could not subdue her. He never intended annexing that territory; yet showed no anxiety to come to terms with the Ādil Shāh. His insistence on a personal surrender of Ismael was as unreasonable as it was impolitic. Self-glory meant more to him than the State's well being. This personal equation to the State sent him in vain pursuit of Ismael to the battlements of the distant Kulbarga where he practised a little at king-making. He carried everything before him. Red ruin followed his march to Kulbarga and return. But it meant no more than this. He demonstrated his inability to hold the inhospitable and waterless country for any considerable length of time. This but heartened the victims of his invasion. Kṛṣṇarāya ceased to be a serious threat to them. At the worst, he could only



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lay waste a part of their territory. The Moslems were as hostile as ever to Vijayanagara.

This much could be said for Kṛṣṇarāya that he could not trust Ismael's professions of friendship and loyalty. *But his march to Kulbarga was a wrong step taken. It did not bring Ismael down to his knees. What is worse, it roused the Moslem princes, hitherto friendly to Vijayanagara, to a sense of insecurity.* The ease with which Kṛṣṇarāya had beaten Ismael about Rāichūr opened their eyes, probably for the first time. Their united demand of Kṛṣṇarāya that he should give back to Ismael what he had taken so far, demonstrates this to an extent. Afraid to strike, they protested. *But the way Kṛṣṇarāya reacted to their remonstrance does not do much credit to that monarch as a statesman.* His message to them was not couched in terms of any courtesy. It was an open threat that the Rāya would himself seek them in their own kingdoms and destroy them. Might be, the Moslem Lords were half-hearted in their protest. More probably, they might not have taken the Rāya's threat very seriously. But the king's march to Kulbarga must have frightened them a great deal. For the defence of their realm, they would have found it necessary to join hands with each other as against the Vijayanagara armies. It was even possible that they should ally with the Ādil Shāh to stand up and fight this menace of Kṛṣṇarāya. But this was averted at the end as the king abandoned this northern exploit. His councillors did not agree to this, writes Nuniz, 'saying that water would



fail him by that road and that it did not seem to them that those Moorish Lords whom they counted as friends would be otherwise than afraid that the king would take their lands as he had taken those of the other ..... and that for this reason these Lords would probably make friends with the Ydalcao, and together they would come against the king; and although there was no reason to be afraid of them, yet the king must need fear the want of water, of which they had none. And the king agreed that this counsel was good.' <sup>56</sup>

To dabble with the succession to the Bahmuny throne was thus Kṛṣṇarāya's device to cover the frustration of his designs against Bijapur in particular and the kingdoms of the Dakhan generally. 'After the return of the king to Vijayanagara,' states Nuniz 'nothing more passed between him and the Ydalcao worthy of record, relating either to peace or war.' <sup>57</sup>

Nuniz does not specify the date, but about the end of Kṛṣṇarāya's reign, probably in 1528 A. D., he describes some military manoeuvres that took place on the frontier common to both the kingdoms. He writes that having collected his army and formed afresh his forces of cavalry and elephants, Ismael Adil Shāh moved, against Raichūr, where he pitched his camp. Hearing of this, Kṛṣṇarāya rushed up to

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56. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE. pp. 357—58.

57. *ibid.* p. 358.

that place as fast as his horse could take him. But the news of his approach sped faster and the Ādil Shah promptly sought safety in flight. Except for the six hundred horses that he bought on the road from the Portuguese, the king had started off alone. When, however, he arrived at Raichūr, the Ādil Shah had already left. Disappointed and provoked beyond all measure, the king, 'sent a message to the Ydalleao saying that he had already twice broken his oath and his word, and that as he had not fulfilled the promise he had made he would make war on him in such fashion as that by force he should become his vassal, and that he would not let him alone till he had taken from him Billagao.'<sup>58</sup> But soon winter set in, compelling a postponement of military operations. The king retired to his capital. He initiated negotiations with the Portuguese Governor of Goa for help and busied himself making ready for the coming war. But in the midst of his preparations the king 'fell sick of the same illness of which all his ancestors had died.'<sup>59</sup> Shortly, after, he passed away.

*Nuniz thus leaves the impression that Kṛṣṇarāya retained possession of Rāichūr to the end of his life. But this does not appear to have been really the case and that for various reasons. We shall come to them by and by. We may, however, note a few points of this story which make it unconvincing. Kṛṣṇarāya*

58. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE pp. 361—2.

59. *ibid*, p. 362.

could not be expected to gallop off all alone, 'without even telling any one,' to compel the Ādil Shāh in full force to raise the siege of Raichūr. The exploit is too quixotic to put to the king's account. Nor was Ismael Ādil Shāh so chicken-hearted to be panic-stricken at the approach of a mere six hundred horse, even if led by the redoubtable Rāya. As shall be presently described, Ismael had a great accession to his power before he undertook to repair his prestige so grievously shaken at Raichūr, a few years earlier. And again, in his message, the Rāya promised to beat Ismael thoroughly, into a vassal, and would not let him alone until he would take Belgaum from him. Is it that the loss of Belgaum was the worst that could ever befall the Ādil Shāh and that he would quail at the very thought of it? It could never be worse than the loss of his independent sovereignty over Bījapur and to attribute to Kṛṣṇarāya a resort to such a threat to make Ismael alive to the danger he ran, is, to say the least, very suspicious. On the other hand, *we may gather from Ferishta that Ismael Ādil Shāh recovered possession of Rāichūr while Kṛṣṇarāya was yet alive.*

With the beginning of the year 1524 A. D., Bījapur appears, to have started on the path of recovery. In that year, she gained back the mainlands of Goa. This is seen from the report the Chamber of Goa submitted to the king of Portugal, dated 31st October, wherein is written.

"The mainland which Ruy de Mello ..... conquered was entered by the Moors, who used to

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possess it, in the month of April of five hundred and twenty four, and they hold it as theirs and the first Thanadar's district which they took was that of Perna, which is by the sea side. There they captured two Portuguese, and one of them was the Thanadar, these are prisoners in the fortress of Bylgan, of which the Suffilarim is captain." <sup>60</sup>

Very little mention is made of this circumstance by other historians, Ferishta included. Mr. Sowell, therefore, infers that these successful Moors 'were not the royal troops acting under the orders of the Sultan, but belonged to the local levies of Asada Khan, then Chief of Belgaum.' <sup>61</sup> This inference appears correct considering how Assud carried himself subsequent to his return from Vijayanagara, where he had compassed the execution of Salabat Khan. Assud grossly misrepresented Kṛṣṇaraya's doings to his monarch. Then 'he went to Bilgao, where he strengthened his position, and when the Ydalleao sent afterwards to summon him he never obeyed, because he knew that the wickedness that he had done had been found out.' <sup>62</sup> The exploit, thus, was on Assud's own at the expense of the Portuguese. *It could not, therefore, directly enhance the power of the Ādil Shāh.* But what is much more important to note, *Assud proved successful where the mighty forces of Vijayanagara had recently suffered a reverse.* For,

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60. Danvers: PORTUGUESE INDIA, I, p. 368

61. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE. p. 159.

62. Nuniz, FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 357.



*Barros states that about the year 1523, Saluva Timma, the king's minister invaded the mainlands near Goa, which had been recently acquired by the Portuguese under Ruy de Mello; that he advanced towards Ponda with a small force but that he was attacked and driven back.*<sup>63</sup>

Ferishta, however, does not tire extolling Assud Khān to the skies. For him, Assud was everything that a loyal chieftain of Ismeal could ever be. In his account Assud appears accompanying Ismael in each and every war that the latter had to fight at this time. We may infer, therefore, that if Assud were rather cautious and restive, it was only a passing whim of his and that he never disappointed Ismael in whatever was desired of him.

*Assud's achievement, coming on the heels of Saluva Timma's repulse, was timely. It revived the drooping spirits of the Bijapuri soldiers. Their vision of the beleagured Kulbarga became gradually blurred and shortly after, they were again in the fighting trim. It was none too soon. For Burhan Nizām Shāh was marching 'with forty thousand men to besiege Sholapur and to occupy the Ceded Districts.'*<sup>64</sup> He had confederated with the Imād Shāh and the Barid and was come in 931 A. H. (= October 29, 1524 — October 17, 1525 A. D.) to demand of Ismael the cession of those territories, the dowry promised him

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63. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 158.

64. Briggs : FERISHTA, III, p. 52.



at the time of his marriage with Ismael's sister. The battle raged furious and resulted in an overwhelming success to Bijapur, Burhān having barely escaped capture.

In the year 935 A. H. (beginning September 15, 1528 A. D.) Ismael once again inflicted a crushing blow to the invading forces of Burhān Nizām Shāh, who once again turned into his ally. The same year, Ismael married his sister Khoodeija to Alla-ood-Deen Imād Shāh, king of Bērar.

In this same year, Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt invading Ahmadnagar, Ismael sent ten lakhs of 'hoons' and six thousand horse to assist Burhan Nizām Shāh. With the return of these troops after the retreat of Bahādur Shāh, Ismael came to learn how Amīr Bārid was planning an attack on Bijapur. He had even tried to 'corrupt the fidelity of these troops with promises of reward. This incensed Ismael a great deal. Imād was already his ally by marriage. Burhan in obligation to Ismael, agreed to leave Bārid to his own resources. And Ismael marched against Bidar with a powerful army.

In this war Amir Bārid was taken prisoner. The capital city of Ahmudābad with its fortress of Bidar fell into the hands of the Ādil Shāh and the vast treasures of the Bahmuny royal family were laid before him. The Bārid's life was spared, Assud Khān becoming security for his fidelity. A week later, Ismael 'marched with his army to the south, attended by Alla-ood-Deen Imād and Ameer Bereed with their

forces. The Mahomedans met with no interruption to their progress. Rachore and Moodkul both surrendered by capitulation, after a siege of three months, after having been in possession of the infidels for seventeen years.' <sup>65</sup>

That both Nuniz and Ferishta depict differently the event of about the same time is easily gathered from the context. Mr. Sewell states that Barros by implication places this event subsequent to 1529 A. D. He refers to an attack on Ponda by three Hindu Chiefs, which led the inhabitants to seek help of the then Governor of Goa, Nuno da Cunha. Da Cunha was not Governor till 1529 A. D. 'At this time,' according to Barros, Amir Barid submitted to the Ādil Shāh. This evidently refers to the Ādil Shāh's capture of the Barid, noted above. <sup>66</sup>

In my opinion the phrase 'at this time' does not necessarily indicate a subsequence. It may stand as well for anteriority or coevality. In this context, Barros might have meant no more than that the action of the three Hindu Chiefs forced the inhabitants of Ponda to approach Da Cunha for help and that in the meantime, the Barid had surrendered to the Ādil Shāh. This latter event and the march on Rāichūr closely following it, might, therefore, have preceded Da Cunha's advent into Goa as its Governor.

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65. Briggs III, p. 66.

66. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE pp. 159-160.

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This apart, Ferishta himself sets the two limits in time for these important happenings. As is already described, Bārid drew the wrath of Ismael as the forces of Bahadur Shāh were disappearing into Gujarat after their invasion of the Dakhan. Now, Bahadur's march into the Dakhan occurred in September 1528.<sup>67</sup> The events relevant to our study followed. Ferishta states that the reduction of Raichūr and Mudkal belonged to a time preceding the second invasion of the Dakhan by Bahadur Shāh which took place directly the rainy season of 1529 was over.<sup>68</sup> He writes that 'Ismael Adil Shāh, who had vowed to refrain from wine till the reduction of these fortresses, was now induced to make a splendid festival, on which occasion he drank wine and gave full scope to his inclinations ..... These rejoicings continued for a whole month ..... At this period intelligence was received that Bahadur Shāh of Guzerat was again preparing to invade the Deccan; .....<sup>69</sup> Ismael's capture of Raichūr occurred while Bahadur's preparations were still on i. e. fairly anterior to the rainy season of the year 1529 A. D.

According to Ferishta, the fortress of Raichūr fell into the hands of the Hindus, as the Regency of Kamāl Khān at Bijapur drew to its end, i. e., about 1511-12 A. D. He states that Hindus retained it for seventeen years, before Ismael Adil Shāh wrested

67. Commissariat: HISTORY OF GUZERAT, p. 341.

68. *ibid*, p. 322; Bayley's GUJERAT, pp. 340-46.

69. Briggs, III, pp. 66-67.

it back. And this again brings the events under reference to about 1528—9 A. D.

Most probably these exploits ran into the first quarter of the year 1529 A. D. Kṛṣṇadēvarāya was still alive, ruling from Vijayanagara. We need not subscribe to the uncertainty that troubled Mr. Sewell, when he wrote "perhaps this matter ought to find place under the reign of Acyuta Rāya, but ..... it may have occurred before the death of Kṛṣṇa Deva." <sup>70</sup>

Mr. Sewell's doubt is due perhaps to what Ferishta describes as the reason of Ismael's easy victory over Raichūr, 'The affairs of the kingdom of Beejanuggur' writes the Historian 'had been lately thrown into confusion owing to the death of Hemraj to whom his son Ramraj had succeeded. Against this prince rebellions were excited by several Rāys, so that the Muhomadoyns met with no interruption to their progress.' <sup>71</sup> Ferishta's statement of affairs obtaining at Vijayanagara at this time, is accepted as accurate by Dr. N. Venkatarāmanayya, with a few modifications. "Hemraj whose death about 1530 A. D. threw the kingdom of Vijayanagara into confusion was Kṛṣṇarāya himself. Rāmarāja who is said to have succeeded him was not his son but son-in-law." <sup>72</sup>

70. FORGOTTEN EMPIRE p. 160, n. 3.

71. Briggs: FERISHTA III, p. 66.

72. Dr. N. Venkatarāmanayya: STUDIES, p. 21.



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These writers appear to have started with the conviction that a great monarch like Kṛṣṇarāya could not have been treated to such a fare by the Ādil Shah, whom he had all but crushed. Nuniz, however, ascribes these events to Kṛṣṇarāya's reign, though he gives them a different termination. If Raichūr were lost by Acyuta in the very first year of his reign, how was it Nuniz did not mention it at all? He had not a single good word to say of Acyutarāya. The first invasion of Vijayanagara territory by Bijapur, that Nuniz refers to, belongs to the year 1535 and to the reign of Ibrāhīm Ādil Shah. Had Acyuta suffered a defeat at the hands of Bijapur much earlier, Nuniz, with his positive dislike of Acyuta, would not have omitted to mention it.

Apart from this, there is another aspect of this question to note. The events narrated by Nuniz belong to the very last days of Kṛṣṇarāya. Ferishta's account likewise treats of this same period of time. From him, we learn that, the only opportunity for Ismael to attack Raichūr was immediately after the surrender of Amir Barid. This happened at the very end of 1528 or just about the beginning of 1529 A. D. Ismael gained Raichūr and while preparing to avenge this, Kṛṣṇarāya breathed his last.

This success of Ismael Ādil Shah finds an echo in a passage from Kalabhāgavata of Kōnerunātha (1549 A. D.). Appalarāja, the son of Āravīḥi Rāma, rāja Timma "opposed the combined forces of Sava (Ādil Shah) and Bārid at Kurakacerla, and defeating



them, entered the *swarga* by piercing through the orb of the sun." On this Dr. N. V. Ramanayya comments :— 'The date of the battle of Kurakacerla cannot be fixed at present. One point seems to connect the battle definitely with the siege of Rāichūr by Ismael Ādil Shāh in A. D. 1530. The Vijayanagara general is said to have perished while opposing the advance of the combined forces of Sava and Barid. Such a combination of the troops of these two Muhammadan chiefs occurred only once before 1549 A. D., and that was according to Ferishta, in 1530 A. D., when Amīr Barid was forced to assist his triumphant enemy, Ādil Shāh, in recapturing the fort of Rāichūr.' " That Ferishta was referring to a time earlier than 1530, by a year and more, is already demonstrated.

Small wonder, if this battle went against Vijayanagara. Nuniz clearly suggests that Kṛṣṇarāya had not expected any attack on Rāichūr and that Ismael took him by surprise. That this was the case may be gathered also from Ferishta. Stuck knee-deep in his war with Barid, Ismael could never have intended an invasion of the Rāichūr doab. His overwhelming success against Bidar, which was followed by Imād and Barid augmenting his military strength with their own contingents, the numerous factions consequent upon Kṛṣṇarāya's handling of the question of his succession, all these combined to inculcate in Ismael a desire to strike at Rāichūr. As Ferishta tells us, his march to Rāichūr took hardly a week. Appala-

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78. *ibid* p. 21 and note.

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rāja's valiant attempt to stem his advance was of no avail. Rāichūr once again passed into the power of Bijapur.

Kṛṣṇarāya took shame on himself. At the heels of all his resounding successes against the Moslems of the Dakhan came this stroke of ill luck, that stained his standing reputation of a conqueror. He was anxious to wipe it off at any cost. This time he would strike at Bijapur all along the border, as far west as Belgaum. But he was not to see the fulfilment of his ambition. In the midst of his preparations, death snatched him away. When the Rāya saw his end was drawing near, he made a will saying that "they should make king his brother Achetarao," and that "he should take Billgao, and should make war on the Ydalleao". "

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